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FOREWORD
Indecopi’s contribution to the economic growth of Peru is rooted in its institutionalism, which 
serves as the foundations of, among other aspects, the technical decisions issued since its 
establishment. In this regard and in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the institution, 
we believe it is important to share the essence of our job, through a number of publications 
describing the duties carried out by INDECOPI through each one of its decision-making 
bodies.  Our purpose is to present, in an educational way, the work we have performed during 
these 20 years to fulfill our mandate aimed at consumer protection, intellectual property, 
defense of free and fair competition, and developing quality infrastructure in our country.
These books have been articulated following educational guidelines and techniques and the 
contents of each volume of the collection have been structured in a standard manner.  Thus, 
we start with a theoretical framework which underpins the function entrusted to INDECOPI, 
developing fundamental concepts for each protected institution.  Next, we describe the 
legislative and jurisprudential milestones achieved during the Institute’s evolutionary 
process. 
Finally, as could be expected, we have furthermore set aside space to reflect on the lessons 
learned and to think into the future by moving towards a more proactive Indecopi, anticipating 
and providing the answers that our society and market need. 
At this moment, you have a copy of the book about Defense of Free Competition, in which 
Eduardo Quintana describes the important role that INDECOPI is playing and which included 
a study of the legislative evolution of Competition Law in Peru during these twenty years, 
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the major features determining behaviors criminalized by Legislative Decrees 701 and 1034, 
i.e. abuse of dominant position and horizontal/vertical cartel behaviors. The importance of 
integrating Competition Policy falls within the context of the economic growth of our country.
I take this opportunity to express our deepest gratitude to Eduardo Quintana and to the 
Technical Secretariat of the Commission for the Defense of Free Competition led by Miguel 
Angel Luque, and especially to David Fernández for his contribution with this work.
We hope you find this book useful and conveys, as intended, the extent of the work performed 
by Indecopi throughout these 20 years of technical and independent work serving the nation 
and the commitment of each one of the collaborators who created these pages, as part of the 
history we bring to you today.
Hebert Tassano Velaochaga
Chairman of the Board of Directors
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INTRODUCTION
Free competition is the best mechanism to encourage the efficient allocation of resources in 
the market.  This is due to the fact that, in order to earn consumers’ preference, suppliers 
lower their prices and improve the quality of their products.  As a result, consumers have 
more and better options to choose from.  For this reason, the defense of free competition is 
one of the most important public policies for the economic growth of a country.
In the twenty year of Indecopi, Peru’s Competition Policy has advanced significantly, reflecting 
the work of the Commission on Defense of Free Competition (CLC) and the Defense of 
Competition Specialized Chamber of the Tribunal (SALA) of Indecopi and the contribution of 
specialists, attorneys, and economists, who have provided academic insights after reviewing 
and critiquing the various elements of free competition.
Thus, for example, it is important to point out that, from its early years, CLC and SALA 
established important criteria for the analysis on the anticompetitive behaviors, among which 
are the per se rule recognition for the «hard core cartels» (a case against poultry companies), the 
use of indirect evidence (case against Rheem Peruana S.A. and Envases Metálicos S.A.), the 
liability of professional associations and colleges (case against the Chemical Pharmaceutical 
College of Peru), the rule of bare agreements and complementary agreements or «ancillary 
restraints doctrine» (case Civa), the definition of relevant market (case against Minsur), and 
the unjustified refusal to deal (case of the market of Santa Anita).
In recent years, CLC and SALA have consolidated their analysis, thereby solving large-scale 
cases within the framework of Legislative Degree 1034 (2008). Among the recent cases with 
highlighting: the Apeseg case (car insurance settlement), Backus (exclusivity contracts like 
abuse of dominant position), Medical oxygen (collusive tendering in health-care sector), 
Asetup (recommendation of passenger transportation prices), Carga Huaraz (settlement 
of prices and customer allocation in heavy cargo transportation market), and Cementos 
(concerted and unjustified refusal as a vertical cartel behavior). 
In this context, the goal of this book is to perform a thorough review the development of 
policy and jurisprudence on Competition Law in Peru, and to explain the major features that 
define the behaviors criminalized under Legislative Decree 1034, i.e., abuse of dominant 
position and horizontal/vertical cartel behaviors. 
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In Chapter I, we present a general framework of the application of competition laws.  First, 
we provide a description of the phenomenon of a competitive process and the conditions 
which maximize its efficient development across various markets, in addition to the concept 
of market power and the justifications for the existence of competition laws.  Next, we offer 
an account of Competition Law, defining the areas of action and the most important concepts 
of this field, in light of jurisprudence and scholarly papers both national and comparing with 
international experience.
In Chapter II, we provide an account of the evolution of the Peruvian legal system on free 
competition. In particular, we analyze the most important aspects of Legislative Decree 
701, the Law on the Elimination of Monopolistic, Controlling, and Restrictive Practices 
on Free Competition; and the current Legislative Decree 1034, Anti-competitive Behavior 
Suppression Law.
In Chapter III, we describe and analyze the most important assumptions on abuse of 
dominant position in light of CLC and SALA’s jurisprudence. Emphasis has been placed on 
the claims regarding unjustified refusal to deal, discrimination, and abuse of legal processes. 
In addition, a section is dedicated to the discussion on exploitative effect conducts. 
As can be observed, this book constitutes an exceptional opportunity to appreciate the 
importance and evolution of competition law and its implementation in Peru during these 
twenty years; and the way in which Competition Policy fits into Peru’s economic growth.
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the effort of Professor Eduardo Quintana, who, in 
concise and didactic language, addressed in this book a large number of issues related to the 
Peruvian Competition Law. 
Miguel Ángel Luque Oyarce
Technical Secretary
Free Competition Commission 2
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OBJECTIVES
The Free Competition volume aims at reviewing fundamental judicial–and economic– 
grounds of Competition Law, explaining doctrinal basis, and describing and commenting 
on a representative selection of the main decisions of Indecopi in this matter.  Since the 
prohibition of anticompetitive behaviors is the subject that has produced the largest legal and 
jurisprudential development in Peru, more attention is given to this topic of Competition Law.
In this sense, we analyze how Indecopi has carried out its duty to protect the process of 
competitiveness, ensuring that companies and economic agents do not unlawfully restrict 
competition in the market.  In particular, we evaluated and explained how Indecopi 
investigates and, when appropriate, sanctions unilateral behaviors of the most important 
companies in each economic sector, destined to illegally exclude competitors (acts of abuse of 
dominant position), such as coordinated strategies, through agreements, pacts, or contracts 
between competitors or economic agents to impede the flow of competitiveness (horizontal or 
vertical cartel behaviors.) 
In the same way, in this volume we analyze how Indecopi has benefited from the experience 
gained in investigating and sanctioning anticompetitive practices, not only to define effective 
analysis and evidence methodologies to facilitate their effort, but also to enrich the normative 
development process which led to the new law on this matter in force since 2008.  In this way, 
we assess the impact and contributions of Indecopi regarding the development of economic 
agents and the creation of new and more appropriate legal rules, which are a new starting 
point for its performance as an authority on the defense of free competition.
The regulations on defense and protection of free competition seek to 
prevent companies from concentrating market power for reasons other 
than greater efficiency and from unlawfully using the market power 
they possess.  In the same way, they seek to prevent market power from 
concentrating through mergers or acquisitions of companies as this 
generates a great risk for competitiveness and consumers’ well-being.

Theoretical Framework:
Areas of Competition Law
Chapter 1
Chapter 1 -Theoretical Framework: Areas of Competition Law
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In a market that functions under competitive conditions, the selling conditions (price, quantity, 
quality, and pre and post-sale services, etc.) can be determined as a result of the confluence 
of consumers and clients demand for products or services with the supply of goods from 
producers and traders. In other words, the economic agents interact in multiple deals and 
commercial negotiations, and through these they define the conditions for the sale of goods, 
without allowing producers, traders, or consumers to determine, in a unilateral fashion or by 
their own will. For this reason, it is often claimed that in a market where conditions of absolute 
competitiveness can be found, companies are “price-takers” due to the existing competition, 
each company must ensure that the conditions of their offer be sufficiently attractive for the 
buyers, who would otherwise have the option of buying from alternative suppliers1.
The previous situation is known as “perfect competition” and it requires that the following 
conditions be present in the market, so that no single company can be able to determine the 
conditions of the offer:
•	 Homogenous products. All of the offered goods must possess identical features 
or remarkably similar, so that consumers can identify them as homogenous goods 
independently of who supplies them and they do not have any established preferences 
to any of those goods. Consequently, the situation between products of any supplier is 
completely possible.
•		 A large number of suppliers and buyers. Purchases and sales occur between a large 
number of suppliers and customer, thus the amounts involved in each transaction are 
very small to affect market conditions.
•		 Perfect information. All participants in the market must have complete and symmetric 
information concerning the features and quality of the products, quantities produced, 
prices invoiced, among others. With these, consumers will always have timely and 
sufficient information to make a decision concerning the appropriate purchases.
•		 Absence of any significant entry barriers to the market. The possibility of entry and 
exit of companies to the market should be free. In other words, there should be no major 
obstacles or costs that inhibit the decision of any company or investor to enter a certain 
economic activity and almost immediately withdraw from the market, if considered 
appropriate for its interests. 
1 Sources about competitive markets and the effects of company behaviors can be found on the following: 
CARLTON, Dennis y PERLOFF, Geoffrey. (2000) Modern Industrial Organization. United States of 
America, Addison-Wesley, pp. 56-65. PEPALL, Lynne; RICHARDS, Danniel Jay, y NORMAN, George. 
(2006). Organización Industrial: Teoría y Prácticas Contemporáneas. México, Thomson, pp. 20-25. BLAIR, 
Roger y KASSERMAN, David. (2009). Antitrust Economics. New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-22.
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Nevertheless, markets do not function in absolute competitiveness or in a perfect competition 
due to the fact that the conditions previously mentioned do not make themselves present 
concurrently or completely in any real market. The offered goods differentiate themselves 
through quality, brands, or other features. The number of sellers and buyers is not so large 
that their transactions do not have an impact in the supplying conditions. The information 
available tends to not be imperfect, asymmetric or costly, and the markets tend to present 
different levels of barriers for entry and exit. Because of this, various circumstances exist in 
which companies find themselves able to set conditions of sale in a unilateral or in a jointly 
fashion, without the competition being an element that disciplines their behavior. In these 
situations it is noted that the companies rely in an important market power that allows them 
to neutralize or overcome the possibility of competition. 
The power of the market is usually defined as the capacity of a company to increase its prices 
above the prices of the competition (that is to say, the level that they would have if they 
confronted the effective competition of other companies in the market), without running the 
risk that a considerable amount of their customers transfer their needs to other companies 
that offer lower prices or better conditions. In plain economic terms, the power of the market 
is the capacity that companies have to set their prices above the marginal costs which would 
be the result of a perfect competition scenario. Nonetheless, under these conditions, every 
company has a certain degree of power in the market where the perfect competition does 
not exist. Because of this, it is important to identify how much power each company has 
over the market to evaluate if it can negatively impact the performance of the market or the 
competitive process2.
The issue with the competition policy lies in situations where the companies boast a significant 
market power that allows them to affect competition and damage the dynamics of the market. 
This has been defined in legal terms as monopolist power, a dominant position or substantial 
power, –or significant pull- in the market3.
2 BISHOP, Simon y WALKER, Mike. (2010). The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement. Great Britain, Sweet & Maxwell – Thomson Reuters, pp. 52-53. GUNNAR, Niels; JENKINS, Helen y 
KAVANAGH, James. (2011) Economics for Competition Lawyers. Great Britain, Oxford University Press, pp. 118-119.
3 The term poder monopólico (“monopolic power”) derives from the American antitrust legislation, whereas the 
concept of posición de dominio (“dominant position”) was originally used on the competition acts of the European 
Community. Peruvian competition acts use the same terminology of the European Community. The terms poder 
sustancial de mercado or peso significativo de mercado (both translated as “substancial market power”) are 
commonly used with the same connotation by agencies involved on regulated markets such as communications 
or electric energy (i.e., Office of Communications, British OFCOM, or the European Commission). 
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•	 Motivates the company to earn the consumers’ trust (for example, by producing 
a product at a lower cost than the competitors or to a similar cost but of a better 
quality) and to get the company to become the most-well-known or even the only 
one remaining on the market. This possibility of growth is the key incentive, so that 
the companies decide to compete with a view to becoming the most important in its 
respective market. This is a lawful source of market power.  
•	 A company can absorb, join, or take control over its competitors, or can be integrated 
with its input suppliers or marketing channels, remaining in a better position than the 
competitors, as a result of transactions for acquiring shares or companies, mergers, 
joint-ventures, etc. (business clusters). This is also a legitimate way of acquiring 
market power, but usually undergoes an evaluation by the Agency.
•	 Agency’s legal standards or decisions can reduce the possibility for new companies 
to enter into the market, making their market entry more costly or preventing its 
absolute entry by granting exclusive operations rights. The legal framework can 
grant particular degrees of protection from competition. Again, this is a lawful way to 
earn market power. 
•	 A company with market power can prolong this situation by invalidly preventing rivals 
from competing or by forcing them to compete on unequal terms. Also, two or more 
competitors	can	coordinate	their	behavior	to	achieve	artificial	market	power	that	they	
would not otherwise obtain separately, thus avoiding the risks of competition and 
acting as a monopoly. These ways to maintain or gain market power are illegitimate.
Economic
Efficiency
Concentration
of companies
Benefits
as per Law
Agent
Behavior
The companies can obtain that market power from various sources, some lawful while other 
are not. Among these typical sources of market power, one can find the following:
The regulations on defense and free competition protection do not prohibit or sanction the 
existence of substantial power market or that of a dominant position. Rather, seeking to 
prevent companies to focus on market power for reasons other than an increased efficiency, 
or that market power emerges through mergers or companies’ acquisitions, generating a 
serious risk for the competition and the well-being of the consumers. To this end, Competition 
Law has two typical implementation ways reflected on legal standards, which are known 
as “controlling behaviors” and “controlling structures”. This work is focused on controlling 
behaviors, given that it’s the one of greater legal and jurisprudential development in Peru.
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Competition Law 
1.1. Controlling Behaviors
Controlling behaviors are observed in regulations governing the prohibition of certain 
behaviors of economic agents in the market, which are deemed to invalidly constraint the 
competition to the detriment of the consumer, the competition process and, more generally, 
the market itself.
 
As a rule of thumb, controlling behaviors takes place after the forbidden behavior has been 
produced in the market. In other words, it works like an ex post assessment of the behaviors 
of the companies, identifying their compliance with the legal framework or otherwise.
Given this, the control of behaviors applies in cases where the market power is obtained by 
illegitimate means, as an outcome of the non-valid behaviors of the economic agents.
The regulations for controlling behaviors seek to impede and, if necessary, to 
penalize those restrictive practices of the competition that are performed by 
firms and economic agents.
These antitrust practices can be of two different types, as follows:
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 1.1.1. Abuse of dominant Position or Monopoly
By means of these actions a firm that holds significant market power or dominant position takes 
unfair advantage of said power or position in the market to benefit from it and impede the entry 
of new competitors and to hinder the continuance of those that are already operating in the 
market. Usually, these are illicit acts of one single firm; i.e. unilateral acts to illegally exclude 
competitors from the market. The Peruvian law calls these “acts of abuse of dominant position”.
 a. Relevant market
For a firm to commit such acts of abuse of dominant position it must hold such position in 
the market. To determine whether a firm has a dominant position, or not, it is necessary to 
define whether it can impose the conditions of purchase or sale, regardless of the reaction 
of its customers, suppliers or competitors. A firm may act in such way when customers and 
suppliers in the market in question have real alternatives other than the dominant firm, to buy 
the required goods or to sell the goods produced by them, respectively. Also, the dominant firm 
may behave in such way if the firm does not deal with competitors or, if there are competitors 
which are not strong enough to compete.
The key question to determine whether a company holds a dominant status in 
the market is: Of which market are we talking about?
That is why the concept of relevant market is used for it allows the identification of the 
market scope in which the investigated economic agent operates. In simple terms, the fewer 
alternative suppliers there are for a customer or client to use, the greater the probability that 
the investigated agent holds a dominant position, the existence of such alternative suppliers 
depends on the market in question4.
4 Read about the definition of the relevant market in, among others: BARRANTES, Roxana. (2012). “¿Algún 
Mercado es ajeno a un Economista? Notas sobre el Mercado Relevante pensando en las Telecomunicaciones”. In: 
Revista de Derecho Administrativo. No.10. Lima, Tarea Asociación Gráfica Educativa, pp. 61-72. CAMESASCA, 
Peter and VAN DEN BERGH, Roger. (2002). “Achilles Uncovered: Revisiting the European Commision’s 1997 
Market Definition Notice”. In: The Antitrust Bulletin. No. 47, Spring 2002. New York, Federal Legal Publications 
Inc.. COMISIÓN EUROPEA. (1997). Comunicación de la Comisión Relativa a la Definición de Mercado de 
Referencia a Efectos de la Normativa Comunitaria en Materia de Competencia. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Y 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. (2010). Horizontal Merger Guidelines. United States of America. FIGARI, 
Hugo; GÓMEZ, Hugo and ZÚÑIGA, Mario. (2005) “Hacia una Metodología para la Definición del Mercado 
Relevante y la Determinación de la Existencia de Posición de Dominio”. In: Revista de la Competencia y la 
Propiedad Intelectual. Lima, Indecopi, pp. 153-186. LANDES, William y POSNER, Richard. (2003). “El poder 
de mercado en los casos de Libre Competencia”. In: Ius et Veritas. No. 26. Lima, Tarea Gráfica Educativa, 
pp. 136-172. RUIZ, Gonzalo. (2000). “Definición de Mercado Relevante y Políticas de Competencia”. In: 
Thémis. No. 41. Lima, pp. 297-310. WERDEN, Gregory. (1990). “Four Suggestions on Market Delineation”. 
In: Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper. United States, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division. 
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The idea of defining a relevant market is to assess whether there are, or not, alternatives for 
the customer or client; or, in other words, if the customer or client is “captive” of its usual 
supplier. If the answer is yes, then one may conclude that such supplier has a dominant 
position.
The concept of relevant market is not equal to the concept of economic market in classical 
terms. The economic market, whether it is understood as the place where buyers and sellers 
do business or as the exchange mechanism through which such transactions are carried out, 
ends up being the confluence of the supply and demand of goods or products, individually 
or as a group. The relevant market is the area where the exercise of substantial market 
power affects the competition; i.e. when a firm may impose sales conditions – such as price 
increases or constraints to the production – because there are no other alternatives for the 
buyer, whether in terms of substitutes or additional suppliers.
The extent of the relevant market will depend upon how much chance is there for the buyer 
or consumer to purchase other goods in replacement of the one offered by its supplier and the 
location of other suppliers who can offer the same product or its substitutes. The less there are 
alternatives in terms of substitutes or additional suppliers, the smaller the relevant market is, 
and vice versa. Typically, a relevant market is defined by combining two dimensions: product 
and geography.
Below, the scopes of the relevant market concept used by the European Community and the 
United States are defined.
Chart N° 1
Scopes of the relevant market concept used by the European Community 
and the United States of America 
European Community United States of America
“The main purpose of market definition is to identify 
in a systematic way the competitive constraints that 
the undertakings involved face from the competition 
standpoint. The objective of defining a market in both its 
product and geographic dimension is to identify those 
actual competitors of the undertakings involved that are 
capable of constraining those undertakings’ behavior 
and of preventing them from behaving independently of 
effective competitive pressure”.
“Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution 
factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and willingness to 
substitute away from one product to another in response 
to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change 
such as a reduction in product quality or service. The 
responsive actions of suppliers are also important in 
competitive analysis. (…)
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European Community United States of America
One way of making this determination can be viewed as a 
speculative experiment, postulating a hypothetical small, 
lasting change in relative prices and evaluating the likely 
reactions of customers to that increase”.
“Geographic market (...) the Commission will identify 
possible obstacles and barriers isolating companies 
located in a given area from the competitive pressure of 
companies located outside that area, so as to determine 
the precise degree of market interpenetration at national, 
European or global level”.5
Customers often confront a range of possible substitutes 
for the products of the merging firms. Some substitutes 
may be closer, and others more distant, either 
geographically or in terms of product attributes and 
perceptions.”6
In Peru, the scope of the relevant market is specifically defined by the law in force, as follows:
“Article 6. - Relevant market
6.1. The relevant market consists of the product market and geographic market.
6.2. The relevant product market is, in general, any good or service subject matter of the 
investigated behavior and its substitutes. For the substitution analysis, the competition 
authority shall evaluate, among other factors, the preferences of the customers or clients; 
the features, uses and prices of potential substitutes, and the technological possibilities 
and the time required for the replacement.
6.3. The relevant geographic market is the set of geographical areas where alternative 
sources of the relevant product supply are located. To determine supply alternatives, 
the competition authority shall assess, among other factors, transportation costs and 
existing trade barriers.”7
As can be seen, the scope of the relevant market as defined by Peruvian law largely covers the 
existing methodologies, in other words, it is a fairly general form of analysis. The important 
thing here is to follow according to the analysis stages’ order – first analyzing the relevant 
product and then just move into the geographical scope, as explained in the following graph:
5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. (1997). Op. Cit.
6 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. (2010). Op. Cit. Free translation.
7 Legislative Decree 1034.
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Graph N° 2
Steps to Relevant Market Definition
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Therefore, the identification of a dominant position will require, in each particular case, the 
evaluation of the relevant market where the company being accused of committing abuse of 
dominant position operates.
For this, it is vital to first identify which are those goods required by a client or consumer who 
is alleging the existence of abuse of dominant position (in a particular procedure this means 
the identification of which is the good subject matter of the investigation). This involves 
defining the needs that the customer seeks to satisfy with the acquired good so as to identify, 
based on those needs, which may be those goods that can be alternatively purchased as a 
substitute of the product that is currently used to satisfy such needs.  At this point it should 
be noted that the degree of substitution between the goods or services must be evaluated 
carefully, as some may be better substitutes than others due to the characteristics of the goods 
(quality, components, functions, etc...) the costs for obtaining them or their prices. Based on 
these aspects, some goods will be included as substitutes and others will be discarded. The 
goods identified (the good subject matter of the investigation plus its substitutes) are grouped 
and turned into the relevant product.
Then, the companies that can offer any of the goods that are considered relevant within the 
identified group must be identified, whether they are within the same geographic area as the 
buyer’s local supplier, or elsewhere. What is important here is to identify whether the companies 
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that sell or can sell the relevant product to the purchaser are in real capacity to turn into alternative 
suppliers of the regular supplier. For this, it is important to take into account the different costs or 
the time involved for the transfer of goods offered by these suppliers, in order to identify whether 
the buyer will get these goods in conditions similar to those offered by the usual supplier. Thus, 
alternative suppliers will be included or excluded according to whether the buyer can acquire 
the goods offered by them in equivalent terms, or not. This is done is to identify the group of 
suppliers that can truly be considered as alternatives. Finally, the geographic market is defined 
considering the areas where these alternative suppliers are located.
Graph N° 3
Definition of the geographic market of alternative suppliers
Alternative
Sources
X      =       Y      +       Z      +      W
Area M Area N Area O
a, b, c d, e f, g, h
Area M
Substitute
Product
Reference
Product
Geographic Market
Relevant Product
In the chart above, the relevant market has been determined as areas M-N-O (geographic 
market) in which goods X-Y-Z-W (relevant product) are traded; depending on such relevant 
market one may only define the existence of a dominant position.
 b. Dominant Position 
To identify the existence of a dominant position in the relevant market already defined, there 
are several analysis tools that for methodological purposes can be divided into two groups. 
On one hand, the tools to evaluate the structure of the market and its participants at the 
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time of the complaint (actual competition); and on the other hand, tools for assessing market 
dynamics and potential newcomers (potential competition).8
The actual competition analysis seeks to identify which is the specific gravity of the defendant 
in the relevant market facing other participants, and also to know how competitive the market 
is in global terms. For this, two main tools are used: the assessment of the market share and 
the measurement of market concentration index.
In terms of market shares, all companies that have been identified as relevant market 
participants should be considered i.e., all suppliers alternative to the defendant. The market 
share allocation can be made by considering various calculation factors, such as the production 
installed capacity of each company, the units or volumes effectively produced or sold by the 
companies, the value of the sales income, etc.
The measurement typically used to calculate market shares is the number of units sold, i.e., 
how much can a company is able to place on the market, as this is an indicator of how 
much such products are accepted by customers. In some cases, it is recommended to use 
earned income as measurement because they turn out to be a better indicator of the level 
of customer loyalty towards the products of a company and, thus, of their potential ability to 
enforce the terms of sale. It is noted that revenues are better for measurement purposes, for 
example, when it comes to brand products the number of units sold does not always reflect 
the relevance of the mark.
It is important to note that market share is a strong indicator but should not be taken as the 
defining element of dominant position existence. In other words, if the defendant has recorded 
a high market share – for example 55% – this should be considered as indicative of its relevance 
in the market, but should not determine by itself the existence of a dominant position.
8 Read about the identification of dominant position in, among others : DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2010). Op. Cit. FERNÁNDEZ, Cani. (2006) “Cuota de Mercado y 
Poder de Mercado”. In: MARTÍNEZ LAGE, Santiago and PETITBÒ JUAN, Amadeo. (Directores). (2006). 
El Abuso de la Posición de Dominio. Madrid, Marcial Pons, pp. 61-74. FIGARI, Hugo; GÓMEZ, Hugo y 
ZÚÑIGA, Mario. (2005). Op. Cit., pp. 153-186. GUTIÉRREZ, Inmaculada and PADILLA, Jorge. (2006). “Una 
Racionalización Económica del Concepto de Posición de Dominio”. In: MARTÍNEZ LAGE, Santiago and 
PETITBÒ JUAN, Amadeo. (Directores). (2006). El Abuso de la Posición de Dominio. Madrid, Marcial Pons, 
pp. 15-31. LANDES, William and POSNER, Richard. (2003). Op. Cit, pp. 136-172. Chapters “Barreras a la 
entrada y estrategia competitiva” and “Empresas dominantes” de TARJIZÁN, Jorge and PAREDES, Ricardo. 
(2001). Organización Industrial para la Estrategia Empresarial. Santiago de Chile, Prentice Hall, pp. 73-92 
and 247-257. Also read the Annex “Barriers to Entry” in: WORLD BANK – OECD. (1998). A Framework for the 
Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy. Washington, WORLD BANK – OECD, pp.101-123.
Chapter 2 - Legislative Development in Peru
Free Competition24
In addition to the above, the market share of the defendant should always be compared 
against the market share of other companies that are in the relevant market. If the defendant 
has a 45% share and the nearest competitor has 40%, the high share of the former does not 
necessarily gives the defendant the freedom to impose the terms of sale in the market because 
the latter is comparable and may discipline the behavior of the defendant.
Finally, it is advisable to carry out the market share assessment in the appropriate timing so 
as to take into account whether the market is stable and / or shows a constant high share of 
the defendant for several years.
On the other hand, the market concentration index is a tool to measure the conditions of 
the competition in the market as a whole and not to evaluate the relevance of defendant as 
happens with the market shares. In this case, the market is considered to be less competitive 
when there is a higher degree of concentration and vice versa.
Existing methodologies for measuring market concentration are varied9, but the one that 
is mostly used is called Hirschman - Herfindahl Index (HHI). This index is based on the 
shares of the companies included in the relevant market and is represented by the sum of the 
squares of such shares10.
The relationship between the HHI value and the degree of competition is set forth under the 
following terms:
Chart N° 2
Relationship between the HHI value and the degree of concentration  
HHI Index Degree of market concentration
Less than 1 500 Not concentrated
Between 1 500 and 2 500 Moderate concentration
Above a 2 500 Highly concentrated
 
9 For example, the so called CR4 that was previously used considering the top four companies 
in the market, the “Dominance Index” created in Mexico, the entropy index, among others. 
10 If there were five companies in the relevant market, each one with a 20% share, the HHI would be 2.000 
(the addition of the 5 times 400). Evidently, the index is increased or reduced depending on the number of 
companies and the share each one has. If there were ten companies with a 10% share each, the IHH would 
be 1.000. In an extreme case, where there is just one company with a 100% share, the IHH would be 10.000.
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As such, the competition conditions will be considered greater when the IHH indicates that 
it is not a concentrated market or, at least, when it is a moderately concentrated market, and 
it will be lower in highly concentrated markets.
If the actual competition analysis shows that a company has a considerable market share 
without the participation of other strong competitors in a highly concentrated market, one 
can consider that there is a higher probability of it holding a dominant position. However, the 
actual competition analysis should not be considered sufficient to conclude that the defendant 
holds a dominant position. Rather, it will be necessary to supplement it with the analysis of 
potential competition.
Graph N° 4
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The potential competition analysis seeks to identify whether the behavior 
of the agents acting in the relevant market and, in particular, the behavior 
of the defendant will be disciplined by the competition risk that new 
competitors may bring along when entering into the market. 
The entry of new market players depends on the costs and time involved or, in broader terms, 
the access conditions that may inhibit or prevent the decision of entry of new competitors.
Such access conditions are analyzed as market entry barriers, which may have different 
backgrounds:
b.1.  Legal
The government influences and / or determines the possibility of players entering into 
the market through legal or administrative decisions, whether intentionally or otherwise. 
Legal barriers may constraint the entry or continuation of players in the market in two ways:
• Explicit: By setting constraints to the entry of companies, such as special licenses or 
permits to operate involving requirements that are quite difficult or costly to fulfill. 
Otherwise, the government may ask for requirements that are not expensive but 
which take too much time to obtain, thus delaying its entry. Regulations affecting 
the use of certain goods may also restrict the entry; thus, area restrictions may 
prevent new firms from using the best locations, and the labor obligations may 
force firms to hire workers with accreditations which are not the ones needed. 
International trade restrictions are another classic example of such barriers 
that prevent the entry of foreign goods through tariffs or non-tariff measures.
•	 Implicit: By regulations adopted for reasons unrelated to market entry or competition 
but which, in the end, constraint the entry. For example, environmental protection 
regulations, even if the government imposes the same costs to all businesses, 
it can reduce the expected entry of businesses and turn it into a less attractive 
activity. Also, these rules may favor established companies facing potential interests 
seeking to enter into the market if, for example, they are forced to immediately 
fulfill the obligations set forth under such regulations, while granting longer 
terms to established firms (thereby generating an absolute advantage in costs).
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b.2. Economic and structural
Characteristics specific to the economic activity involved in each relevant market 
determine whether it will more or less difficult to enter into the market. By rule of 
thumb, these are linked to necessary investments with a sunk cost nature specific of 
the economic activity to be performed, which cannot be recovered if the firm decides 
to leave the market immediately. The most extreme example of structural barrier is 
that of natural monopolies. Here, it is more efficient to have one only supplier in the 
market (i.e., what is natural is to have a monopoly) and the entry of new suppliers 
to compete with the already established is unprofitable11. Many economic activities 
have major investment components that are qualified as sunk costs, not only in terms 
of major infrastructure of specific use for the activity (rail infrastructure), but also of 
investments that are not always tangible (advertising costs, improving knowledge 
and research, etc.). Also, economic barriers are created when there are absolute 
advantages in derived costs; for example, access to very privileged resources that 
others do not enjoy.
 b.3. Strategic
This type of barrier is originated from the behavior of firms already established in the 
market, and serve as a deterrent to potential newcomers. It can be seen in business 
strategies, for example: sales conditions fixed by firms, such as sales with prices 
below cost, sprawl of excessive production capacity compared to regular demand 
needs, policies on “hoarding marks”, etc. Similarly, it may occur through contractual 
policies, such as holding numerous exclusive distribution relationships with points of 
sale, among others.
The assessment of market entry barriers for purposes of identifying a dominant position does 
not seeks to make an evaluative judgment on such barriers but rather determine whether 
these exist and how broad these are, in order to know if they make the market less competitive 
and, therefore, if there may be a company with a dominant position.
11 This happens, for example, in cases such as that of the water and sewage utility company where to have a 
second operator entering into the market, duplicating the entire infrastructure network already deployed is not 
efficient. The characteristics inherent to such activity and the investment involved make it impossible for new 
players to compete. In this case, the existing economic or structural barrier is so high that it absolutely protects 
the operator against the competition and, therefore, allows for such operator to hold a dominant position.
Chapter 1 -Theoretical Framework: Areas of Competition Law
Free Competition28
The existence of a company with a large share in a highly concentrated market can be played 
down if the analysis of market access barriers shows that these are low or reduced and, 
consequently, there is a considerable possibility of potential competition. Conversely, if the 
market is found to have high entry barriers, it would confirm the actual competition analysis 
and the dominant position of the company.
Finally, the assessment of the so called purchasing power is usually added to the dominant 
position analysis. In this aspect, the subject of analysis is if buyers have sufficient capabilities 
to offset the decisions of the defendant and that is why it is coined as purchasing power. In 
particular, it assesses whether the purchaser have the capability to concentrate the demand 
and negotiate jointly with the allegedly dominant supplier; whether – given its characteristics 
and power– the purchaser is in a position to vertically merge with a competitor of the 
defendant, and even whether the purchaser can acquire any of these competitors to replace 
the need to purchase from the allegedly dominant supplier.
As can be observed in the following quotation, the definition of dominant position contained 
in the Peruvian law largely reflects the method of analysis described:
“Article 7. – Market dominant position
7.1. Any economic agent enjoys a dominant position in a relevant market when it has 
the ability to constraint, affect or substantially distort the supply and demand conditions 
in said market preventing its competitors, suppliers or customers from offsetting – now 
or in the foreseeable future – such possibility, due to factors such as:
a) Strong participation in the relevant market.
b) The supply and demand characteristics of the goods or services.
c) The technological development or services involved.
d) The access of competitors to financing and supply sources, as well as distribution 
networks.
e) The existence of legal, economic or strategic barriers to enter into the market.
f) The existence of suppliers, customers or competitors and their negotiating power.
7.2. The mere holding of a dominant position does not constitute an unlawful behavior.” 12
An important point to note is that the law expressly provides that the existence of a dominant 
position is not unlawful; therefore it is necessary to identify an act of abuse of dominant 
position to breach the law.
12 Legislative Decree 1034.
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c. Abuse of dominant position
Regarding the acts of abuse of dominant position, without detriment to the detailed analysis 
that will be done later, here some important distinctions have to be made so as to understand 
the evolution that has had the interpretation of the type of abusive acts forbidden by the 
Peruvian law13. 
These acts of abuse of dominant position are classified into two big categories:
13 Read about the abuse of dominant position in, among others: ALFARO ÁGUILA-REAL, Jesús. (2006). 
“Delimitación de la Noción de Abuso de una Posición de Dominio”. In: MARTÍNEZ LAGE, Santiago 
and PETITBÒ JUAN, Amadeo. (Directores). (2006). El Abuso de la Posición de Dominio. Madrid, Marcial 
Pons, pp. 193-226. BULLARD, Alfredo. (1997) “¿Dejar competir o no dejar competir? He ahí el dilema. Las 
prácticas predatorias y el abuso de posición de dominio”. In: Themis. No. 36. Lima. Forma e Imagen, pp. 
65-89. EUROPEAN COMMISSION – DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF COMPETITION. (2005). Competition 
discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses. Brussels. European 
Commission. QUINTANA, Eduardo and VILLARÁN, Lucía. (2008). “Sobre la prohibición de abuso de posición 
de dominio sin necesidad de probar relación de competencia”. In: Derecho & Sociedad. No. 31. Lima, Editora y 
Comercializadora Cartolan, pp. 318-319. REY, GUAL, HEWITT, PERROT, POLO, SCHMIDT & STENBACKA. 
(2006). “Un Enfoque Económico del Artículo 82”. En: MARTÍNEZ LAGE, Santiago and PETITBÒ JUAN, 
Amadeo. (Directores). (2006). El Abuso de la Posición de Dominio. Madrid, Marcial Pons, pp. 99-154.
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•	 Exploitative abuse, and
•	 Exclusionary abuse.
On this subject Indecopi’s Court has pointed out the following:
“19. An exclusionary practice is considered as one whose effects mainly impacts on 
the market structure, or that is aimed at strengthening the market power of a dominant 
position by putting in a disadvantageous position other competitors.  For example, 
by refusing to hire or denying the access to key facilities.  On the other hand, the 
exploitative abuse involves the exploitation or the exercise of market power, having a 
direct impact on the consumers or suppliers, for example by imposing ‘excessive’ prices 
(sales or purchase) or unreasonable conditions and terms.”14
The Technical Secretariat of the Commission for the Defense of Free Competition of Indecopi 
states the following about each of the categories of abuse of dominant position:
“24. Exclusionary behaviors have the real or potential effect of harming the competition 
for the benefit of the dominant position and to the detriment of the current or potential, 
direct or indirect competitors.  It is important to mention that these are conducts that 
can affect the dominant’s competitors due to reasons different from having a greater 
economic efficiency. The exclusionary behaviors produce a direct impact on the 
competitive process and an indirect impact on the welfare of consumers, because by 
reducing the level of competition (direct effect), the options available for the consumers 
are also reduced (indirect effect). Exclusionary behaviors may be the refusal to make a 
deal, price discrimination, tied sales, predatory pricing, etc.
25. Exploitative behaviors consist of the direct exercise of market power by the dominant 
agent.  By having such behavior, the economic agent that enjoys a dominant position 
imposes on his clients or suppliers certain conditions that allow him to gain better 
economic benefits (conditions different from those that he would have been able to 
impose otherwise). Exploitative conducts does not only affect the competitive process 
but could also energize it by encouraging the entry of new competitors attracted 
by the profits earned by the dominant agent.  ‘Excessive prices’ and ‘exploitative 
discrimination’ are examples of exploitative conducts.15
14 Resolution 0708-2011/CS1-INDECOPI, dated March 16, 2011. Please note that the cited Resolution refers to 
the foot note of the following references: GOYDER, D.G. (2003). EC Competition Law. Great Britain, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 284-285. MOTTA, Massimo & DE STREEL, Alexandre. (2003). Exploitative and Exclusionary 
Excesive Prices in EU Law. In: http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Motta/Papers/ExcessivePrices18122003.pdf. (Visited on 
September 23, 2012).
15 Resolution 005-2010/ST-CLC-INDECOPI, dated April 15, 2010.
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In addition to the above, two types of exclusionary abuse must be distinguished depending 
on how its antitrust effects impacts on a direct or indirect competitor of the dominant firm or 
a company that is in disadvantage in front of its competitors but that does not compete with 
the dominant firm. In this case the distinction is between: 
•	 Acts of exclusionary abuse with a competition relationship, and
•	 Acts of exclusionary abuse without a competition relationship or arbitraries.
The acts of abuse with a competition relationship mean that the behavior of the dominant 
company harms its competitors, whether in the same market where it operates or competitors 
of firms belonging to its same economic group that operates in related markets. In such way, 
the dominant company acts with the intention of excluding its direct competitors or indirect 
competitors in related markets because it has incentives to harm them as it will give to the 
dominant the benefit of reducing or eliminating the competition.16
Graph N° 6
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16 QUINTANA, Eduardo and VILLARÁN, Lucía. (2008). Op.Cit., pp. 318-319.
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The acts of exclusionary abuse without a competition relationship means that the dominant 
company limits the competition in related markets, affecting one or more firms in face of 
its competitors yet the dominant company does not compete, anyway, against the affected 
companies, not even through companies of its same economic group. In this case, the 
dominant company does not operate with the intention of limiting the competition because 
it does not gain any competitive benefits when affecting a company against its competitors. 
However, the dominant company can achieve other type of benefit through that behavior, 
such as an economic benefit.  In this situation, restrictive effects on the competition can be 
generated because some competitors are in disadvantage in front of others as a consequence 
of the performance of the dominant company, but the latter does not have antitrust incentives, 
therefore these acts are also known as arbitrary abuse.
  
Graph N° 7
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It should be pointed out that the cases of exclusionary abuse without a competition relationship 
are not equivalent to acts of exploitative abuse because in the former exclusionary effects do 
occur affecting the competition process.17
17 Idem.
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1.1.2. Collusion practices 
Collusion practices are behaviors coordinated between competing agents or agents that 
participate in different stages of the productive or commercialization processes and by such 
coordination they stop acting independently between them and start to act in collusion according 
to their agreement or covenants therefore causing an undue restriction on competition.
Unlike what happens in acts of abuse of dominant position which are –as a rule of thumb– 
unilateral acts, collusion practices always involve two or more agents.  Also, these agents 
must necessarily be independent; they should have the capacity to take business and 
entrepreneurial decisions on their own account and risk, because this is the only way they 
can choose not to behave independently through a collusion act.  That is why if companies 
are not independent – either because they belong to the same economic group or for some 
other reason – they cannot act with the freedom to decide and therefore they will not fulfill 
the basic premise to fall into illegal collusion practices.
Collusion practices are classified as horizontal or vertical depending on the type of agent that 
participates.
 a. Collusion Practices between competitors
The horizontal collusion practices occur between two or more agents that compete between 
them, this means between companies that produce and/or sell goods that are alternative (for 
example, goods that have the same purpose but are from different brands). Therefore, it is 
pointed out that these practices involve companies that are at the same level of the productive 
or commercialization chain.18
18 Read about collusion Practices between competitors in: COMISIÓN EUROPEA. (2001). Directrices sobre la 
Aplicabilidad del Artículo 81 del Tratado CE a los Acuerdos de Cooperación Horizontal. FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. (2000). Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among 
Competitors. GALÁN CORONA, Eduardo. (1977). Acuerdos Restrictivos de la Competencia. Madrid, Editorial 
Montecorvo. IVALDI, JULLIEN, REY et al. (2003). The Economics of Tacit Collusion (Final Report for DG 
Competition, European Commission). In: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_
of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf  (visited on September 23, 2012). MOTTA, Massimo. (2009). “Cartels in the European 
Union: Economics, Law, Practice”. In: VIVES, Xavier. (Editor). Competition Policy in the EU, Fifty Years on 
from the Treaty of Rome. Great Britain., Oxford University Press, pp. 95-134. Phlips, Louis. (1995). Competition 
Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective, Glasgow, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-20. QUINTANA, Eduardo. 
(2011b). “La idoneidad de los carteles y su prohibición absoluta o per se". In: Diálogo con la Jurisprudencia. No. 
152. Lima, Imprenta Editorial El Buho, pp. 329-346. VELASCO, Luis. (2005). “Acuerdos, decisiones colectivas 
y prácticas concertadas”. In: Derecho Europeo de la Competencia: Antitrust e Intervenciones Públicas. España, 
Lex Nova, pp. 55-101.    
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In this case, is about behaviors that result from the agreement between two or more competitors 
who individually do not have substantial market power, but through collusion they can have 
it artificially, and by stopping the competition against each other they behave as a monopoly.
For example, think about an agreement in which competitors stop fixing 
their price individually and start doing so together, or an agreement through 
which competitors assign to each other an area and promise not to interfere 
in each other’s area.
In such situations, the most serious outcome of collusion practices between competitors is 
the occurrence of effects similar to that of a monopoly, both in terms of profitability for the 
participants of the cartel, as well as in terms of detriment to consumers.  When firms eliminate 
the competition risk to take advantage of the collusion, they can obtain undue benefits greater 
than the profits that could have been achieved in a competition situation (or as economists 
say, they can obtain monopolistic profits).19
 
When the only purpose of collusion practices is to affect the market supply conditions, 
generally harming effects such as the following occurs:
 
•	 Affect the buyer or consumer when allowing them to be charged with higher prices or by 
imposing less beneficial conditions than those which take precedence in a competitive 
market.
•	 Deprive the buyer or consumer of the possibility to choose between different options of 
price, quality and other sales conditions.
•	 Limit the incentives of efficiency and innovation of the companies participating in the 
collusion, because by eliminating the competition risk they also eliminate the desire to 
win over the rivals.
As these are practices by which competitors make a “fraud” to the market because they stop 
competing and start to artificially behave as a single agent in order to obtain invalid benefits, 
the legal treatment for these behaviors is often quite dramatic.
19 Should be taken into account for these effects that usually collusion do not seek to exclude competitors from 
the market – with the notable exception of boycotts – but rather to ensure the participation of the majority or all 
of the companies operating in the market , in order to effectively manipulate the formation of prices and other 
conditions of the offer.
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The most popular methods of collusion practices between competitors are agreements and 
the so-called concerted practices or pacts20.  Additionally, some legal frameworks also include 
decisions and recommendations within the modalities of collusion practices, like happens in 
the Peruvian law which we will review later.
Typically, the agreement is a meeting of the minds (through a contract, agreement, pact, etc.) 
by which competitors make a commitment to behave under a common action plan, in order 
to restrict the competition between them so as to avoid the risks that they may have to face 
if they have to fight in the market to win preference of the consumers.  For the companies 
participating, the agreement can be done orally or in writing and could be binding effect or 
not. Therefore, its enforceability can occur through mechanisms acknowledged by the legal 
system or simply through supervision and private sanction measures.21
From that, it is inferred that a commitment that is only morally binding for companies – 
often called gentleman’s agreement or pact (in which there is an “Honorable commitment of 
keeping one’s word”22), could be classified as an illegal agreement23. Usually, the existence of 
such agreements is proven by direct evidence.
Concerted practices occur when competitors consciously act in a coordinated fashion in the 
market, and such form of action cannot be explained by the characteristics and conditions 
of the market, but rather by considering that there has been a connection or link between 
those involved. What is important in this type of behavior is to reliably demonstrate that 
the behaviors of the competitors do not respond to the natural conditions of the market, but 
20 It should be noted that the terms “acuerdo” and “concertación” match the English definition of “agreement” 
or “combination”, and “conspiracy” or “collusion”; on this matter please read: KHEMANI, Shiam y SHAPIRO, 
Daniel. (1996). Glosario de Términos Relativos a la Economía de las Organizaciones Industriales y a las Leyes 
sobre Competencia. World Bank, pp. 2, 7-9 and 14. 
21 Should be noted that if it clearly is an antitrust agreement it will be an illegal commitment and, therefore the 
enforceability of the agreement cannot be supported by mechanisms recognized by the legal system.  That is, 
if competitors agreed to fix prices between them, replacing the functions of the market, then none of them will 
pretend to make this agreement enforceable before the Judiciary or any arbitration court.   
22 The quoted phrase belongs to VELASCO, Luis Antonio. (2005). “Acuerdos, Decisiones Colectivas y Prácticas 
Concertadas”. In: Derecho Europeo de la Competencia: Antitrust e Intervenciones Públicas. España, Lex Nova, 
p. 62.  
23 Indecopi has a broad concept of what constitutes an agreement between competitors and has shown this in 
numerous decisions. As an example, it can be seen in Resolution 036-2004-INDECOPI/CLC, of June 23, 2004: “51. 
The term “agreement” is not limited to binding agreements by law. It only suffices that one of the parties voluntarily 
commits to limit its freedom of action with regards to the other. Therefore, only a morally binding commitment can be 
an 'agreement'. There may be, in fact, agreements that do not intended to legally bind the parties, but that commits 
the word or the credibility of those who made the agreement. They are known as ‘gentleman’s agreements’.” 
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that there has been some type of coordination aimed at not to competing against each other. 
The existence of concerted practices must be demonstrated through indirect evidence since 
there is no direct prove or it may never be found (because offenders usually try to disappear 
it).  Therefore, this is demonstrated by analyzing the behavior or coordinated action of the 
offenders in the market (usually called “parallelism”) and other elements of judgment or 
findings that indirectly and through valid inferences, lead to the conclusion that there was a 
meeting of the minds between competitors (indirect evidence)24.
The decisions are agreements adopted inside associations or trade unions of competing 
companies, which are binding for the members and it objective is to limit the competition 
between them.  From Indecopi’s point of view, such decisions have the following characteristics:
 “54. The decision to associate can be adopted by the majority of the membership of any 
association or union (general assembly of associates, board of directors, committees, 
etc.) or may derive from an statement of a member of the organization (president, 
general manager, etc.).
55. It is important to analyze the collusion decisions taken through unions belonging to an 
association.  Because unions reach agreements depending on the quorum and majority, 
it will be sufficient for the agreement to be approved in a valid session (the quorum set 
forth in the bylaws) and by its majority to consider that it has been agreed by all members, 
even if some did not attend the meeting. Absent members are considered exempt of 
responsibility only if they timely informed their opposition to such agreement but did not 
execute it.  The silence of the attendees means the tacit acceptance of the agreement 
adopted by the union if they carry out acts that reflect the agreement of collusion.
(…)
57. On that sequence of ideas, it is valid to affirm that what differentiates the agreement 
from the decision is that in the agreement all of them give their consent, while in the 
decision it may happen that the companies obliged to comply with it may not have 
even given their express consent, and can even oppose to it.  In the last case, the 
24 Indecopi has issued several pronouncements recognizing these characteristics in the concerted practices, for 
example: Resolution 036-2004-INDECOPI/CLC, of June 23, 2004: "66. In this regard, the concerted practice, 
although it does not contain all elements of the arrangement, evidences a coordination observed by the 
participants’ behavior, which can lead to competition conditions not expected by market characteristics.
 (...) 68. A concerted practice must be tested properly, although it may suffice to proof assumptions. Indeed, the 
evidence of concerted practices is normally done by relying on presumptions and signs about their existence, 
based primarily on the fact that the behavior of firms in the market would be inexplicable if it would not be for 
some sort of agreement between them.”
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responsible parties will be all but the ones that expressly opposed to it and did not 
execute the agreement.
58. The agreement reached within the framework of an organization can be analyzed 
as decisions of that organization or as agreements between its members.  This is to 
prevent partners from avoiding their collusive responsibilities by transferring the formal 
authorship onto the collective entity. This way, the decision of a group of companies is 
presumed to be multilateral on the fact that it groups several companies, even though 
it is supposed to be a unilateral act of one single legal entity.
(…)
60.  As seen, when it comes to a group of companies, the agreements and decisions 
reached are both sides of the same coin.  If the assembly of associates approves the 
prices there are going to charge by each associated company, such act is an agreement 
of the companies and a decision of the association. In both cases it is a collusion 
practice classified as administrative offense”.25
Finally, also according to Indecopi, recommendations have the following characteristics 
when compared to decisions:
“53.  The understandings adopted by group of companies or corporations for purposes 
or effects that are contrary to the competition constitute decisions if such are binding, 
or recommendations if such are only guidelines. In other words, the decisions can be 
of mandatory compliance in virtue of the rules governing the association, within which 
such decision was adopted, or may be otherwise and simply be a recommendation.
(…)
61. If the statement of one organization authority (for example, the president of the 
association) is not binding but is merely a suggestion or guidance, then the offense will 
be classified as follows: the president made a recommendation and will be penalized 
for that, meanwhile the companies that applied such recommendation will be penalized 
according to the form of the agreement”26.
25 Resolution 036-2004-INDECOPI/CLC, of June 23, 2004.
26 Op. cit. 
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Graph N° 8
Collusion practices between competitors
Collusion practices between competitors can cause adverse effects resulting from restricting 
the competition, as well as beneficial effects derived from the joint action of competitors in 
the market.  Based on the above, there are two typical criteria to analyze collusion practices 
between competitors.
On one hand is the automatic prohibition criterion, according to which it is enough for the 
practice to exist, independent from the adverse effects caused. This analysis criterion was 
originally called per se illegality. On the other hand, is the prohibition criterion based on the 
effects of the collusion practices, so that the illegality statement requires the demonstration 
of the adverse effects on the market, which implies comparing the benefits and detriments of 
such collusion practices with mix effects so as to identify if the net effect is negative, because 
only in such case the behavior would be illegal.  This criterion was called rule of reason27.
The automatic prohibition criterion or per se illegality was created by the Supreme Court 
of the United States for cases of price fixing between competitors, by agreement or through 
a pact, also for those practices that –indirectly- have a similar effect like the reduction of 
production, or offer, or distribution to the market.  According to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the experience shows that this type of conduct, due to its own nature, tends 
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27 GELLHORN, Ernest & KOVACIC, William. (1994). Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell. United States of 
America, West, pp. 165-169. HOVENKAMP, Herbert. (2005b). The Antitrust Enterprise, Principle and Execution. 
United States of America, Harvard University Press, pp. 253-268.   
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to restrict competition without a reason that justifies it, and therefore it turns out to be 
inconvenient to use private or public resources to determine if, in any remote case, it causes 
beneficial effects28. 
Collusion practices above mentioned are severely followed up and penalized without further 
queries about its effects because its only purpose is to restrict competition. Such type of 
practice is also called hard core cartels.  The adverse effects of such practice are not required 
to be quantified or whether if it produced the adverse effects expected by the offenders for 
declaring it illegal29.
Without detriment to the above mentioned, the application of the automatic prohibition criterion 
has been restricted to the most harming practices, considering that in many circumstances 
it is adequate to study the reasonability of such practices and its effects on each particular 
case, avoiding thus penalizing as illegal those agreements that, without appearing to do so, 
generate more welfare for consumers, reduce transaction costs, or lead to greater efficiency 
in the supply chain30.This is to say that a group of horizontal collusion practices are analyzed 
under the criterion of the so-called rule of reason.
This is because, besides producing restrictive effects on the competition, collusion practices 
between competitors may also produce beneficial effects, for instance: quality standardization 
agreements benefit consumers by reducing the so-called research costs between different 
presentations31. Only as example the agreements of development and research can be 
considered as such32.
Usually, companies try to improve the products or services they offer to satisfy consumers’ 
needs, generating innovations at different levels.  In general, innovation is achieved through 
28 AREEDA, Philip & KAPLOW, Louis. (1988). Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases. United States of America, 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, pp. 226-227. HOVENKAMP, Herbert. (2005b). Op. Cit., 260-267.
29 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. (2000). Hard Core Cartels. 
The name Hard Core Cartels is recognized in the field of Competition Law and is observed in the guidelines 
issued by the authorities for the defense of competition in the United Stated or the European Community. 
Read: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. (2000). Op. Cit., pp. 3 y 8-9; 
COMISIÓN EUROPEA. (2001). Op. Cit., paragraphs 18 and 25.
30 AREEDA AREEDA, Philip y KAPLOW, Louis. (1988). Op. Cit., pp. 198-199 y 225. BORK, Robert. (1993). The 
Antitrust Paradox, a Policy at War with Itself. United States of America, Simon & Schuster, pp. 26-30.
31 To have a review  of this type of collusion practices and its legal treatment in Peru, read: BULLARD, Alfredo 
& FALLA, Alejandro. (2002). “La mujer del César...: ¿son los Acuerdos de Compras Conjuntas Ilegales según 
las Normas de Libre Competencia?”. In: Ius et Veritas. No. 25. Lima, Tarea Gráfica Educativa. QUINTANA, 
Eduardo. (2009). “Los Acuerdos de Investigación y Desarrollo frente al Derecho de la Competencia Peruano”. 
In: KRESALJA, Baldo (editor). Anuario Andino de Propiedad Intelectual. No. 6. Lima, Palestra Editores.
32 What follows has been taken from: QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2009). Op. Cit., pp. 312-315.
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research and development activities that require investments that can be expensive and 
sometimes very risky.
For example, think about drug researches for treating very serious diseases, this is an activity 
that requires expensive resources without being possible to ensure in advance that positive 
results will be achieved and that it may take quite a long time.  These are activities that 
require risky, expensive and long-term investments
Given the characteristics of the investment required, it is possible that competing companies 
may decide to carry out together such activities, and for that purpose they will try to enter into 
research and development agreements. These agreements reduce the exposure to risk and 
allow them to collect and invest, as a group, the necessary resources.  Likewise, this allows 
companies to contribute with the assets, knowledge and/or technologies that each one has 
separately and which are complementary.
However, a research and investigation agreement can also cause significant restrictions to 
the competitive process between the participants, as well as the exclusion of other competing 
companies that do not take part in such agreement.  As mentioned before, the agreements 
between competitors allow them both to reach together the market power they would not 
have individually.  The research and development agreements between competitors can 
include conditions that involve practices usually forbidden by competition rules, for example: 
concerted price fixing of the products obtained from the innovation achieved or the division 
of the market to commercialize such products.
With regards to the above mentioned, the Competition Law validly assumes that the best 
criterion to evaluate this type of agreements is by considering its positive and negative effects 
for the market and the well-being of consumers in the long and short term.  It should be 
noted that a restriction on the competition in the short term can be more beneficial for the 
market as a whole in the long run.  For example, a transitory restriction on the capability of 
a laboratory to individually conduct the research and development activities so as to conduct 
them together with other competitor’s laboratories may result in a great benefit for consumers 
in the long term.
 b. Vertical Restraints to competition
Vertical restraints to competition occurs between economic agents operating at different 
levels of the production or trading chain – activities which are generally complementary such 
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as that of a manufacturer and its input supplier, or a manufacturer and wholesale and/ or 
retail distribution channels –, that is why they are classified as vertical since it involves such 
a relationship33. 
Necessarily, vertical restraints require the participation of two or more mutually independent 
agents, and that at least one of them decides or accepts to hold or to restrict its free will in 
business depending on the commitment made to it or with other agents. This coordinated 
restriction of freedom may be expressed in various aspects of the business relationship 
between the agents involved at different levels of the production and trading chain, for 
instance: the prices to be charged, the geographic area to be served, the products that may be 
sold, the trading channel to be used, among others
Vertical collusion practices may be observed in the same modalities as horizontal collusion 
practices by agreements, concerted practices, decisions or recommendations. The main 
difference is that vertical practices involve agents from different levels of the production 
chain or trading.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, vertical restraints may happen in a variety of scopes and 
aspects of business activity; therefore, some of its main manifestations will be explained34. 
Particularly, three generic groups of vertical restraints are described. For explanatory purposes, 
a relationship between manufacturer and wholesale or retail distributor is assumed.
33 Read about vertical collusive practices in, among others: ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW. (2006). Antitrust 
Law and Economics of Product Distribution.United States of America, ABA Publishing. BAMBERGER, Gustavo. 
(2009). “Revisiting Maximum Resale Price Maintenance: State Oil v. Khan”. In: KWOKA AND WHITE. 
(editors). The Antitrust Revolution. United States of America, Oxford University Press, pp. 456-472. COMISIÓN 
EUROPEA. (2010). Directrices relativas a las restricciones verticales.  FALLA, Alejandro and BULLARD, Alfredo. 
(2002). “¡Prohibido prohibir!: el fantasma de los precios sugeridos y la fijación de precios de reventa en el 
Derecho de la Competencia”. In: Themis. N°45. Lima, pp. 215-227. KATZ, Michael. (2009). “Exclusive Dealing 
and Antitrust Exclusion: U.S. v Dentsply”. In: KWOKA y WHITE. (editores). The Antitrust Revolution. United 
States of America, Oxford University Press, pp. 389-415. MARTÍNEZ, Martha and QUINTANA, Eduardo. (1998). 
“Contratos de exclusividad y ventas atadas. Cuando lo atado es la exclusividad”. In: Boletín Latinoamericano 
de Competencia. No. 5. pp. 51-59. Comunidad Europea, see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/blc/ 
(visited on December 17, 2012). REY, Patrick and CABALLERO, Francisco. (1996). “The Policy Implications of 
the Economic Analysis of Vertical Restraints”. In: European Community - Economic Papers. N° 119.  Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission.
34 For this purpose, the European Commission classification is used for providing a simple explanation.
Chapter 1 -Theoretical Framework: Areas of Competition Law
Free Competition42
Graph N° 9
Groups of vertical restraints
b.1. Restraints that determine a single branding group
Such restraints occur when one or more firms agree to sell goods from one single 
manufacturer or brand. Under this light, firms restrict their business free will by 
committing to only purchase goods from a particular manufacturer and to only offer 
those goods through its distribution channel or outlet. Such practices may be found in 
exclusive supply contracts, non-compete clauses, minimum sales quotas, among others
The most direct restrictive effects generated by these constraints on competition are 
mainly the following:
•	 Other manufacturers are excluded from having access to trade channels or outlets 
already engaged with one single brand;
•	 The competition that may exist between different brand products in retail outlets 
is reduced. This type of practice limits the competition between manufacturers or 
goods from different manufacturers therefore limiting inter-brand competition, or 
the competition between brands.
b.2. Restraints that determine a limited distribution group 
These occur when a manufacturer decides to sell its goods through one single distributor. By 
doing so, the manufacturer limits its free will in business by committing to conduct all of its 
sales through one single distribution or sales channel. The most typical form in which this 
type of practices can be found is in exclusive distribution contracts, which usually assigns 
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a defined geographic area or number or type of customers. Often, the manufacturer is in 
charge of prohibiting or restricting the possibility of a distributor to reach out of its  exclusivity 
scope and invade the scope of other exclusive distributors. Another way of having limited 
distribution restrictions are selective distribution contracts. By means of such contracts a 
manufacturer chooses to designate a limited number of authorized representatives to sell 
its brand, after a rigorous selection process based on the compliance of stringent quality, 
reputation or others requirements.
The most direct restrictive effects generated by these constraints on competition are mainly 
the following:
•		 Other distributors are excluded from having the power of acquiring goods from the 
manufacturer that entered into an exclusive distribution covenant.
•		 The competition that may exist between distributors of goods from one manufacturer 
is prevented or reduced.
This type of practice restricts competition between distributors of goods from one single 
manufacturer or of the same brand, therefore limiting intra-brand competition, or competition 
within one brand.
b.3 Restraints that determine a Resale Price Maintenance Group
In this case, the manufacturer convinces and engages one or more distributors to 
sell its goods to customers at the price defined by such manufacturer. In this way, 
a distributor constraint its business will by accepting the retail price defined by 
the manufacturer. These constraints are observed in three ways: fixed resale price, 
maximum price or minimum price; being the former the one that generates the greater 
constraint, while the other two offers the distributor a certain margin of decision 
downstream or upstream, respectively.
The restrictive effects of the competition that produce such constraints are mainly the 
elimination or reduction of the price competition that may exist between distributors 
of goods from a manufacturer 35. These kinds of practices also restrict competition 
among distributors of goods from the same manufacturer or the same brand; therefore, 
these are also part of a group of practices that restricts intra-brand competition or 
competition within a particular brand.
35 Some indicate that horizontal collusion practices among producers can be facilitated by creating greater 
transparency in the market price information. 
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The different vertical restraints to competition may take place independently or simultaneously. 
Thus, a manufacturer can commit to give the exclusive distribution of its brand to a distributor 
and, in turn, the distributor can also commit to hold one single brand to the manufacturer, 
and even in this business relationship having a resale price fixed by the manufacturer may 
be agreed upon. The more complex the vertical restraint network enforced is, the greater the 
likelihood of generating more serious and possibly illegal restrictive effects.
The analysis of the restrictive effects of the competition, in the case of vertical practices, 
usually begins by assessing if the competition between manufacturers, or inter-brand 
competition, is strong, weak or non-existent. If inter-brand competition is considerable, 
the intra-brand vertical restraints effects (for example, if a manufacturer selects only one 
dealer or fixes the resale price of its different dealers) may be neutralized because even when 
distributors of a same brand do not compete against each other, they shall do so against 
other brands distributors, thus allowing buyers to find assorted sale conditions between the 
different brands36. Nevertheless, when inter-brand competition is weak, the vertical inter-
brand restraints effects may turn out to be graver because it hinders or makes it difficult for 
buyers to find different options – at least – between different distributors of the same product 
or brand.
Furthermore, as for the analysis of inter-brand restrictions, each manufacturer may have its 
own business and convincing strategy to try and make sales and distribution channels decide 
to solely commit to their brand or products. This struggle to “win” trading channels could 
be in itself a way of competition between manufacturers, but it should be noted that once 
vertical single-brand commitments are established, the trading and end-sales market may 
become rigid and make it more difficult for the entry of new manufacturers. Likewise, there is 
also the possibility that a manufacturer has more success in convincing sales and distribution 
channels, thus isolating other manufacturers from the means to reach end consumers. On that 
basis, these restrictions can have more serious restrictive effects on the competition when one 
of the participants has a dominant position.
36 In this sense, the European Commission pronounced the following: “In a market where individual distributors 
distribute the brand(s) of only one supplier, a reduction of competition between the distributors of the same brand 
will lead to a reduction of intra-brand competition between these distributors, but may not have a negative effect 
on competition between distributors in general. In such a case, if inter-brand competition is fierce, it is unlikely 
that a reduction of intra-brand competition will have negative effects for consumers.” European Commission 
(2010) Op. cit.
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Notwithstanding the identification and measurement of its restrictive effects on the 
competition, the analysis of vertical practices also requires the examination of its possible 
beneficial effects under the reasonability criterion. In other words, vertical restraints are 
usually analyzed under the so-called rule of reason or sound judgment criterion, which has 
been defined as:
“A legal approach by competition authorities or the courts where an attempt is made 
to evaluate the pro-competitive features of a restrictive business practice against 
its anticompetitive effects in order to decide whether or not the practice should be 
prohibited. Some market restrictions which prima facie give rise to competition issues 
may on further examination may be found to have valid efficiency enhancing benefits. 
For example, a manufacturer may restrict supply of a product in different geographic 
markets only to existing retailers so that they earn higher profits and have an incentive 
to advertise the product and provide better service to customers. This may have the effect 
of expanding the demand for the manufacturer’s product more than the increase in 
quantity demanded at a lower price. The opposite of the rule of reason approach is 
to declare certain business practices per se illegal, that is, always illegal. Price fixing 
agreements and resale price maintenance in many jurisdictions are per se illegal.”37
Considering the benefits that may be produced as a result of vertical restraints to competition, 
the analysis includes reviewing whether a greater efficiency is generated and if it tends to 
correct market failures or externalities generated by the business policy in every link of 
the production or distribution chain. For example, exclusivity contracts (single branding or 
limited distribution type) may reduce transaction costs that would be otherwise undertaken 
by the manufacturer if it had to deal with numerous distributors, and can also offer to assure 
a certain amount of sales on the side of one sole distributor, thus allowing better a production 
planning. At the same time, the exclusive distributor can focus its sales efforts on one single 
product brand offering for example more guarantees or pre-sale and post-sale services to 
the consumer, thereby encouraging competition between brands. Additionally, the producer 
can make more investment, promotion and training in favor of the exclusive distributor or 
seller, because the manufacturer would not have direct competitors that could freely take 
advantage of such investments. In the last two cases, one can affirm that vertical restraints 
allow controlling undesired free-rider situations.
37 KHEMANI, Shyam & SHAPIRO, D. (1996). Op. Cit., p. 55. 
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To measure and compare the negative effects related to competitive restriction against the 
positive effects mentioned above, some assessment principles are set forth, such as:
•	 The position of the manufacturer and its competitors, or the distributor and its competitors, 
and the degree of existing inter-brand competition. 
•	 The legitimate justifications for establishing the vertical restraint (reduction of transaction 
costs, assurance of sales flow for investment and production planning, control of free rider 
issues, promote the entry and positioning in new markets).
•	 The share of distribution or sales channels that are available for other current or potential 
manufacturers, after creating the vertical restraint
•	 The term of the contracts through which the vertical restraint is established and the possibility 
of waiving the obligations undertaken therein without incurring significant costs38.
To conclude, the lack of independence of the agents usually exempts them from incurring in 
vertical collusion agreements and concerted practices. Indeed, if firms operating at different 
levels of the production chain belong to the same group, it is not possible to substantiate that 
one of them, or both, limit their free will in business in terms of the commitment made to 
each other because the decision of such firms responds to the same business will. A similar 
situation occurs when the so-called agency relationships exist. In this case, a firm acts in 
the name of and on behalf of another, strictly following its instructions and without power to 
bargain beyond the sales conditions indicated by the latter to the former, i.e. under the typical 
logic of a sales agent. In such situations, the agent’s lack of capacity to decide determines 
that there is no vertical collusion practice.
Notwithstanding the above, depending on the circumstances, a more detailed analysis on the 
firms’ independence might be needed; particularly in cases qualifying as agency relationships. 
To do this, the specific characteristics of each business relationship between the firms must 
be considered, because if the seller undertakes the investments necessary for the activity 
performed (e.g. acquires assets necessary for the sales or covers the costs required for its 
engagement, such as transport, storages, advertising materials, etc.) or assumes the risks of 
the business (for example, whether to cover the cost of the products it is impossible to place 
them), the lack of independence aforementioned dilutes and gets increasingly closer to the 
trader or distributor status within a vertical restraint of competition.
38 EUROPEAN COMISSION. (2010). Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Op. Cit., paragraphs 110 and the following. 
HOVENKAMP, Herbert. (2005a). Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of Competition and its Practice. United States 
of America, Thomson-West, pp. 441-445. MARTÍNEZ, Martha & QUINTANA, Eduardo. (1998). Op. Cit., p. 71.
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1.2. Controlling Structures
Controlling structures are observed in the regulations establishing a procedure through 
which any State authority approves mergers, either before or after the acts required for 
the execution of such operations are completed. The purpose of these regulations is for the 
authority to analyze the scope of the mergers and define, in anticipated terms, which effects 
it may have on competition in the relevant market and, accordingly, conclude whether or not 
to approve the operation.
This means that the authority assesses how the market currently operates with the structure it 
has (with its number of participants and the conditions of competition shown) and compares 
it against the new market configuration if operation is was to be approved and the impact 
it would have on future competitive conditions. If the potential effects of the merger are 
identified as adverse to competition and consumers, the merger is disapproved. This system 
does not prohibit nor prevent mergers, except in the most serious cases in which it can end 
up in a prohibition to merge, although this are almost always exceptional cases.
Depending on the type of operation designed by the firms, mergers are called:
•	 Horizontal merger: when competing firms that produce and / or sell substitute goods are 
merged.
•	 Vertical merger: when firms acting in different stages of the production or trading process 
are involved. For example: a producer and its supplier of inputs, or a producer and its 
wholesale or retail distribution channel.
•	 Conglomerate merger: when economic agents performing unrelated activities are 
involved; i.e.: agents that are neither competitor nor have a vertical relationship, as the 
abovementioned.
Often, the control of structures operates before carrying out the actions required to effectively 
implement the merger of the companies involved. Therefore, this works as an ex ante 
evaluation of the mergers according to the consequences it would bring to the market, unlike 
controlling behaviors which operates ex post. Notwithstanding the above, there are legal 
systems where controlling structures can be applied ex post.
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Considering the above, controlling structures have within its scope those situations where 
market power finds its origin in mergers, therefore it is also known as merger control.
As part of the substantive analysis that is performed on mergers, the negative effects that 
it may have (restrictive effects on the competition) are compared against its positive effects 
(efficiencies and cost savings) with the purpose of determining whether to authorize the 
notified operation, or not.
Chart N° 3
Types of corporate groups and their effects
Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate
Possitive
Effects
•	Economies	of	scale	in	the	
production, input purchase 
or in the distribution for the 
new entity resulting from the 
merger.
•	Cost	reductions	for	the	new	
entity resulting from the 
merger:
   Production costs;
   Transactions costs
•	Use	of	similar	technologies	in	
the productive process. 
•	Cost	reductions	in	the	
distribution of complementary 
goods for the new entity 
resulting from the merger.
Negative
Effects
•	Unilateral	effects	:
   Generation or increase of 
the dominant position for the 
new entity resulting from the 
merger which may generate 
an increase on the prices or 
the capacity to handle the 
production.
•	Collusion	effects	:
   Reduction of the number of 
participating agents which 
may generate incentives for 
tacit collusion.
•	The	new	entity	resulting	from	
the merger can hinder the 
access of competitors to 
vertically related markets or 
increase the access cost of 
rivals through: (i) the strategic 
control of inputs; or (ii) the 
creation of entry barriers.
•	In	rare	cases,	it	is	deemed	
that it may facilitate the 
practice of cross-subsidies 
or predatory practices on 
the side of the new entity 
resulting from the merger.
•	Reduction	of	the	potential	
competition when the 
new entity resulting from 
the merger incorporates 
enterprises that where 
considered before as potential 
competitors.
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The Peruvian competition law regulations include both controlling behaviors and controlling 
structures. This paper will only refer to the control of behaviors in Peru considering that 
controlling structures have quite limited scopes.
On this last point is noteworthy to mention that controlling structures in Peru do not cross-cut 
all economic activities, but one. Indeed, the control of structures is enforced by Law 26876, 
Antitrust and Anti-oligopoly Law of the Electricity Sector39, and its regulations, Supreme 
Decree 017-98-ITINCI (applicable to all mergers of Peruvian companies holding concessions 
in power generation, transmission or distribution)40, and Supreme Decree 087-2002-EF 
(applicable to all mergers of said companies that may result as a consequence of winning 
a bid of the private investment promotion process)41. The main difference between these 
regulations is the approval process to which the merger is subject to, being the latter case 
much shorter42. The merger control procedure in Peru is ex ante, meaning that it involves the 
evaluation and approval of the operations prior to its execution, on charges of lacking legal 
effect and the imposition of fines of considerable amount.
On the other hand, the control of behaviors in Peru is cross-cutting to all productive or 
commercial activities of the economy, by means of Legislative Decree 1034, Law on the 
Repression of Anti-competitive Conducts, in force as of July 24, 200843, and previously by 
Legislative Decree 701, Law on the Elimination of Monopolistic, Controlling and Restrictive 
Practices Affecting Free Competition44.
39 Law published in El Peruano official gazette on November 19, 1997 and entered into force the next following 
day.
40 Regulation published in El Peruano official gazette on October 16, 1998 and entered into force the next following 
day.
41 Regulation published in El Peruano official gazette on June 1, 2002 and entered into force the next following 
day.
42 Review a current version of the actual position on merger control in Peru in: DIEZ CANSECO, Luis; 
FALLA, Alejandro; QUINTANA, Eduardo & TÁVARA, José. (2012). “Mesa Redonda: Control de Fusiones y 
Concentraciones Empresariales en el Perú”. In; Ius et Veritas. No. 44. Lima, Tarea Gráfica Educativa. For a 
comprehensive review of the existing literature on this subject see Appendix I, which includes a long list of 
papers on the subject.  
43 Legislative Decree 1034 was published in El Peruano official gazette on June 25, 2008 and its fourth 
supplementary and final provision set forth that it would enter into force 30 days after its publication. 
44 Legislative Decree 701 was published in El Peruano official gazette on November 07, 1991.
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Graph N° 10
Legislative Development of the Regulations concerning Competition Law
2.1.  Legislative Decree 701
Most of Indecopi’s experience on this matter was gained during the enforcement of Legislative 
Decree 701, a regulation that was in effect and applied for approximately 15 years since 
Indecopi began its work back in 1993 until July 2008, date in which Legislative Decree 1034 
took effect45. 
The validity of Legislative Decree 701 was conditional to the establishment of the National 
Commission of Free Competition which, according to the initial version of the regulation, 
was created as a stand-alone agency with technical and administrative autonomy and whose 
purpose was to ensure the compliance of said legislation. For this purpose, the Commission 
was empowered to make its own rules and that of its Technical Secretariat, which would then 
be approved by Supreme Decree. However, such entity was not created. It was necessary to 
found the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (Indecopi) for Legislative Decree 701 to become officially enforced.
Indeed, through Law Decree 25868 the Act on Organization and Functions of Indecopi46 
was enacted and, with this regulation the first amendment to Legislative Decree 701 
45 Although Legislative Decree 701 was published in late 1991, it started to be effectively applied when Indecopi 
started to operate in 1993.
46 Published in El Peruano official gazette on November 24, 1992. 
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was enforced. This amendment was intended to repeal various provisions related to 
the National Commission of Free Competition47, for its establishment and operation to 
remain as part of the organizational structure of Indecopi. Also other articles relating 
to the character and functions of the Commission (Article 8) were amended; likewise, 
its court of appeal became Indecopi’s Court (Article 18). Thus, the enforcement of 
Legislative Decree 701 remained within the organizational structure of Indecopi48.
The following amendment to Legislative Decree 701 was made by means of Legislative 
Decree 78849. This was the first substantial amendment to the law and it is important to 
delve into it. Legislative Decree 701, in its original version, not only contemplated a regime 
for prohibiting restrictive practices on the competition between economic agents under the 
modalities of agreements, concerted practices, decisions and recommendations (Article 6), 
but also an regime for authorizing such practices when certain conditions were met related 
to its effects and capability to generate benefits for consumers (Article 7). Particularly, it 
allowed for the authorization of practices restricting competition but which, at the same time, 
contribute to improving the production or trading of goods and services, or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, provided that it allows consumers to adequately participate 
of its advantages, it prevents the imposition of restrictions which are not indispensable to 
achieve the benefits, and not to substantially eliminate competition50. It should be noted, 
47 The articles repealed were # 9, 11, 12 and 13. 
48 It is noteworthy that shortly after Decree Law 25868 was passed, Legislative Decree 701 was further amended 
by Decree Law 26004, published in the official gazette El Peruano on December 27, 1992. This amendment was 
minor, including a paragraph in Article 23 stating that “By Supreme Decree, with the approval of the Council 
of Ministers, any further sanctions and measures that the Commission may adopt in order to ensure the free 
competition shall be established.” This Decree was never passed.
49 Published in El Peruano official gazette on December 31, 1994.
50 “Art. 7.- The Secretariat of the Multisectoral Commission of Free Competition may authorize agreements, 
decisions, recommendations, concerted practices or parallel actions referred to in Article  6 or categories thereof, 
in the following cases:
 a) When it contributes to improving the production or trade of goods and services, or to promoting technical or 
economic progress provided that it:
 1) Allows consumers or users to adequately participate in its benefits;
 2) Do not impose on the concerned individual or legal entity restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of those objectives and,
 3) Do not allow the concerned individuals or legal entities to eliminate the competition of a substantial part of the 
goods or services covered.
 b) When it has for purpose to protect or promote national export capacity, to the extent that it is 
consistent with the obligations arising from international treaties signed by Peru with other States, 
and in particular integration treaties, as provided in Articles 101 and 106 of the Constitution;
 c) When it has for purpose to, in any transitory or temporary form, match the supply to the demand, when a sustained 
bearish trend appears on the market or when the excess of the productive capacity are clearly against the economy;
 d) When it produces a significantly large improvement in the living standards of the economic sectors 
or geographical areas depressed; or for its small size, it is not capable of significantly affecting the 
competition; or have for purpose to cooperate towards the improvement of production, technology or similar”. 
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moreover, that authorization applications were subject to positive administrative silence 
(Article 21). Through Legislative Decree 788, the authorization regime was repealed51.
The second and more significant substantive amendment to Legislative Decree 701 was made 
by means of Legislative Decree 80752.  This regulation introduced the following relevant 
changes:
•	 Two behaviors were eliminated which were classified as acts of abuse of dominant 
position53.
•	 Two other behaviors also classified as abuse of dominant position were amended54.
•	 Three behaviors classified as restrictive practices on the competition were modified.55.
•	 Three new restrictive practices on the competition were added.
•	 The provision relating to the possibility of filing a criminal procedure in cases of violation 
to Legislative Decree 701 was amended, noting that the Provincial Prosecutor was solely 
responsible for filing a procedure after receiving a complaint forwarded by the Commission 
51 Furthermore, Article 10 of Legislative Decree 701 which provided the requirements of holding a professional 
degree and not less than ten years of experience to be a member of the Commission was also repealed considering 
that such requirements became part of the general requirements for any member to a committee of Indecopi.
52 Published in El Peruano official gazette on April 18, 1996.
53 In particular, paragraphs d), and e) of Article 5 were repealed as these considered as abuse of dominant position 
the following behaviors:
 “(…)
 d) The application to the local sale of raw materials, whose selling prices are regulated on the basis of international 
prices, pricing systems, conditions of sale, delivery or financing involving the gain of higher sales values in the 
local market than the sales values obtainable in the export of these same materials.
 e) The use of the terms granted by tax stability agreements entered into prior to the effective date hereof, in such 
way that it prevents other companies producing similar goods from having equitable competition opportunities 
both in the domestic market, and internationally”
54 Paragraphs a) and f) of Article 5 were amended. The two texts that were modified were:
 “a) The unjustified refusal to meet the demands for the purchase of products from the local market.
 (…)
 f) Other cases with similar effect that are classified by Supreme Decree countersigned by the President of the 
Council of Ministers, and the Ministers of Economy and Finance, of Justice and of Industry, Domestic Trade, 
Tourism and Integration”. 
55 Paragraphs a), d) and g) of Article 6 were modified. The texts that were modified were:
 “a) The unjustified agreement on prices or other market conditions.
 (...)
 d) The agreement on the quality of the products, when it does not correspond to national or international standards.
 (...)
 Other cases with similar effect that are classified by Supreme Decree countersigned by the President of the Council 
of Ministers, and the Ministers of Economy and Finance, of Justice and of Industry, Domestic Trade, Tourism and 
Integration.”
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when the violation was willfully committed causing serious consequences for the general 
economic interest.
•	 The possibility for offenders to apply for a liability waiver was introduced provided that 
they submit evidence to help identify and prove the existence of an illegal practice, and 
which are crucial to penalize those responsible.
•	 The possibility to impose penalty payments to ensure the compliance of the order was 
introduced by means of injunctions in case the offender is reluctant to comply with it.
•	 The scale of fines applicable to violators was substantially increased56.
After the last modification described, Legislative Decree 701 has been enforced without 
any amendment for over ten years, although its interpretation was subject of substantial 
variations across the case law, as will be explained in later chapters. The following is the 
scope of Legislative Decree 701 considering its latest version after the changes introduced by 
Legislative Decree 807. 
 
2.1.1. Purpose
Legislative Decree 701 indicated as its purpose is the development of the free private initiative 
seeking the best interest of consumers.
2.1.2. Subjective Scope
Individuals and legal entities, whether public or private, engaged in economic activities, as 
well as those individuals who manage or hold the legal representation of legal entities were 
considered as part of the subjective scope.
2.1.3. Objective Scope
Two categories of prohibited behaviors were considered as the objective scope of the law: 
•	 Acts of abuse of dominant position, and
•	 Restrictive practices on the competition.
56 The scale of penalties existing prior to this amendment indicated up to 50 tax units (UIT) as the maximum 
penalty for the most serious offenses.
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It should be noted that Legislative Decree 701 also contained a general statement indicating 
that those behaviors limiting the competition in such way “…that generates an adverse effect 
against the general economic interest of the country” (Article 3) are prohibited and will be 
penalized. Such general statement resulted to have a rather broad legal interpretation of the 
scope of Legislative Decree 701, as will be explained later on. 
 a. Acts of Abuse of dominant position
With respect to acts of abuse of dominant position, first, Legislative Decree 701 qualified 
dominant position as the capability of one or more undertakings to act independently 
regardless of the other participants in the market (competitors, buyers, clients or suppliers), 
by factors such as a significant share, supply and demand characteristics, technological 
development, competitors’ access to funding sources and supply and distribution networks. 
This allowed for the possibility of a joint dominant position between two or more companies
Additionally, Legislative Decree 701 stated that an abuse of dominant position was committed 
when a dominant firm acted improperly in order to obtain benefits and cause harm to others, 
which would not have been possible otherwise57. Thus, to find a case of abuse of dominant 
position it should be established that, as a result of the practice, the dominant firm obtained 
a benefit and also caused damage to another market agent.
The acts of abuse of dominant position, as explicitly defined in the regulation (Article 5), 
were:
•		 The	unjustified	refusal	to	meet	the	demands	for	the	purchase	or	acquisition,	or	the	sales	
offer or delivery of products or services.
•		 Enforcing commercial relationships under unequal conditions for equivalent transactions 
that place some competitors in a disadvantageous position in face of others. Giving 
discounts and bonuses that correspond to generally accepted business practices which 
are granted or awarded under certain compensatory circumstances, such as advance 
payment, amount, volume or others and / or which are granted in general, in all cases 
where there are the same conditions do not constitute abuse of dominant position.
57 “Article 5.- An abuse of dominant position happens when one or more companies that are in the situation 
described in the previous article and act improperly in order to obtain benefits and harm others, which have not 
been possible otherwise.”
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•		 Subordinating the execution of contracts to the acceptance of supplementary obligations 
which, by its nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
purpose of such contracts.
•		 Other similar cases.
 b.  Restrictive Practices on the Competition
With regards to restrictive practices on the competition, Legislative Decree 701 observed that 
it may be done through agreements, concerted practices, decisions and recommendations, 
without specifying if these were behaviors involving competitors or companies operating 
at different levels of the supply or trading chain. The behaviors specifically classified as 
restrictive practices on the competition are the following (Article 6):
•	 Competitors agreeing directly or indirectly on fixing prices, or other trade or service 
conditions.
•	 Dividing up the market share or the sources of supply.
•	 Distribution of production quotas.
•	 Agreeing on the products’ quality when it does not correspond to national or international 
standards, and it adversely affects the consumer.
•	 Enforcing commercial relationships under unequal conditions for equivalent transactions 
that place some competitors in a disadvantageous position in face of others. A practice is 
not restrictive on the free competition when discounts and bonuses are given pursuant to 
generally accepted business practices, when these are granted or awarded under certain 
compensatory circumstances, such as advance payment, amount, volume or others and / 
or which are granted in general, in all cases where there are the same conditions.
•	 Subordinating the execution of contracts to the acceptance of supplementary obligations 
which, by its nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
purpose of such contracts.
•	 The concerted and unjustified refusal to meet the demands for the purchase or acquisition, 
or the sales offer or delivery of products or services.
•	 The concerted limitation or control of production, distribution, technical development or 
investment.
•	 The establishment, agreement or coordination of offers or refraining from bidding in 
tenders, bids, auctions or public auctions.
•	 Other similar cases.
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2.1.4. Procedure
The procedure’s definition in Legislative Decree 701 is relatively scarce. Based on the logic of 
a procedure already initiated, either by order ex officio or at the request of one of the parties, a 
term of 15 days for disclaimers used to be established, after which a testing period of 30 days 
was scheduled, then the Secretariat Technical issued an opinion that was submitted to the 
Commission without stating a specific deadline; and, finally concludes with the first instance 
decision that should be issued within five days of receipt of such opinion.
 
The proceedings in the second instance began with the appeal. A 15-day notification was 
granted, as of the decision of first instance. The ruling of the second instance should be 
issued within the next 30 days following the appeal.
2.1.5. Penalty Regime 
The only sanctions provided for in Legislative Decree 701 were fines. Offenses were classified 
as minor, serious and very serious for the purpose of determining the fine to be imposed. The 
minor or serious violations could result in fines of up to 1,000 UIT, provided that they do not 
exceed 10% of the sales or gross income earned in the year prior to the resolution imposing 
the fine. In very serious offense cases, the fine could be higher than 1,000 UIT, provided that 
they do not exceed 10% of the sales or gross income earned in the year prior to the resolution 
imposing the fine.
Additionally, the possibility of imposing fines of up to 100 UIT to each legal representative 
or members of the governing bodies of the offender was also contemplated according to their 
liability in the offenses committed.
Finally, different scoring criteria to grade the severity of the offenses related to the scope of 
the breach and the effects produced were also considered.
2.1.6. Other relevant aspects
Among other relevant aspects of the regulations, it should be noted that the power of issuing 
injunctions at any stage of the process was foreseen, and for doing so the application should 
be settled within a period not exceeding 10 days. The measures could constitute an injunction 
for halting, or the imposition of certain conditions to prevent damage.
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Also the possibility of offenders filing a commitment to stop doing the acts under investigation 
within a period of 30 days, foreseen for rebuttals, was considered. Such commitment was to 
be evaluated by the Secretariat and, if appropriate, a proposal was made to the Commission 
to accept it.
Finally, an option for any of the offenders to submit a request for liability waiver was foreseen. 
Offenders had to provide evidence to help identify and substantiate the existence of an illegal 
practice. If the evidence was crucial to impose a sanction, the Commission could accept such 
request.
2.2. Legislative Decree 1034
Legislative Decree 1034 was the natural evolution of the regulatory framework after more 
than a decade of enforcing the controlling behavior regulation. Aspects that were not 
expressly defined before were defined, and the absence of certain regulations identified were 
completed58.
 2.2.1. Purpose
Legislative Decree 1034 is more accurate in setting forth its purpose which is to promote 
economic efficiency in markets for the sake of consumers.
 2.2.2. Subjective Scope
This regulation defines with more detail the agents subject to investigation and penalties, 
noting that it applies to individuals or legal entities, irregular corporations, standalone 
equities or other public or private, governmental or non-governmental, for-profit or non-for-
profit entities that offer or demand goods or services or whose partners, affiliates, unionized 
or members conduct such activity.
58 Read comments relating the scope, interpretation and convenience of issuing Legislative Decree 1034, in: 
PATRÓN, Carlos. (2008). “Aciertos, divergencias y desatinos de la nueva Ley de Represión de Conductas 
Anticompetitivas”. In: Ius et Veritas. No. 36. Lima, Tarea Gráfica Educativa, pp. 122-144. QUINTANA, Eduardo. 
(2011a). “El objetivo de la ley de competencia peruana y la interpretación de las conductas prohibidas”. In: 
Revista de la Competencia y la Propiedad Intelectual. No. 13. Lima, Indecopi, pp. 19-59. RUIZ, Gonzalo. (2011). 
“La nueva  Ley de Represión de Conductas Anticompetitivas: acotando la discrecionalidad de la autoridad de 
competencia”. In: Revista de la Competencia y la Propiedad Intelectual. No. 13. Lima, Indecopi, pp. 163-182.
59 “Art. 10.- Abuse of dominant position 
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Furthermore, individuals conducting, managing or representing the legal subjects mentioned 
above are also subject to the regulation, to the extent that they have participated in the 
planning, implementation or execution of the offense.
Finally, the regulation provides that individuals acting on behalf of such holders of rights are 
liable for their actions, even if they do not have civil representation conditions.
 2.2.3 Objective Scope
In the case of Legislative Decree 1034, three categories of prohibited behaviors are considered: 
(i) acts of abuse of dominant position; (ii) horizontal cartel behaviors (agreements, pacts and 
recommendations among competitors); and (iii) vertical cartel behaviors among different 
agents of the production or commercialization chain. 
 a.  Acts of Abuse of Dominant Position 
Regarding the abuse of dominant position, Legislative Decree 1034 establishes how to 
delimit the relevant market, which was not foreseen in Legislative Decree 701. In that regard, 
Legislative Decree 1034 states that the relevant market is formed by the product market 
and the geographic market. Furthermore, it defines product market as a good or service 
subject of the behavior investigated and its substitutes, noting the factors to be evaluated 
in the substitution level. As well, the regulation defines geographic market as the group of 
geographical zones where alternative sources of supply of the relevant product are located, 
and notes the aspects to be considered to determine the alternatives of supply. 
Regarding the dominant position, Legislative Decree 1034 estates that this position may only 
be individual (setting aside the possibility of a joint or collective dominant position accepted 
in Legislative Decree 701), and qualifies it as the possibility to substantially restrict, affect or 
distort conditions of supply and demand, without the other market participants (competitors, 
suppliers or customers) to counteract said possibility, due to the same factors foreseen in 
Legislative Decree 701, but adding as well, the existence of barriers to legal, economic or 
strategic access and the power of negotiation of suppliers, customers or competitors. 
In Legislative Decree 1034 the definition of abuse of dominant position is more developed 
than in Legislative Decree 701, because it states that it is produced when an economic agent, 
having a relevant dominant position, uses this position to unlawfully restrict competition, 
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obtaining benefits and harming real or potential, direct or indirect competitors, that would 
not have the ability to hold that position. Additionally, the regulation states that if the exercise 
of a dominant position does not affect real or potential competitors, it is not abuse of dominant 
position59. 
As for prohibited behaviors, the regulation typifies a broader list of acts of a dominant position 
(number 10.2 of art. 10):
•	 Unjustified refusal to meet purchase or acquisition demands, or accept offers to sell or 
supply goods or services. 
•	 Application in commercial relations of unequal conditions for equivalent services that 
place some competitors in an unfavorable situation among other competitors. It does 
not constitute abuse of dominant position the granting of discounts and bonuses that 
correspond to generally accepted commercial practices, which are granted or awarded 
for specific compensations circumstances, such as advance payments, amount, volume 
and/or others to be concluded in general in all cases where there are unequal conditions. 
•	 The subordination of the execution of agreements when accepting supplementary 
services, that due to their nature or according to commercial practices is not in relation 
with the object of such contracts.
•	 Unreasonably impede a competitor from entering or remaining in an association or 
organization of intermediation. 
•	 Establish, impose or suggest distribution or exclusive sales agreement, non-compete 
clauses or similar, that are unjustified.
•	 Use in an abusive and repeated way legal processes or administrative proceedings to 
restrict competition. 
•	 Incite third parties not to supply goods or services, or accept them.
Finally, Legislative Decree 1034 as well contains a general prohibition of acts of abuse of 
dominant position, stating that they are the behaviors which prevent or hinder the access 
 10.1. There is abuse when an economic agent, having a dominant position in the relevant market, uses this 
position to unlawfully restrict competition, obtaining benefits and damaging real or potential, direct or indirect 
competitors, which would have been impossible to hold that position. (…) 
 10.5. It does not constitute abuse of dominant position the exercise of said position if it does not affect real or 
potential competitors”.
60 Arguments to the bill of law of the Legislative Decree approving the Law on Suppression of Anticompetitive 
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or permanence of current or potential competitors in the market for reasons different from a 
greater economic efficiency.
It is important to note that at the beginning of the list of acts of abuse of dominant position 
expressly typified, the regulation states that they are exclusionary behaviors (number 10.2). 
In addition to the abovementioned, it also specifies that the exercise of said position is not 
a case of abuse of dominant position, if it does not affect real or potential competitors. On 
this basis, acts of exploitative abuse, as explained on the previous chapter, are not qualified 
as abuse of dominant position under Legislative Decree 1034, as they do not affect real or 
potential competitors. 
In a subsequent chapter the interpretation of Indecopi about exploitative abuses will be 
explained. Suffice it to add at this point that the presentation of motives elaborated by Indecopi 
to support the bill of law that led to Legislative Decree 1034 states that the regulation aimed 
to rule out the possibility to be applied to acts of exploitative abuse60.
 b.  Horizontal Cartel Behaviors
Legislative Decree 1034 defines horizontal cartel behaviors as the agreements, concerted 
practices, decisions and recommendations carried out between competitive economic agents 
that have the object or effect of restricting, hindering or distorting free competition. 
Behaviors expressly typified as horizontal cartel behaviors are: (number 11.1 of art. 11):
•	 Direct or indirect concerted price fixing or other commercial or service conditions 
•	 Concerted limitation or control of production, sales, technical development or investments.
•	 Concerted distribution of customers, suppliers or geographical areas. 
Behavior. In effect, Indecopi stated that was looking to "... clarify the regulation in the sense that it is established 
that alleged exploitative behaviors are not considered violations of competition rules, discharging the possibility 
of different interpretations of meaning." Also, Indecopi stated that: "the nature of the abusive behavior of a 
dominant position has been specified, noting that are those behaviors the ones that affect the competitive 
process by restricting competition, hence that harmed agents are real or potential competitors, direct or indirect. 
Therefore, any abusive behavior of a dominant position, in accordance with the provisions of the Project, shall 
have exclusionary effect. Identifying acts of abuse of dominant position with the effect of excluding competitors is 
directly related to the purpose of the project contained in Article 1, that is, the prohibition of behaviors that harm 
the competitive process and, therefore, economic efficiency ".
61 Regarding the abuse of dominant position in the form of unjustified refusal to deal, the following may be seen 
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•	 Agreeing on products quality, when they do not correspond to national or international 
standards or adversely affect the consumers.
•	 Concerted application in commercial relations of unequal conditions for equivalent 
services that place some competitors in an unfavorable situation among other competitors. 
•	 Concert unjustifiably the subordination of the execution of agreements when accepting 
supplementary services that due to their nature or according to commercial practices are 
not in relation with the object of such contracts.
•	 Unjustified and concerted refusal to meet demands for the purchase or acquisition, or 
accept offers to sell or supply goods or services.
•	 Concert unjustifiably distribution or exclusive selling. 
•	 Concert or coordinate bids, positions or proposals or refrain from bidding or tendering in 
public or private or other forms of public procurement or acquisition under the relevant 
legislation and in public auctions and auctions.
Finally, Legislative Decree 1034 as well contains a general prohibition of horizontal cartel 
behaviors, stating that they are those behaviors of equivalent effects that seek to obtain 
benefits for reasons different from a greater economic efficiency (paragraph k).
 c.  Vertical Cartel Behaviors 
Legislative Decree 1034 defines vertical cartel behaviors as the agreements, concerted 
practices, decisions and recommendations carried out between different economic agents 
that operate in different stages of the production, distribution or commercialization chain, 
that have the object or effect of restricting, hindering or distorting free competition. 
Regarding the behavior qualified as vertical cartel behaviors, the regulation states that they 
can be carried out through any of the suppositions typified as cases of abuse of dominant 
position or horizontal cartel behaviors. Finally, there is only vertical cartel behavior if at 
least one of the involved parties has a dominant position in the relevant market before the 
prohibited behavior was carried out. (art. 12).
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 2.2.4. Criteria to analyze prohibited behaviors 
Legislative Decree 1034 considers two criteria for analyzing prohibited behaviors, unlike 
Legislative Decree 701, which does not consider any specifically. These criteria are relative 
prohibition and absolute prohibition. 
 a. Relative Prohibition
To determine the occurrence of an unlawful behavior subject to this criterion, the authority 
shall demonstrate (i) the existence of the behavior, and (ii) that it has or may have negative 
effects on competition and consumer welfare. In accordance with the presentation of motives 
elaborated by Indecopi to support the bill of law that led to Legislative Decree 1034, the 
application of relative prohibition is: 
“Comparative legislation, in broad consensus, grants those behaviors that may have both 
negative and positive effects, a presumption of legality, and thus a treatment of relative 
prohibition, or what is the same, the analysis under the rule of reason.  In a similar sense, 
the bill of law establishes a relative prohibition to particular behaviors. As abovementioned, 
this type of analysis requires the authority to evaluate what is the net effect of the behavior 
and, only in the case where this effect is negative – because positive effects are less than 
negative effects – the behavior shall be considered as an infringement”.
This is the general rule of analysis under Legislative Decree 1034, because it applies all the 
acts of abuse of dominant position and vertical cartel behaviors, as well as most of horizontal 
cartel behaviors. 
 b. Absolute Prohibition 
To determine the occurrence of an unlawful behavior subject to this criterion, the authority 
shall only demonstrate the existence of the behavior, without evaluating its effects in the 
market. It is worth mentioning that the effects of the unlawful behavior are only evaluated 
once it was demonstrated that said behavior existed and in order to grade the severity of it 
and the applicable sanction. 
This is an exceptional rule of analysis under Legislative Decree 1034, applicable only to four 
types of agreement among competitors (number 11.2 of art. 11):
•	 Price fixing or other commercial or service conditions. 
•	 Limit production or sales, particularly through quotas. 
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•	 Distribution of customers, suppliers or geographical areas. 
•	 Establish positions or abstentions in bids, tenders or other form of public procurement or 
acquisition under the relevant legislation and in public auctions and auctions.
Additionally, it should be stated that when establishing horizontal cartel behaviors subject 
to absolute prohibition, Legislative Decree 1034 states that it is about those “inter-brand 
horizontal agreements which are not complementary or ancillary to other lawful agreements” 
and which are aimed at one of the four types of agreements previously stated. 
The abovementioned indicates that the four types of inter-brand horizontal agreements listed 
may have the complementary or ancillary character to other lawful agreements, in which case 
they would no longer be under absolute prohibition. Thus, the agreements that are usually 
absolute prohibitions may stop having this qualification and may have to be evaluated in 
accordance with the relative prohibition criterion.
For this, it shall be relevant to define when an agreement is ancillary to another lawful 
agreement. Legislative Decree 1034 does not establish this, so it may have to be outlined 
through jurisprudence and could take as reference a declaration issued by Indecopi under 
Legislative Decree 701, which will be explained in a subsequent chapter.
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 2.2.5. Proceedings:
The proceeding in Legislative Decree 1034 is far more developed than in Legislative Decree 
701 in different relevant aspects.
First, it considers that once a complaint is filed, there is a 45 day term for proceedings prior 
to its admission, in which merits of the complaint are evaluated. If the Technical Secretariat 
considers that there is merit, it issues a resolution initiating the proceeding, presents it to the 
Commission and notifies the investigated party within five days. After that, there is a 30 day 
term for discharges and the eventual presentation of third parties. After this deadline, the 
stage of proofs starts, which lasts seven months. 
Once this stage is completed, the Secretariat has 30 days to issue a technical report 
analyzing the infringing conduct and recommending to the Defense of Free Competition 
and Protection Commission to declare grounded or not the complaint and, if applicable, any 
appropriate measures. Subsequently, the parties may submit their allegations on the report 
of the Secretariat within 15 days and may also speak to the Commission. As an exception, 
the Commission may conduct evidentiary proceedings within 30 days, after which there is a 
possibility for the parties to present their allegation within the following 15 days. Finally, the 
Commission has 30 days to issue the final resolution in the first instance. 
The first instance resolution shall be notified to the parties within 10 days of issuance and they 
have 15 days to appeal.  The processing in the second instance should not exceed 120 days.
 2.2.6. Sanctions Regime
The Sanctions Regime of Legislative Decree 1034 has a more precise order than the stated in 
Legislative Decree 701 and modifies the maximum amount of fines, based on the severity of 
the infringement
The sanctions regime has the following structure: 
•	 Minor infringement of up to 500 UIT, provided that it does not exceed 8% of the sales or 
gross income of the previous year per offender or economic group. 
•	 Serious infringement of up to 1.000 UIT provided that it does not exceed 10% of the sales 
or gross income of the previous year.
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•	 Very serious infringement, which has a fine exceeding 1.000 UIT, provided that it does not 
exceed 12% of the sales or gross income of the previous year. 
In the case of professional associations or unions or economic agents that have started their 
activities after January 01 of the previous year, the fine shall not exceed, in any case, 1.000 
UIT. 
The regulation as well provides the possibility to impose fines of up to 100 UIT to each legal 
representative or member of the governing or administrative bodies of infringing companies, 
as to determine their liability on the infringements committed. 
Legislative Decree 1034 also sets the criteria to grade the severity of the infringements, 
largely related to the scope of the infringement and the effects produced (as happened with 
Legislative Decree 701, but adding others, as unlawful benefits expected by the offender, the 
probability of detecting the infringement and the procedural conduct of the offenders. 
Finally, it contemplates as novelty the faculty to impose coercive fines in case of breach of 
injunctions and/or corrective measures, which were imposed. 
 2.2.7. Corrective Measures
Other new aspect in Legislative Decree 1034 is that it expressly establishes measures that can 
be used to reestablish the competitive process, including: 
•	 Cease or fulfillment of activities. 
•	 Obligation to hire, even under certain conditions. 
•	 Unenforceability of anti-competitive clauses or provisions of legal acts.
•	 Access to an association or organization of intermediation.
 2.2.8. Other relevant aspects 
Legislative Decree 1034 also includes the power to impose injunctions at any stage of the 
proceedings, which shall be resolved within 30 days, extendable for a similar term. It is 
noted that those measures may be innovative or non-innovative, generic or specific, and may 
consist particularly in the cessation order, the obligation to hire, the imposition of conditions, 
suspension of legal acts and the application of positive behaviors.
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Regarding the commitment to cease acts under investigation, it is noted that it may 
be presented within 45 days of the notification of the imputation of charges and that the 
Secretariat evaluates it, provided that it fulfills with the following: (i) all or part of the agents 
investigated shall recognize all or some of the charges filed; (ii) it shall be credible that the 
conduct has not caused any serious impairment to the consumers welfare; (iii) those under 
investigation shall offer corrective measures that allow the verification of the injunction and 
guarantee no recurrence. The Secretariat proposes the suspension to the Commission. 
Finally, it also contemplated the possibility of filling an application for exemption from 
liability, which shall provide evidence to help identify and accredit the existence of an 
unlawful practice. If evidence is decisive, the Commission may accept. A new and important 
aspect is that only the first to achieve to accept the scheme will benefit from the exemption 
from liability, while the following are only eligible for a reduction of the fine.
As noted, the development of substantial and procedural aspects of Competition Law is more 
comprehensive in Legislative Decree 1034 than it was in Legislative Decree 701. As well, 
current regulation states different aspects than in the previous regulation, which are not 
expressly defined.
The following summary chart compares the mentioned aspects (see Chart No. 4):
Chart N° 4
Comparative chart between Legislative Decree 701 and Legislative Decree 1034
Legislative Decree 701 Legislative Decree 1034
Objective
•	 Free private initiative to develop in 
the best interest of consumers.
•	 Promote	economic	efficiency	in	market	for	the	best	
interest of consumers. 
Subjective
scope 
•	 Public or private agents carrying 
out an economic activity. 
•	 People who manage or represent 
legal entities.
•	 Companies, independent patrimonies or other public 
or	private,	profit	or	nonprofit	entities,	which	offer	or	
demand services or goods in the market, or whose 
associates or members do.
•	  People, who direct, manage or represent the 
aforementioned.
Objective
scope 
•	 Abuse of dominant position.
•	 Restrictive competition practices.
•	 Abuse of dominant position.
•	 Horizontal	Cartel	Behaviors.	
•	 Vertical Cartel Behaviors. 
•	 Out of the scope of behaviors as consequence of 
the stated in any legal regulation.
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Legislative Decree 701 Legislative Decree 1034
Dominant 
position
•	 One or more companies acting 
independently without competitor, 
buyers, customers or suppliers.
•	 A company with the possibility to substantially 
restrict, affect, or distort the condition of supply 
or demand, without competitors, suppliers or 
customers to counterattack this possibility.
Criteria of 
analysis
•	 Not foreseen. •	 Relative prohibition as general rule.
•	 Absolute prohibition as exceptional rule in limited 
assumptions.
•	 Agreements ancillary to principal legal agreements, 
as exception to the exceptional rule.
Proceedings
•	 Only reference to terms of mayor 
acts	in	first	and	second	instance.
Development of the procedure with most of procedural 
acts	 defined	 and	 with	 express	 terms,	 mainly	 in	 first	
instance. 
Sanctions
•	 Minor or serious infringement of 
up to 1.000 UIT, without exceeding 
10% of the income of the offender.
•	 Very serious infringement of up to 
1.000 UIT, without exceeding 10% 
of the income of the offender. 
•	 Minor infringement of up to 500 UIT, without 
exceeding 8% of the income of the offender or 
economic group.
•	 Serious infringement of up to 1.000 UIT, without 
exceeding 10% of incomes.
•	 Very serious infringement more than 1.000 UIT, 
without exceeding 12% of incomes.
•	 Coercive	fines.
Corrective 
Measures
•	 It is not foreseen •	 Different modalities are foreseen.
Injunctions •	 At any stage and within 10 days to make a decision.
•	 At any stage and within 30 days to make a decision, 
extendable for other 30 days.
Injunction 
commitment
•	 Within 30 days after discharges, 
prior evaluation of the Secretariat 
with specifying the aspects to be 
considered.
•	 Within 45 days of notifying the imputation of 
charges. Evaluation of the Secretariat with several 
conditions to be followed.
Exemption from 
liability 
•	 May be accepted if evidence is 
decisive. 
•	 May be accepted if evidence is decisive. 
•	 Only	the	first	to	achieve	it	will	benefit	from	the	
exemption, the following may get a reduction of the 
fine.
Prescription of 
infringements
•	 5 years after de infringement was 
committed. 
•	 5 years after the last infringing conduct was 
executed. 
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2.3. Indecopi’s decision making bodies
Indecopi’s bodies in charge of applying the regulations for the defense of competition and 
protection are the following:
 2.3.1. First Instance 
The Defense of Free Competition Commission (hereinafter referred to as Commission) is the 
first instance for decision making for both the application of control behaviors and structures 
as well as for issuing injunctions within or outside the administrative proceeding.
 2.3.2. Second Instance 
The Specialized Defense of Competition Chamber of the Tribunal of Indecopi (hereinafter 
referred to Tribunal) is the second administrative instance to review the decisions of the 
Commission, either on substantive, procedural or preventive matters. Additionally, it is also 
an instance to review resolutions issued by the Technical Secretariat at the beginning of the 
administrative sanctioning proceeding, as explained below.
 2.3.3. Instructive Body
The Technical Secretariat of the Commission (hereinafter referred to as Technical 
Secretariat) has the functions of an instructive body and is responsible for the investigation 
of anticompetitive conducts themselves, and as well evaluates business concentration 
in the electrical sector that are notified for prior authorization; in both cases, either upon 
application or ex-officio. Pursuant to current law, the Secretariat is responsible for initiating 
the administrative sanctioning proceeding to control behaviors through a resolution of 
imputation of charges against economic agents under investigation.
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Graph N° 12
Indecopi’s decision making bodies
As every administrative decision, final resolutions of the Specialized Defense of Competition 
Chamber of Indecopi may be contested to the Judiciary through a contentious administrative 
proceeding. 
Special 
Division for 
the Protection 
of the Competition
Defense Committee for
the Free Competition
Administrative Office
of the Commission
Jurisprudence and 
Indecopi Contributions
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3.1. Abuse of dominant Position 
The investigation of acts of abuse of dominant position has occupied considerable part of 
Indecopi’s labor. As general principle, these actions started at the initiative of competitors, 
customers or associations representing customer. Complaints for abuse of dominant position 
have been filed against private or public companies, as well as against intermediary 
organizations. 
In the following graph (see Graph N° 13) the evolution of the number of proceedings initiated 
for abuse of dominant position is shown. 
Graph N° 13
Number of proceedings initiated for abuse of dominant position
Below is a selection of cases that make it possible to review the experience of Indecopi and 
identify the interpretative criteria and evolution in the treatment of various forms of abuse 
of dominant position. The level of development and explanation of selected cases varies 
according to their significance and/or more relevance. 
First Quinquenium
(1993 - 1997)
Second Quinquenium
(1998 - 2002)
Third Quinquenium
(2003 - 2007)
Fourth Quinquenium
(2008 - 2012)
62
19
27
22
Source: Technical Secretariat 
APD
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 3.1.1 Unjustified Refusal to deal61
From the beginning, Indecopi has known and resolved a number of considerable cases 
of abuse of dominant position in the form of unjustified refusal to deal.  Typically, these 
proceedings are solved at the initiative of either party, and, certainly, this type of abuse of 
dominant position has arisen most cases in Indecopi, in comparison with the proceedings 
initiated to investigate the other types of abuse. 
Existing jurisprudence related to the prohibition of unjustified refusal to deal shows that 
companies with a dominant position that hold the right to freely decide who to hire, when 
not to hire (this is to say, when they refuse to deal with a specific economic agent) shall have 
an objective and reasonable justification to sufficiently explain the reasons for their decision. 
This is due to the reason that the refusal to deal by a dominant economic agent may prevent 
competitors from entering the market or hinder their permanence in it. 
Thus, for example, the refusal to sell indispensable supplies produced or offered by a dominant 
company may cause the retirement of one or more competitors from a related market. Likewise, 
the refusal to access an intermediary organization – controlled by a dominant entity- which 
is the necessary channel to reach buyers or consumers, may determine that a competitor may 
not access the market. The cases described below show situations like these and explain the 
method that Indecopi has followed in order to analyze them.
Jurisprudence described shows that the typical elements to identify the abuse of dominant 
position in the form of unjustified refusal to deal are: 
in: BULLARD, Alfredo. (2003b). “El Regreso del Jedi (o de la Discrecionalidad en la Aplicación de las Normas 
de Libre Competencia)” (the Return of the Jedi [or of the Discretionality in the Application of Free Competition 
Regulations]) . In: Themis. No. 47. Lima, pp. 129-158. DIEZ CANSECO, Luis. (2012). “Teoría del Cuello de 
Botella: Las Facilidades Esenciales” (“Bottleneck Theory: Essential Facilities”). In: Themis. No. 61. Lima, pp. 65-
93. FALLA, Alejandro. (2004). “Facilidades Esenciales y Negativa Injustificada a Negociar” (“Essential Facilities 
and Unjustified Refusal to Negotiate”). In: Themis. La Evolución de la Libre Competencia en el Perú.(The 
Evolution of Free Competition in Peru) Lima, Themis, pp. 69-76. HARO, José Juan. (2005). “Contra los excesos 
de la regulación económica. Sobre monopolios naturales, instalaciones esenciales y otros fantasmas”(“Against 
economic regulation excess. Natural monopoly, essential installations and other ghosts”) In: Themis. No. 50. 
Lima, pp. 151-167. HIGA, César and CIGÜEÑAS, Francisco. (2011). “Las Negativa Injustificada a Contratar: 
Aplicación y Límites de la Legislación de Defensa de la Libre Competencia” (“Unjustified refusal to hire: 
application and limits of the legislation of Free Competition Defense”). In: Revista de Derecho Administrativo. 
No. 10. Lima, Tarea Asociación Gráfica Educativa, pp. 95-99. KRESALJA, Baldo and QUINTANA, Eduardo. 
(2005). “La doctrina de las facilidades esenciales y su recepción en el Perú”(“The doctrine of essential facilities 
and it reception in Peru”). In: Ius et Veritas. No. 31. Lima, Tarea Gráfica Educativa, pp. 59-89. QUINTANA, 
Eduardo y VILLARÁN, Lucía. (2008). Op. Cit., pp. 317-326. 
62 Resolution 002-99-INDECOPI/CLC, dated March 19, 1999. Confirmed in all particulars by Resolution 
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•	 Dominant	position	in	a	relevant	market.
•	 Existence	of	the	refusal	to	deal	showed	through	express	manifestation	of	will	or	delaying	
or similar responses.
•	 Unjustified	character	of	the	refusal,	considering	reasonable	and	objective	reasons	that	
may be duly proved. 
•	 Exclusionary	effect	of	competition.	
Regarding the justification for the refusal, jurisprudence shows that it may respond to 
technical (for example, security reasons or impossibility of additional production), legal (due 
to regulations demanding refusal to meet some orders in certain circumstances), contractual 
reasons (for example, when previous commitments entered with third parties cover all the 
available offer), among others.
As shall be seen, cases of unjustified refusal to deal have generated discussion on whether or 
not there is need of competition, direct or indirect (through related companies) between the 
dominant company and competitors harmed by the refusal is a necessity. As well, it has led 
to the evaluation on when the good offered by the dominant company may be qualified as 
essential facility for competitors. 
Chart N° 5
Abuse of dominant Position
Cases of Unjustified Refusal to deal 
CASES OF 
UNJUSTIFIED 
REFUSAL TO 
DEAL
Bergerman and Barbosa v. Asociación de Productores Agrícolas del Mercado de 
Santa Anita (1999)
Cab Cable SA. v. Electrocentro SA. (2002)
Aero Continente SA. v. Banco de Crédito del Perú (2002)
Ferrocarril Santuario Inca Machupicchu SAC. (FERSIMSAC) v. Ferrocarril Transandino 
SA. (FETRANS) (2007)
Compañía Cervecera Ambev Perú SAC. (Ambev) v. Unión de Cervecerías Peruanas 
Backus	 y	 Johnston	SAA.	 (Backus),	 the	Comité	 de	Fabricantes	 de	Cervezas	 de	 la	
Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (CFC), and others (2009).
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a. Bergerman and Barbosa v. Asociación de Productores Agrícolas    
del Mercado de Santa Anita (1999)
The first case that is interesting to explain is the one corresponding to the complaint filed by 
Mr. Roberto Bergerman Acosta and Mr. Walter Barbosa Mendoza v. Asociación de Productores 
Agrícolas del Mercado de Santa Anita, for unjustified refusal to access of Extra Super Rice 
under Molino del Rey brand – commercialized by the plaintiffs – to market of Santa Anita, 
administrated by the aforementioned Association62. 
Some days prior to the complaint, two trucks carrying Molino del Rey rice were prevented 
from accessing the market of Santa Anita, although they had all documentation in order for 
their access and having already paid their entrance fee. As demonstrated by the facts and 
evidence, the refusal to access was due to the order of the administration of the market. 
After the corresponding preliminary analysis and at the request of the plaintiffs, the Free 
Competition Commission ordered as injunction that the Association and its governing bodies 
allow the access of vehicles carrying Molino Rojo rice to the market of Santa Anita, as well as 
free commercialization of that product in said market. 
In the evaluation of the case, the Commission considered that the Association has a dominant 
position in the relevant market defined as supplies centers where rice was commercialized 
at wholesale level in the city of Lima.  Furthermore, it found that the access of trucks with 
Molino del Rey rice were prevented without justification, and that instead of explaining the 
reasons for preventing the entrance of trucks, the Association only denied having ordering 
the refusal to access and it was irrefutably demonstrated in the proceeding that such order 
was given, without evidence of an objective reason to justify it.
Finally, the Commission concluded that such behavior had restricted competition in the sale of 
rice of different brands in the market of Santa Anita. Consequently, it penalized the Association 
with 10 UIT and ordered not to restrict the access of Molino Rojo rice to the market. 
In this case, the Association, as administrator of the market of Santa Anita, was considered 
as an entity with a dominant position that incurred into an unjustified refusal to deal by 
ordering not to allow the access of trucks with the product of the plaintiffs. In this case, the 
0216-1999-TDC-INDECOPI, dated June 16, 1999.
63 It is worth mentioning in the Resolution the Commission stated that the refusal had occurred under "suspicious 
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Association, as itself, was not competing with any the plaintiffs but however it was considered 
that it has restricted competition in the sale of rice of different brands inside the market of 
Santa Anita.  Besides, it was not demonstrated that the Association would have prevented the 
access of trucks in agreement with rice traders who could be benefited with the plaintiffs’ rice 
unavailability for sale63. 
  b.  Cab Cable S.A. v. Electrocentro SA. (2002)
In this case, the behavior denounced by Cab Cable was an unjustified refusal to lease power 
poles for the installation of cables to transmit television signals. In January 1998, Cab Cable, 
concessionaire of cable television service in the city of Huancayo, acquired part of the 
infrastructure that Cable Visión Huancayo S.A. had been using to render that service in the 
aforementioned city. The latter company had entered a lease agreement on poles for laying 
cable networks with Electrocentro, the power concessionaire.
When Cab Cable informed Electrocentro that it had acquired the assets of Cable Visión 
Huancayo S.A. and requested the execution of a new lease agreement on poles to include 
an expansion to other poles, Electrocentro communicated it the impossibility to execute the 
agreement due to “the current circumstances and requirements of the Standards of Quality of 
Electrical Services, due to the reason that our distribution equipment was not the appropriate 
to render that type of collateral services”. In this light, Cab Cable offered Electrocentro to 
purchase an insurance to cover any possible accidents for using its poles, and give a letter of 
guarantee to cover any eventual monetary compensation that Electrocentro may have to pay 
to affected users due to problems with power shortage. Nevertheless, Eletrocentro did not 
accept these offers in order to execute an agreement. 
circumstances". This is because the impediment of trucks to access the market coincided with a complaint for 
violation of intellectual property rights raised by one of the plaintiffs against a rice seller of the market of Santa 
Anita which, in turn, was a member of the Association. In that complaint, Mr. Bergerman denounced the owner 
of company CODIREY EIRL for misuse of the distinctive sign of his property – use of the design and distinctive 
colors of Molino del Rey- on the package of rice CODIREY. This complaint was the reason to order as injunction 
the cease of the misuse of the distinctive sign and the immobilization of product Arroz Grano Esmeralda of 
CODIREY EIRL company. The complaint argued that the refusal of access of trucks with rice Molino del Rey 
to the market of Santa Anita would have been prompted by a letter from a member of the Association to the 
President of the latter, Mr. Romulo Rodriguez, requesting to refuse the access to the market of Molino del Rey 
rice because due to the complaint filed for r violation of distinctive signs. However, there was no evidence to 
prove such claims, but only the existence of disciplinary proceedings for violation of intellectual property rights.
64 Resolution 011-2000-INDECOPI/CLC, dated October 09, 2000. 
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The abovementioned facts led Cab Cable to file a complaint against Electrocentro for 
unjustified refusal to deal. To that end, it stated that the impossibility to access Electrocentro 
poles prevented it from operating in the market, which was not only harming Cab Cable but 
also users of cable television service in the city of Huancayo, who were impeded from having 
an alternative service, different from the offered by Cable Mágico. Additionally, Cab Cable 
presented as evidence of the absence of support of the refusal, that in August 1998 Electrocentro 
entered a lease agreement on poles with Telecable Pichanaki S.R.L., concessionaire of cable 
television, for the area of Pichanaki Vally. In the clauses of this agreement, it is stated that 
the concessionaire of cable television shall assume full responsibility in case of accidents of 
users of electrical service supply and staff of Electrocentro during installation, maintenance 
and service operations. 
Electrocentro suggested for its defense that the decision to suspend the lease of poles was 
due to the reason that during the lease term, its maintenance and repair operations were 
hampered by cable installations, thus power shortages were longer, making it difficult to 
comply with the Standards of Quality of Electrical Services that establish the minimum 
quality of electrical services that power companies are obliged to render. In addition to the 
abovementioned, it was also noted that its refusal was because it was in the middle of a 
process of privatization, thus, it had express order not to accept any contractual obligations 
beyond 1998. 
As well, Electrocentro declared that the refusal to hire did not cause any economic harm 
to the plaintiff because, according to the agreement entered with Cable Visión Huancayo 
S.A., Cab Cable shall receive three times the initial amount of the compensation stated in 
the agreement if Electrocentro does not enter a new lease agreement on poles. As for the 
agreement with Telecable Pichanaki, it specified that those poles were made of cement and 
not wood, and were found in good conditions, while the ones requested by Cab Cable were 
15 year old and were not tall enough for installing additional cables. 
Finally, Electrocentro declared that its refusal did not restrict competition in its favor, because 
rendering cable television services was not part of its business, and besides, it could not be 
accused of trying to benefit Telefónica del Perú, because there was no reason for doing that. 
The Commission explained the scope of the refusal to deal and to what extent a company with 
a dominant position may justify its decision to refusal to hire. It pointed out that in cases of 
unjustified refusal to deal, “the existence of competition between the company carrying out 
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that practice and the company that is being affected by competition is assumed in both cases”. 
As well, it also explained that: 
“In general, competition regulations do not oblige companies to cooperate with their 
competitors, even in cases where a company is in a dominant position. (…) For example, a 
producer may justify the refusal to sell his/her product due to very simple economic reasons, 
such as, failure to comply with some agreements related to the sale (quality, terms, etc. ), 
failure to pay or the violation of intellectual property rights by the consumer of the good”.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Commission suggested that there may be cases of 
refusal where there is no competition between the dominant and the company concerned, 
calling them as “arbitrary refusal”. In this regard, the following was noted:
“(…) this Commission considers that the practices of refusal to deal or negotiate, which do 
not involve competition between the parties, may be treated by agencies and regulations 
protecting free competition. The final decision of the intervention by the competition 
authority shall be based on a case by case evaluation, which may give rise to assumptions 
in which the intervention would not be convenient because: (i) the case involves industries 
that require special treatment from an specific agency; (ii) the market may solve the 
problem by itself; (iii) the cost of the intervention is higher than the benefit to be obtained.” 
Applying the previous concept, the Commission analyzed the reason stated by Electrocentro. 
First, it considered that the plaintiff could not ignore the existence of a commercial relation 
with Cab Cable, because there was sufficient evidence of a fluent communication between 
the companies prior to the refusal of Electrocentro. Regarding the process of privatization 
and the impossibility to execute agreements with obligations beyond 1998, the Commission 
understood that the communication sent by the General Management of Electrocentro to 
its line managements was not enough to demonstrate by itself that the new owner of the 
company were obliged to comply with the lease agreements on poles executed by the previous 
administration. With regard to the eventual breach of the Technical Standard of Quality of 
Electrical Services, the Commission considered that, according to it, power shortages may 
be caused due to different causes, which are not necessarily related to maintenance works 
on poles or other elements of support. Furthermore, regarding the technical argument of 
crossed networks and parallelism, it pointed out that in a large group of blocks was possible 
to determine that poles of Electrocentro would not have any problems of crossed networks 
and parallelism. 
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Based on the analysis before mentioned and even if there is no evidence of competition 
between Cab Cable and Electrocentro, the Commission concluded that “the arguments 
expressed by Electrocentro (..) are not reasonable economic grounds to justify the refusal 
denounced”. As consequence, it declared the complaint grounded and imposed a fine of 20 
UIT to Eletrocentro.
Additionally, it ordered to notify the Resolution and its reports to the authorities on energy 
and telecommunications, in order to propose a multi-sectoral regulation that allows a better 
utilization of the infrastructure described, thereby allowing the development of competition 
in markets involved64.
The second instance ruled confirming the decision of the Commission, although the fine was 
reduced to 5 UIT65. 
The Tribunal rejected the different justifications presented by Electrocentro, considering 
that if existing poles of this company have available capacity it was not reasonable for Cab 
Cable to invest in building high cost poles and social loss by not using integrally existing 
resources. As well, the Tribunal understood that the installation of cable television networks 
in power distribution poles do not necessarily imply energy shortages due to the reason that 
other distribution companies has permitted such installation without necessarily damaging 
the rendering of electrical power supply service. Likewise, it stated that problems of crossed 
networks and parallelism that may be presented would arise, in principle, only by the breach 
of set standards in the National Electrical Code.  With all of that, it concluding that there were 
no reasons to justify the refusal to renew the agreement with Cab Cable. 
In its argumentation the Tribunal explained that:
“If a company cannot acquire the resource or service controlled or rendered by the 
dominant company, it would be prevented from competing in the market, to the detriment 
not only to said company, but as well to potential consumers. The decision that a 
competitor does not enter or leave the market is not due in this case to – the refusal to hire 
– the decision of consumers, but to the unilateral decision of the dominant company”.
65 Resolution 0869-2002/TDC-INDECOPI, dated December 11, 2002. 
66 Resolution 022-2001-INDECOPI/CLC, dated June 11, 2001.
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At the same time, the Tribunal was clear at stating that: 
“This does not mean that the dominant company has the obligation to hire anyone 
who requests it, but it means that cannot refuse to hire unjustifiably. In other 
words, the obligation to hire is not imposed, but the burden of justifying its refusal”. 
Additionally, the Tribunal stated that although a dominant company retains the right to decide 
freely whether or not to hire a third party, when controlling an essential facility shall allow 
access to it if it has available capacity to do so. It asserted that:
“(…) an essential resource is that infrastructure indispensable for the production of a 
certain product in another market, thus, the refusal to provide that good harms competition. 
In this sense, if a company that has a resource or service considered as essential, 
unjustifiably refuses to hire another person and said behavior harms general economic 
interest, especially consumers, shall be sanctioned by the free competition authority”.
The Tribunal sought to be more accurate at this point and defined four conditions so that the 
obligation to allow access to an essential facility exists: 
•	 The	control	of	an	essential	facility	shall	be	in	the	power	of	a	monopolist	(or	a	company	in	
a dominant position).
•	 Incapability	or	unreasonableness	to	duplicate	the	essential	facility.
•	 Refusal	to	use	the	essential	facility.	
•	 Possibility	to	provide	the	facility.	
 c.  Aero Continente SA. v. Banco de Crédito del Perú (2002)
Aero Continent denounced that it had tried to open a checking account at Banco de Crédito 
for its authorized agent in the city of Puerto Maldonado to deposit money from the sales of 
services in such city; this is to say, to have, transfer and use money safely. Nevertheless, 
Banco de Crédito has denied rendering that service, despite it was the only private banking 
institution operating in Puerto Maldonado.  
The Commission considered that the complaint was groundless because it understood there 
were other alternatives for Aero Continente to have secure money availability from the sale of 
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its services in Puerto Maldonado, as for example, the correspondent banking service of Banco 
de la Nación that also operated in said city and allowed the transfer of money for a payment. 
The Commission also understood that the refusal of Banco de Crédito was justified, since 
the plaintiff did not comply with the proceeding adopted by Banco de Crédito in compliance 
with the Regulations of the Superintendency of Banking and Insurance for the surveillance 
of activities of money laundering or other illegal activities66. 
The Tribunal had also another criterion and revoked the decision in the first instance, 
declaring grounded the complaint, ordering Banco de Crédito to accept the application for a 
checking account in Puerto Maldonado, and imposing a fine of 2 UIT67. 
This decision was founded on the dominant position hold by Banco de Credito in the checking 
accounts service in Puerto Maldonado, because there were no other agencies, branches or 
offices of banking entities authorized to render that service. For that, the Tribunal ruled out 
that the correspondent banking service of Banco de la Nación was comparable to transfers 
via checking accounts, because it only allowed one deposit at a time with a different financial 
cost. Besides, it also considered that there was no evidence that other banks intended to 
establish in that city. Based on these circumstances, the Tribunal stated that the checking 
account service was essential to Aero Continente en Puerto Maldonado. 
As for the justifications presented by the defendant, the Tribunal did not consider them 
acceptable to validate the refusal to open a checking account. In that regard, the Tribunal 
noted that although the regulations of the financial system granted discretion to banks to 
evaluate the moral and economic suitability of possible customers, such discretion shall be 
restricted when the bank had the capacity to prevent a user to be completely deprived of 
the service (this is to say, if it has a dominant position), in which case the selection and 
exclusion of potential customers shall be sustained at maximum objective conditions and 
according to the criteria provided by law. Having said that, it considered that the applicable 
legal regulations did not allow the exclusion of a client on the basis of suppositions and, as 
well, that the refusal to treat could not be supported by criteria contained in a document 
prepared internally by the Bank. 
67 Resolution 00870-2002-TDC/INDECOPI, dated December 11, 2002.
68 Resolution 064-2006-INDECOPI/CLC, dated September 04, 2006.
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d. Ferrocarril Santuario Inca Machupicchu SAC (FERSIMSAC)    
 v. Ferrocarril Transandino SA. (FETRANS) (2007)
In the process of promoting private investment on Project of Railway South-East, stretch 
Cusco-Machu Picchu-Hydroelectric Station, the infrastructure of Railway Cusco-Machu 
Picchu was awarded to FETRANS. In the corresponding bidding process, it was established 
through Circular N° 17 that (i) as part of the award, locomotives and rolling stock (locomotives 
and wagons) used by ENAFER will be given to the awardee to transport passengers and load; 
and (ii) the “Awardee shall hire, or in its case incorporate a legal entity to act as Operator of 
Railway Services”.
Graph N° 14
Railway Activity
Once the award was granted, FETRANS incorporated Perurail SA company in order to 
render the service of passenger and load transport in Cusco- Machu Picchu stretch using the 
abovementioned locomotives and rolling stock. For those effects, FETRANS entered a lease 
agreement on all locomotives and rolling stock with Perurail. 
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FERSIMSAC, company authorized to render services of passenger and load transport in the 
Cusco-Machu Picchu stretch, requested FETRANS to enter a lease agreement on the locomotives 
and rolling stock awarded and also requested the same commercial conditions maintained with 
Perurail. FETRANS stated that it was impossible to accept the requested because it had already 
entered a lease agreement with Perurail on all the above means of transport. 
FERSIMSAC filed a complaint against FETRANS for abuse of dominant position in the form 
of unjustified refusal to lease locomotives and rolling stock, based on the lease agreement 
entered with Perurail, preventing it from competing with this company in the rendering 
of passenger and load transport in the South-East Railway. According to the plaintiff, any 
alternative to have its own locomotives and rolling stock (for example, buying or leasing them 
from other companies) was much more onerous than leasing them directly from FETRANS, 
whereupon this company has a dominant position. Furthermore, the plaintiff stated that 
the refusal to lease based on the execution of the agreement with Perurail was not justified 
because it was a form to maintain monopoly on passenger and load transport on said stretch.
Graph N° 15
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FETRANS objected that it was technically and economically feasible for FERMINSAC to 
lease or buy its own locomotives and rolling stock from third parties, but that it did not want 
to make the corresponding investment. As well, it stated that the refusal was fully justified 
because there was an agreement with Perurail that shall be respected. As well, it noted that 
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the award model allowed a vertical integrated operation, which meant that it had preferred 
to recover investment in railway infrastructures and improve the quality of the service, 
instead of encouraging competition since any direct or indirect obligation to provide access 
to locomotives and rolling stock was foreseen. 
The Commission found the complaint groundless68. Although it considered that FETRANS 
had a dominant position and that the existence of a lease agreement on locomotives and 
rolling stock entered between FETRANS and Perurail, without proper due process in which 
parties interested may have accessed it to compete for the leasing, may prevent competition in 
the market of passenger and load transport services, concluded that the refusal was justified 
in the fact that Circular NO17 of the bidding process allowed FETRANS to lease 100% of 
locomotives and rolling stock from the related company that it may create. 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned, the Commission stated that the existing situation 
consolidates a monopoly in the rendering of transport service in the Cusco-Machu Picchu 
stretch, for which it was convenient for the State to intervene to establish a proceeding to 
ensure access to locomotive and rolling stock which is part of the assets of FETRANS award.
The Tribunal held an opposite opinion because revoke the first instance decision and declared 
the complaint grounded, ordering FETRANS to stop with the refusal to lease and imposed a 
fine of 165 UIT69.
First, the Tribunal agreed with the Commission that FETRANS has a dominant position in the 
relevant market, because it ruled out that the purchase or supply of locomotive and rolling stock 
of third parties was a substitute in economic terms of the lease with FETRANS; this since such 
investment would have been a barrier of access due to higher costs and a barrier to exit due to 
sunk costs, and besides it was an investment that only may be recovered in seven years.
 
Second, the Tribunal stated that: 
“Literal interpretation of Circular N° 17 shows that vertical integration was protected 
by FSO, provided that the awardee of Fetrans Award could choose to hire a company 
as transport service operator or incorporate a legal entity acting as such. However, this 
does not imply the recognition of a kind of exclusivity on the material in favor of Fetrans-
69 Resolution 1122-2007/TDC-INDECOPI, dated July 02, 2007.
70 The other defendants were Maltería Lima SA., Compañía Cervecera del Sur del Perú SAA. and Cervecería San 
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Perurail Group, in virtue of which Fetrans may deny to lease materials to third parties, 
other than the existing”.
For that reason, the Tribunal made a systematic interpretation and comprehensive view of 
Circular N°17, pointing out that it: 
“… suggested an exceptional scenario, in which the lease of the entire material of 
Perurail was justified; however, when an operator unrelated to Fetrans requested access 
to this material, it shall receive a nondiscriminatory treatment, which means that Fetrans 
could not refuse access to the material only on the basis of a previous lease agreement 
with Perurail”.
 
According to the Tribunal, said interpretation was consistent with the purpose sought when 
admitting the vertical integration between the awardee and the transport company, which 
was to ensure continuity of the service for passenger and load transport, and not to grant a 
kind of exclusivity to the Concessionaire in the use of locomotives and rolling stock to render 
the service for passenger and load transport. In function of that, it concluded that the refusal 
to lease to FERSIMSAC was not justified by the previous contract entered with Perurail. 
 e. Compañía Cervecera Ambev Perú SAC. (Ambev) v. Unión de Cervecerías Peruanas 
Backus and Johnston SAA. (Backus), the Comité de Fabricantes de Cervezas de la 
Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (CFC), and others (2009)70
Ambev would enter the Peruvian market of selling beer and tried to join CFC, as it controlled 
the Containers Interchangeable System (SIE) in which the company sought to participate. 
CFC was the holder of collective brands that distinguished beer containers of 620 ml used by 
consumers to buy beer at that time, by exchanging empty containers with full containers with 
their favorite brand, being the latter the SIE.
For that, after joining the National Society of Industries (SIN) as adherent member, Ambev 
requested as well to join CFC, but its access was denied, pointing out that said company did 
not elaborate bottles or bottle beer in Peru. Ambev requested the decision to be reconsidered 
because the Statute of SNI and CFC did not establish the elaboration or bottling of beer in 
Juan SAA.
71 Resolution 045-2009-INDECOPI/CLC, dated June 25, 2009.
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Peru as a requirement at the moment of presenting its request, but the refusal continued. 
Therefore Ambev requested CFC to provide the percentage of beer production necessary for 
joining CFC, and CFC simply replied that it was necessary to be an industrial member of SNI 
(not only an adherent member) and develop the brewing or malt industry in Peru.
In January 2004, Ambev filed a complaint for abuse of dominant position against Backus and 
CFC for unjustified refusal to deal as part of a strategy to prevent its access to SIE. In the 
complaint Ambev stated that its access to CFC had been denied in spite of complying with all 
the requirements, without one being making and bottling beer in Peru. As well, it confirmed 
that as a member of SIN it was entitle to attend union committees such as CFC. 
CFC defended itself stating that joining CFC requires the joint consideration of the 
requirements foreseen in both SIN and CFC Statute, and that this determines that in order 
to join CFC, it is required to be an industrial member, have started activities and pursue 
activities related to the members of CFC. As well, CFC stated that it was unreasonable to 
include companies which are not engage in producing beer, only by adducing to be a member 
of SIN, because the Statue foresees to group industrial members developing the same activity 
into committees. 
On the other hand, Backus defended itself stating that Ambev had requested to join CFC and 
not to establish a system of bottle exchange with Backus or its related companies. Similarly, 
it declared that companies from Backus group did not seek to create any barriers for Ambev 
to access the market, thus they offered it to establish a real system of bottle exchange that 
benefit consumers and prevent the improper use of Backus group assets. Finally, Backus 
pointed out that adherent members of SNI, who do not represent a current industry and are 
not involved with a percentage in domestic production could not access SNI committees, 
due to the reason that these bodies seek to group specialized manufacturing producers of a 
particular industry and not future industries, that being in activity, classified in a category 
of CIIU which does not correspond to the committee they want to apply, as happened with 
AmBev and its desire to join CFC.
During this proceeding different actions were taken, even an injunction was issued in favor of 
Ambev that was subsequently revoked in the second instance.  After a long investigation, in 
2009 the Commission decided to accept the withdrawal of the complaint presented by Ambev, 
mediating for this, the presentation of the extrajudicial settlement reached by the plaintiff 
and Backus. 
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Commission Resolution accepted the withdrawal 
of the compliant and decided to conclude the proceeding due to the lack of involvement with 
general interest71. In particular, the Commission considered that although there had been an 
unjustified refusal to access CFC, said behavior did not produce any adverse effect on the 
capacity of Ambev to compete, thus an affectation on the competitive process would not have 
been verified.
For the analysis, the Commission distinguished two scenarios to access an intermediary 
organization. On one hand, it stated that access to an organization of this nature is relevant 
when it is indispensable or significant for the company to offer its products and services to 
buyers, by which the refusal to access the organization reduces its capacity to compete in the 
market. In that case, the Commission noted that it was necessary to evaluate the nature of 
the agreements that support that organization and the purpose of its operation. The following 
Graph (see Graph N° 16) shows the scenario in which access to an intermediary organization 
is indispensable.  
Graph N° 16
Indispensable or significant intermediary organization 
On the other hand is the scenario in which belonging to an intermediary organization is not 
a significant or vital requirement for the company to commercialize its goods in the market, 
so that the refusal to access is not a barrier to entry and its effect is diminished or disappears. 
This scenario is shown in the following graph (see Graph N° 17).
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72 BULLARD, Alfredo. (1997). Op. Cit. DIEZ ESTELLA, Fernando. (2003). La Discriminación de Precios en el 
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Graph N° 17
Not indispensable or insignificant intermediary organization 
Considering the aforementioned, the Commission understood, in first place, that pursuant 
the Statutes of SIN and CFC, the only requirement to join CFC was to be a member of 
SIN, but not an industrial member. Besides, it considered that it was not valid to refuse the 
incorporation of CFC by stating that Ambev was not a beer producer in Peru, because “… the 
incorporation of adherent partners with experience in the industry developed by CFC does not 
distort the fulfillment of its functions”. Thus, it concluded that the refusal was unjustified. 
Regarding the effect of this refusal, the Commission stated that “…a harmful effect on the 
capacity of Ambev to compete would not be verified, nor that it has been in disadvantage for 
not participating in SIE, all of this for the scenarios analyzed”.
In order to reach to this conclusion, the Commission stated that it would analyze if the alleged 
behavior had created barriers to access to Ambev, pointing out that: 
“… ‘barriers to access”, for the purposes of antitrust analysis, are those structural 
conditions of the market or behaviors of incorporated companies that prevent or delay 
the access of potential competitors, in such way that allows the execution of power of the 
first ones in the market”.
As well, it stated that: 
“The delay to access of a new competitor, product of a behavior incompatible with the 
economic efficiency of the established agent, is as well contained under the prohibition 
of abuse of dominant position due to its harmful effects on the competitive process”.
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With regards to the access of an intermediary entity, such as CFC, the Commission stated that: 
“… refusal to incorporate or maintain an agent within an agreement between competitors 
involving a facility to participate in the market (intermediary organization) may result in 
an anticompetitive behavior by the company, in the case of abuse of dominant position 
(…)”.
However, it also explained that:
“… when the intermediary organization brings together producers of a specific good, and 
being a member of that organization is not an indispensable or significant requirement 
to commercialize in the market, the refusal to incorporate or maintain does not constitute 
a barrier to access”. 
Finally, the Commission stated that: 
“… for an unjustified refusal to collaborate among competitors to be a behavior of abuse 
of dominant position, in the form of barriers to strategic access, the costs imposed to 
the competitor entering due to that behavior are relevant. In effect, what is relevant for 
identifying an anticompetitive behavior, under these suppositions, is the magnitude of 
those costs and how they impact on the capacity to compete of rivals, and, particularly in 
the opportunity of potential competitors to access the market”.
Based on these ideas, the Commission evaluated in what extent Ambev had been affected 
for not belonging to CFC and not participating in SIE, finding that said company had 
accomplished to enter the market and launch its products in its own containers, even without 
been part of CFC. Consequently, it noted that although the refusal may have created higher 
costs for Ambev, the magnitude of them did not have an impact in the vital capacity to compete 
against the plaintiff. 
3.1.2 Discrimination72
The experience of Indecopi regarding abuse of dominant position in the form of discrimination 
is not as wide as its experience on unjustified refusal to deal. However, there have been 
several cases of discrimination that have given rise to interesting developments. 
Derecho de la Competencia (“Price discrimination on Competition Law”). Madrid, Thomson - Civitas. GERADIN, 
Damien and PETIT, Nicholas.  (2005). “Price Discrimination under EC Competition Law: The Need for a Case-
by-Case Approach”. In: Global Competition Law Centre Working Paper.  No. 07/05. See: http://www.coleurope.
eu/nl/node/5844. QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2007).  “Discriminación de Precios y Libre Competencia: ¿Nuevos 
Aires para una Antigua Figura?”(“Price discrimination and Free Competition: new looks for an old figure?”)  In: 
Ethos. No. 1. Lima, Impresso Gráfica, pp. 63-72.
73 Resolution 003-93-INDECOPI/CLC, dated August 31, 1993.
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Jurisprudence demonstrates that the prohibition of discriminatory practices is a limitation to 
commercial strategies that may be used by companies in a dominant position. Even though 
they can freely define, for example, their discount policies, they shall always do it with a 
reasonable support, so that they do not place some competitors in disadvantage with others, 
because is evident that a buyer who obtains discounts when acquiring inputs may produce or 
offer these inputs in better conditions than the competitor who does not have access to such 
discounts. 
Discrimination may be presented in different forms, including situations of price differentiation 
or selective discounts, as well as non-uniform processes with regard to other sale or contracting 
conditions (contractual terms, credit conditions, obligations assumed by the buyer, among 
others). These cases, which will be described further on, mainly refer to complaints filed 
for price discrimination, although other forms are as well included, identifying the method 
usually used by Indecopi to analyze them. 
Typical elements of Discrimination
•	 Dominant	position	in	the	relevant	market.
•	 Unequal	conditions	applied	by	a	dominant	company.
•	 Equivalence	of	buyers,	for	example	due	to	costs	related	to	serving	them.
•	 Exclusionary	effect	of	competition
Regarding equivalence or not of buyers, jurisprudence shows that this may be evaluated in 
terms of costs assumed by the dominant company to serve each buyer (if costs are similar, 
different sale conditions shall not be applied) or, in some cases, in terms of its willingness to 
pay (“elasticity of demand”) given the particular characteristic of it demand. In fact, the most 
usual way to evaluate equivalence is through incurred costs. 
In the cases of discrimination described, the issue of whether or not a competitive relationship, 
direct or indirect (through related companies), between the dominant company and harmed 
competitors by unjustified differential treatment, may also be identified.  
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Chart N° 6
Abuse of dominant Position 
Cases of Discrimination
CASES OF
DISCRIMINATION
Fondo de Fomento para la Ganadería Lechera del Sur (Fongal Sur) contra Gloria 
S.A. (1993).
Empresa Editora El Comercio SA. contra Aero Continente S.A. (1999).
Asociación de Empresas Envasadoras de Gas del Perú (ASEEG) contra Vopak 
Serlipsa S.A. y Petróleos del Perú S.A. (Petroperú) (2007). 
 a. Fondo de Fomento para la Ganadería Lechera del Sur (Fongal Sur)  
  v. Gloria S.A. (1993)
Fongal Sur filed a complaint against Gloria for paying discriminatory prices for whole raw milk 
bought from stockbreeders grouped in said Fongal, against the prices paid by stockbreeders 
grouped in Fongal Arequipa73. 
Particularly, Fongal Sur denounced several practices of price differentiation consisting of: (i) 
payment of different purchase prices, depending on whether the milk came from the group of 
producers of Fongal Sur or Fongal Arequipa, (ii) a bonus granted on the price to be paid based 
on the content of fat in milk, for which the results of the exam of fat content were changed, 
and (iii) bonuses granted for sales of greater milk volume, that only some stockbreeders may 
reach. According to Fongal Sur, the objective of Gloria was to unduly benefit Fongal Arequipa, 
placing an advantage on stockbreeders who were members of Fongal Arequipa.
With regard to the first alleged behavior, the Commission identified that the difference in 
prices paid was given and finished before Legislative Decree 701 was issued, so greater 
analysis was not necessary. Regarding bonuses for fat content, the Commission demonstrated 
that Gloria, independently from the origin of milk, was granting them by using a scientific 
method recognized in this industry for offering accurate results when measuring the fat 
content of milk; and, in addition it did not find any evidence that Gloria had distorted the 
results of the exam of fat content. Finally, regarding bonuses for volume sold, the Commission 
considered that Gloria grant them indistinctly, based on an objective criteria as the volume of 
daily milk sold by each stockbreeder, stating that this bonus was only a measure to incentive 
greater production. 
74 Resolution 004-98-INDECOPI/CLC, dated September 30, 1998.
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In this case, the Commission considered that price differentiation may be justified by “intrinsic 
reasons for the operation itself”. In particular, the reasons for price differentiation paid by 
Gloria were related to the characteristics of milk supply, such as the volume sold and the 
amount of fat contained in a product. The explanation behind these reasons may be that the 
costs of Gloria were reduced according to the higher fat content of milk and more purchase 
volume, so it was justified to pay higher prices to whole raw milk producers, who achieved 
the abovementioned conditions. 
 b. Empresa Editora El Comercio S.A. v. Aero   S.A. (1999)
El Comercio used air cargo services rendered by different companies, including 
Aerocontinente, to transport the journal to cities inside the country. Price policies of such 
airline included a general price per kilogram of cargo depending on the destination and other 
price, 50% higher for transport of cargo with any characteristics classifying it as perishable 
(fertile eggs, loading of material sent by courier, journals, and newspapers among others). In 
1997 Aerocontinente created a third price, 100% higher than general cargo, applicable only 
to journals, newspapers and magazines. 
Due to the aforementioned, El Comercio filed a complaint against Aercontinente for price 
discrimination, stating that the creation of a higher price for journals and magazines, different 
from other perishable cargo, was unjustified. This is to say, it denounced price discrimination 
in the transport of two types of perishable cargo.
Additionally, El Comercio denounced that there was also discrimination in the prices that 
Aerocontinente charged to different journal publishers, and presented evidence showing 
that El Comercio was charged with the new price, while other journals were charged with 
lower prices for the same destination, despite of having similar or lower volumes to the ones 
transported by El Comercio. 
The Commission found that Aerocontinente had a dominant position in four of the routes 
that were matter of the complaint (Lima-Iquitos, Lima-Pucallpa, Lima-Puerto Maldonado and 
Lima-Tarapoto). Additionally, due to the proofs that different prices were charged between 
perishable and daily cargo and among journals, the existence of circumstances justifying 
such differentiation was evaluated. 
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Regarding discrimination among types of perishable cargo, the Commission concluded that 
the transport of journals was different from other types of perishable cargo. Those differences 
were related to the cost of opportunity of carrying the journal every day of the year, on the 
first flight in the morning, and in only one-way route (because the cargo did not return on 
the return flight). As well, the creation of the new rate was given at a time of restriction of air 
transport services, because of the exit or gradual retirement of several airlines (as Faucett, 
Americana de Aviación and, to some extent, Aero Perú), therefore the first flight in the morning 
of Aerocontinente for different routes had much more demand. Finally, it also considered as 
a difference that journal companies had less elasticity of demand (this is to say, the need for 
air transport was not considerably affected by changes in the price of the service), thus they 
were willing to pay a higher price. In accordance with those characteristics, the Commission 
considered that there was a justification for charging different prices according to the type of 
perishable cargo, thus, the behavior denounced was not a case of abuse of dominant position.
Regarding discrimination among journals, the Commission found that Aerocontinente has 
entered agreements (hereinafter referred to “swap account”) with most journals, through 
which both parties froze their rates at the date of executing the agreements and as well 
mutual discounts were granted. El Comercio did not accept to enter into a contract of that 
nature, although it was offered by Aerocontinente. Therefore, the Commission found that, 
through such contracts, journals granted specific advantages to Aerocontinente, which was 
not getting from El Comercio, for that reason it was justified to charge lower prices to the first 
companies. Consequently, as well in this case was concluded that this behavior was not an 
act of abuse of dominant position74.
The Tribunal upheld the ruling of the Commission, stating that the demand of journals and 
magazines was of a special nature because they required daily and immediate dispatch 
on the first flight in the morning, circumstances that reasonably explained the higher rate 
applied by Aerocontinente. As well, it noted that in order to determine the legality of price 
differentiation the existence of a reasonable enough explanation for such difference shall be 
evaluated, and on the other hand, if it was possible to appreciate a clear purpose to grant 
special treatment to some competitors in detrimental to others75.
 
75 Resolution 0078-1999/TDC-INDECOPI, dated March 05, 1999. 
76 Resolution 051-2006/CLC-INDECOPI, dated July 10, 2006. 
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 c. Asociación de Empresas Envasadoras de Gas del Perú (ASEEG) v.  
  Vopak Serlipsa S.A. y Petróleos del Perú S.A. (Petroperú (2007). 
Petroperú carried out, apart from activities of production and commercialization of 
hydrocarbons, the operation of storage terminals for hydrocarbons. Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned, the storage terminals for hydrocarbons, chemicals and gases in the port 
of Callao were operated exclusively by Vopak, under an agreement with the Peruvian 
government, after obtaining the award on the public bid for awarding that service. For that 
reason, Petroperú had hired all Vopak storage capacity in the Port of Callao. 
In September 2000, Pemagasa, company belonging to ASEEG, that imported liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG), requested for storage capacity to Petroperú, but it answered that it did 
not have capacity because it was storing LPG necessary for domestic demand. Subsequently, 
in March 2001, LLamagas requested storage to Petroperú for LPG; this company gave up to 
9,500 barrels capacity, yielded to Vopak, after which Llamagas requested Vopak that storage 
and was able to enter an agreement for said volume. A few months later, in June 2001, 
Llamagas requested additional storage to Petroperú for 1,000 barrels, and again it gave up to 
storage capacity and yielded to Vopak, after which Llamagas requested Vopak this additional 
capacity, obtaining a contract for it.
ASEEG filed a complaint against Vopak and Petroperú for establishing unequal conditions 
for equivalent services in the LPG storage market, to the extent that Petroperú had granted 
Llamagas preferential rights to acquire storage, restricting the possibility of any other 
distributor as Pemagasa to access to the new storage capacity available, harming with that 
the competitive process at that level of the value chain of LPG commercialization.
Vopak declared that it did not obtain any benefits from the alleged infringement because 
it would have obtained the same income for entering a contract with Llamagas or with any 
other competitor. As well, it stated that there were no unequal conditions for equivalent 
services, because when Permagasa presented its application there was not storage capacity 
available, situation that changed when Llamagas requested that service. Besides, it explained 
that there was no contractual or legal obligation requiring the company to communicate to 
all stakeholders about the storage capacity available in the market. Finally, it stated that if 
Permagasa had been harmed by the agreement entered with Llamagas, this constitutes a 
legal competitive harm. 
Petroperú claimed that it was not responsible for the obligation of achieving storage rights 
prior importing LPG. As well, it stated that it did not participate in the market supply of LPG 
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storage, but rather, it requested that service, thus it and Vopak did not have a dominant 
position in the market. 
The Commission declared grounded the complaint and imposed a fine of 154.8 UIT to 
Petroperú and 9.5 UIT to Vopak76.
To this end, the Commission identified that Vopak had a dominant position in the market 
of hydrocarbons storage services of Callao. However, it also considered that this position 
was shared with Petroperú, due to the facts related to Pemagasa’s request and the storage 
agreement entered between Vopak and Llamagas. 
Regarding the behavior denounced, the Commission considered that there was evidence 
supporting the conclusion that Petroperú had previously informed Llamagas its decision to 
give up part of the storage capacity contracted with Vopak in the port of Callao; placing it in 
an advantageous position over any other LPG distributor interested in contracting the storage 
capacity released. This was deduced by the Commission by the fact that communication 
between Petroperú and Llamagas, informing that it had given up the storage capacity and the 
communication from Llamagas to Vopak requesting to hire the capacity released was only a 
day difference.
Additionally, the Commission considered that Vopak had granted preferential rights to 
Llamagas, to the detrimental of other LPG distributors, when hiring directly with the first 
company without giving the opportunity to other LPG packagers, as Pemagasa, to access the 
available storage capacity. With this behavior, it would have prevented to comply with the 
principle of free competition contained in its Agreement which states that “... The Operator 
shall not grant preferential rights to any wholesaler, which involves or allows the exclusion of 
others in the use of storage facilities in Terminals, or the release of hydrocarbons in Terminals“.
In the appeal, Petroperú set out that Vopak did not have a dominant position in the 
hydrocarbon storage service, because Repsol and Zeta Gas (LPG packaging companies) 
had greater storage capacity in the area and, despite this, were improperly excluded from 
the relevant market. Although these companies did not compete effectively in the rendering 
of said service, thus they were not potential competitors in the provision of the service. In 
addition to the abovementioned, it also stated that it was not accredited that the alleged 
behavior would have generated a profit to Petroperú, as required by law. Finally, it stated that 
there had not been harm to the competitive process or the general economic interest.
77 Resolution 0454-2007/TDC-INDECOPI, dated March 30, 2007.
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The Tribunal upheld the first instance decision. First, it ruled out that LPG storage capacity of 
Repsol and Zeta Gas was available to other packagers, because both companies had declared 
that they were not engage in leasing storage capacity. Consequently, said capacity was not a 
substitute of the storage capacity of Vopak and was not part of the relevant market.
Graph N° 18
LPG storage plants in Peru
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Source: Ministry of Energy and Mines - DGH.
By: STC-CLC/Indecopi.
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition 97
On the other hand, it considered that, when Pemagasa and Llamagas presented the requests 
to hire storage, Petroperú had already hired all its capacity, thus Vopak could only hire this 
service with another LPG packager if Petroperú released part of its capacity, for which the 
dominant position of Vopak depended only in Petroperú decision. 
Second, it considered that the principle of free competition contained in Vopak’s agreement 
obliged this company to act trying to hire those agents who may perform a more efficient use 
of the capacity released. Moreover, it stated that its dominant position in the leasing market 
of LPG storage capacity impeded it from discriminating among agents that may require said 
service, so that it may affect competition. 
Related to the aforesaid, the Tribunal verified that capacity leasing agreements between 
Vopak-Petroperú and Vopak-Llamagas showed that rates charged to Llamagas for storage 
and dispatch operations were higher than those charged to Petroperú, whereupon Vopak had 
as well obtained individualized benefits derived from a discriminatory behavior. 
Chart N° 7
Storage Agreeements entered by Vopak
Concept/Client Petroperú Llamagas
Date of entry 29 01 99 28 05 01
Validity Indefinitive Until 31.03.04
Forms of 
remuneration 
(US$)
Storage
Capacity Fee 0,60 barrel/month 0,6473 barrel/month
Operation Fee (dispath) 
Throughput 0,58 barrel 0,6258 barrel
Contracted Capacity 49 500 barrels 10 500 barrels
Additional
Services
Overtime
(US$)
7 truck/hour
(minimum 25 dollars per hour or 
fraction)
7 5524 truck/hour
(minimum 46 9544 dollars per hour or 
fraction)
Fuel transfer to
another tank 0,22 barrel 0,3129 barrel
Additionals
25 dollars per ship/hour or 
fraction (Bunker dispatch)
0.015 dollars per barrel 
(received in bonded warehouse)
0,05 soles per gallon 
(Dispatch in cylinders)
15,51 dollars per m2
(Leasing office spaces)
Reason of the Contract ending Current Contract Contract termination at the request of Llamagas
Source: Petroperú y Llamagas.            Elaboration: ST-CLC/Indecopi.
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Finally, the Tribunal affirmed that the cession of storage capacity to Llamagas, instead of to 
Permagasa, may enclose an intention of Petroperú to protect its position in the commercial 
level where it participates in the commercialization chain of LPG, upon which it does obtain 
benefits from the behavior denounced77.
3.1.3 Abuse of Legal Proceedings78
As it is known, companies shall meet the requirements and conditions stated in the legal 
framework and obtain authorizations, licenses, concessions or operating licenses to start 
operating in the market. Although the compliance with necessary requirements is vital for the 
adequate and safe operation of such companies, the existence thereof and the legal channels 
to question their non-compliance may be a way of indirectly occasioning undue restraints 
to competition. In effect, companies or agents already established may find attractive or 
convenient to impede access of new competitors or to delay their access to the market, 
opposing to the granting of permissions, or operating licenses mentioned before. As well, 
they may find useful to question, through the corresponding legal channels, the validity of 
the permissions or authorization already granted to competitors.
In this way, competitors may wrongfully use processes or proceedings established by the 
legal framework to impede or delay the access of competitors or hinder their permanence in 
the market. It is clear that in this type of cases it shall be extremely debatable if the company 
who opposes to the access of a new company is trying to unlawfully restrict competition or 
is simply taking care through the right of action that all regulations of an adequate and safe 
operation are fulfilled.
78 On the abuse of dominant position in the form of abusive and repeated use of processes and procedures the 
following may be seen: BULLARD, Alfredo y FALLA, Alejandro. (2005). “El Abogado del Diablo. El Abuso de 
Procesos Legales o Gubernamentales como Práctica Anticompetitiva”(“Devil´s Advocate. The abuse of legal or 
governmental proceedings as anticompetitive behavior”). In: Ius et Veritas. N° 30. Lima, Tarea Gráfica Educativa, 
pp. 40-51. FALLA, Alejandro y DRAGO, Mario. (2012). “Unas son de Cal y otras de Arena. Aplicación de la 
Ley de Competencia durante el 2011”(“Some are of lime and the others of sand. Application of Competition 
Right in 2011”)  In: Ius et Veritas. No. 44. Lima, Tarea Gráfica Educativa, pp. 158-182. QUINTANA, Eduardo. 
(2012). “Cuando los Litigios se Convierten en una Herramienta Anticompetitiva”. (“When Litigation turns 
into an anticompetitive tool”) In: Diálogo con la Jurisprudencia.  No. 160. Lima, Editorial el Búho, pp. 59-64. 
RIVERA, Alfonso. (2012). “Cómo pasar un camello por el ojo de una aguja: sobre cómo el Indecopi ha dejado 
prácticamente sin efecto la figura del Abuso Anticompetitivo de Procesos” ("How to pass a camel through the eye 
of a needle: how Indecopi has virtually left the Figure of Abuse of Anticompetitive Processes without effect”). In: 
Diálogo con la Jurisprudencia. No. 160. Lima, Editorial El Búho, pp. 51-58.
79 Resolution 057-96-INDECOPI/CLC, dated April 08, 1995. 
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The experience of Indecopi in this matter is circumscribed to three cases. However, as may 
be observed hereinafter, the level of study of this figure has become deeper, contributing to 
adequately to delimit the scope of the behavior prohibited. 
The prohibition of abuse of legal processes allows a healthy balance between the exercise 
of the right to act or petition and protection of competition, constituting as well a limitation 
to the behavior of dominant companies. In that sense, companies with a dominant position 
retain their right to start legal actions, but shall take care that their actions do not constitute 
barriers to access or stay in the market. 
After the development of jurisprudence given, the characteristic elements of this form of 
abuse of dominant position are: (i) the repeated use of legal actions against competitors, and 
(ii) the abusive use of such actions. Being the latter the element most difficult to identify, it has 
been considered that the abusive character is set if two conditions are met. First, the absence 
of an objective foundation or a reasonable expectation of triumph that supports the aspiration 
of the agent that starts and/or promotes legal actions shall be identified (this is to say, it shall 
be established that they are legal actions without merit). Only if the aforementioned is found, 
the second step shall be to identify if legal actions without merit try to affect the correct 
operation of the market, going against competitors or seeking to establish barriers to access 
(anticompetitive effect). 
Chart N° 8
Abuse of dominant Position - Abuse of Legal Processes
ABUSE OF
LEGAL
PROCESSES
Lebar SA. v. Asesoría Comercial SA. and Asociación de Grifos y Estaciones de Servicio 
del Perú (AGESP) (1995).
Asociación Peruana de Operadores Portuarios (APOP) and others v. Pilot Station SA. 
(Pilot) (2007).
Asociación de Operadores de Ferrocarriles del Perú (APOFER) v. Ferrocarril Transandino 
SA. (FETRANS), Perurail SA. (Perurail), Peruval Corp. SA. (Peruval), and Peruvian 
Trains & Railways SA. (PTR) (2011).
 a. Lebar SA. v. de Asesoría Comercial S.A. y la Asociación de    
  Grifos y Estaciones de Servicio del Perú (AGESP) (1995).
This was the first case heard in this matter by Indecopi and occurred while Legislative Decree 
701 was in effect, a regulation that did not include the abusive use of legal processes and 
proceedings as specifically prohibited behavior. The facts are described below: 
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Lebar is a company that was following the necessary procedures to obtain the necessary 
authorizations to install and operate a fuel service station and fuel sales at the intersection of 
Javier Prado and Nicolás Arriola avenues in the city of Lima. 
The AGESP had questioned before several authorities the installation and operation of 
Lebar´s petrol station, affirming that the establishment breached the prohibition of installing 
petrol stations and service stations on the roads, established by the Security Regulations for 
Establishments selling Hydrocarbons Derivatives to the Public (Decree Supreme 054-93-EM). 
Particularly, it has started different proceedings before administrative authorities (General 
Directorate of Hydrocarbons from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the Municipality of Lima 
and the Municipality of La Victoria) and a legal process (actions for constitutional guarantees 
initiated by the Municipality of Lima for authorizing the establishment of Lebar’s petrol station).
Diego Thompson Superior Pedagogic Institute as well was against the establishment of Lebar´s 
petrol station, following the recommendations stated by AGESP, to the extent that it was located 
in Nicolas de Arriola Avenue, just in front of the petrol station. 
Additionally to the aforementioned, the Directorate of Hydrocarbons from the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines annulled the authorization to install Lebar’s petrol station, considering that 
it had not comply to start the corresponding works within 90 days, pursuant to the provisions of 
art. 17 of the Regulations for Commercializing Liquid Fuels derived from Hydrocarbons.
Due to the aforementioned, Lebar filed a complaint against Acosa and AGESP for having “… 
agreed between them, as well as with different companies and entities, on several actions with 
the apparent purpose to impede the development of its project; stating as well that the defendants 
had agreed on“… commercialization and dispatch conditions in the market, every time that 
those acts are directed to impede the operation of our company, so that it cannot represent 
competition for other petrol station related to AGESP and, mainly to Acosa, which is located very 
close to ours”.
The Commission considered that “… the abuse of governmental proceedings (administrative 
or legal) may be considered as a prohibited behavior susceptible to be understood within 
the legislation that sanctions restrictive practices of free competition”. However, after the 
corresponding investigation, the Commission concluded that evidence demonstrating that 
Acosa or AGESP had used “… governmental proceedings with the single purpose to hinder 
competition, impeding the access of LEBAR to the market, were not presented; nor given or 
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presented evidence demonstrating that one or other had used unlawful means to influence the 
action of governmental authorities in charge of solving the proceedings”. 
In its evaluation, the Commission rejected that the document titled “Aide Memoire” presented 
by Lebar was enough evidence to demonstrate the alleged behavior. In this document there was 
a review of the actions taken by AGESP and Diego Thompson Superior Pedagogic Institute, 
recommending the start of several actions for each of them. It is worth mentioning that this 
document was a copy of the original document and that the original one was apparently printed 
in Acosa’s letterhead, although it did not have the date and signature, as well as any evidence 
of the author. 
In this regard, the Commission considered that it was not demonstrated that the wording 
of such document was attributable to Acosa’s staff, besides, it has repeatedly denied its 
participation during its drafting and AGESP also refused receiving it. It also considered that 
even if the wording of that document was attributable to Acosa, by itself it would not prove 
the participation, direct or indirect, of this company in the acts referred to in the document. 
Moreover, there was no evidence that Acosa would have determined the decision of the Board 
of Directors of AGESP to take the actions taken against Lebar’s petrol station. 
Additionally, the Commission considered that although the General Directorate of Hydrocarbons 
exceeded the scope of its powers to rule on issues that were not questioned in the administrative 
proceedings (determine if the petrol station was located on public roads) and qualify as invalid 
the documentation presented by Lebar to accredit the date of start of works, had not provided 
evidence that Acosa or AGESP impelled the decision of the Directorate of Hydrocarbons 
Inspection to rescind the authorization of installing Lebar’s petrol station. 
Based on the aforementioned, the Commission declared groundless the complaint, considering 
that the wrongful use of governmental proceedings as restrictive behavior of free competition 
was not sufficiently accredited79.
80 Resolution 037-2005-INDECOPI/CLC, dated August 04, 2005. 
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 b. Asociación Peruana de Operadores Portuarios (APOP) et al  
 v. Pilot Station S.A. (Pilot) (2007)
The pilotage service is offered to support the captain of a vessel or ship maneuvers, 
complying with the nautical regulations during the performance of operations of mooring 
or unmooring, relocation, turning maneuvers, among others, when a vessel uses a port. 
Given the characteristics of this service and pursuant to Peruvian regulations, its provision 
is mandatory for all vessels entering main ports of a country. In Peru this service is rendered 
under free competition conditions. 
The marine pilot is the professional who renders this service, for which he shall board the 
vessel and give support in the operation to be performed. For example, if you are going moor 
in one of the country’s ports, the pilot goes to open sea to reach the vessel that is outside the 
port, boards it and once inside gives the instructions for the ship to enter and settle in port 
terminal facilities, in proper and safe conditions.
Graph N° 19
Agents involved in the provision of port services
Source: Resolution N°0407-2007/TDC-INDECOPI.
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In order to be a pilot, specific studies and experience shall be achieved particularly on 
geographical, weather conditions as well as location in the port where the service of pilotage 
is rendered. Additionally, a license (licensed captains) granted by the competent authority, 
General Directorate for Port Authorities and the Coast Guard (DICAPI) is required. On the 
basis of that, the number of pilots is reduced for each port, and there is no practical possibility 
of substitution between pilots providing services in different ports of the country, due to the 
specific characteristics of each port. 
Furthermore, in Peru, the service of pilotage was rendered through companies duly 
incorporated for rendering such service, called pilots’ management companies. 
Pilot is a pilots’ management company licensed to provide services at Callao Port Terminal 
since December 2000. In 2001, several maritime pilots working in Pilot voluntarily resigned, 
becoming members of other pilots’ management companies. It is worth stating that the 
agreements entered by the aforementioned pilots with Pilot contained an exclusivity clause, 
and were for a specific term, for which, resigning to Pilot was not enough to terminate the 
existing contractual relationship.
After resignations, Pilot started a series of legal and administrative proceedings against 
those pilots who had resigned, most of them related to breach of contract, as indicated in the 
following chart (see Chart N° 9):
Chart N° 9
Legal and administrative proceedings carried out by Pilot against those pilots 
who has resigned
Pilot Process Competent Authority Outcome
Mr. 
Chávez
Actions for constitutional 
guarantees Third Civil Court of Callao Inadmissible
Actions for constitutional 
guarantees First	Corporate	Court	specialized	in	Public	Law	of	Lima In progress
Complaints of fraud Third Penal Court of Callao In progress
Mr. 
Petrozzi
Actions for constitutional 
guarantees First	Corporate	Court	specialized	in	Public	Law	of	Lima Does not apply
Complaints of fraud Third Penal Court of Callao Groundless
Mr. 
Lavado
Complaints of fraud Ninth Penal Court of Callao Groundless
Complaint for breach of 
obligations DICAPI Groundless
Source: Resolution 0407-2007/TDC-INDECOPI.
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As well, the following actions were started against Mr. Boggiano:
•	 Penal	proceeding	for	alleged	offense	against	public	trust	in	the	form	of	forgery	before	the	
Ninth Penal Court of Callao, against pilot Boggiano Morales.
•	 Administrative	complaint	for	alleged	forgery	at	DICAPI,	against	pilot	Boggiano	Morales
Due to all legal actions started, APOP and the pilots being processed, filed a complaint to 
Indecopi stating that Pilot was unlawfully using administrative and legal proceedings to 
increase legal barriers to access the market of pilotage in the port of Callao, in order to 
impede maritime pilots, who were not working for that company, to freely exercise their 
professional activity with other pilotage service companies, excluding them from the market 
and/or relevant competition costs.
Pilot refused the abovementioned behavior stating that a predatory behavior of that nature 
occurs when the objective of the offender is to prevent or delay the access of competitors 
in the market. In that sense, said supposition would not have been presented in this case 
because legal processes and administrative proceedings were initiated against pilots who 
resigned to Pilot by misconduct regarding the company and not against other maritime pilots’ 
management companies. As well, Pilot declared that the actions taken against pilots were not 
aimed to interrupt the activities of competitors, but they were actions taken to safeguard the 
compliance of the commitment assumed by dissident pilots (contractual term and exclusivity). 
The Commission declared the complaint against Pilot grounded, ordering it to refrain from 
implementing behaviors against free competition aimed to punish pilots who were leaving 
the company and/or impeding the access of new pilots in the market. As well, a fine of 81.2 
UIT was imposed among all offenders including Pilot, its directors, director general manager 
and managers80.
For those effects, the Commission considered that although legal actions taken 
“… were aimed to prevent pilots who resigned to Pilot Station to continue carrying out 
their pilotage activities (…) it actually had the only purpose to cause harm to competing 
pilots’ management companies, by reducing their possibility to obtain the most important 
input for competing in the market, this is to say, maritime pilots object of legal actions”. 
81 Resolution 0407-2007/TDC-INDECOPI, dated March 22, 2007.
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With that, it was demonstrated that the use of these legal actions “did affect direct competitors 
of the company denounced, because it meant a delay or obstacle to access the market, in 
turn consolidating the dominant position of Pilot Station through different means of economic 
efficiency”.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission sought to differentiate the correct and legal 
right to act of anticompetitive behavior implemented by unlawfully taking legal actions, 
considering for such distinction, for example, the sense in which actions initiated by Pilot 
were solved. In particular, it noted:
“This Commission recognizes the legitimate right of every person to request for 
jurisdictional protection and to exercise their right to administrative petition before the 
corresponding bodies; however, if legal processes and administrative proceedings filed 
by the company denounce are disparaged (most of them) by competent authorities, the 
Commission in the scope of its powers may evaluate and eventually conclude on the 
anticompetitive intention of a company that uses unnecessarily those legal mechanisms 
with the only objective to hinder the access or permanence in the market of potential or 
real competitors, and do not exercise in the regular way its right to act.”
Regarding the criterion noted, the Commission concluded that “In this case, from the analysis 
of the processes and proceedings mentioned it may be inferred that the intention of Pilot Station 
was to restrict the access of other competing companies to services of pilots who were object of 
legal and administrative proceedings”. 
At appeal, the Tribunal upheld the first instance decision, including all sanctions imposed81. 
The Tribunal agreed with the Commission when stating that the sense in which actions initiated 
by Pilot were resolved, made it possible to infer the anticompetitive intention of this company: 
“From the file it may be observed that authorities in charge of ruling on the processes 
initiated by Pilot dismissed the allegations and complaints filed, declaring them 
inadmissible in some cases for lack of jurisdiction or groundless because the alleged 
infringement was not configured. From that, it may be deduced that the purpose of 
Pilot to take action against resigning pilots was to prevent these to continue to provide 
pilotage services through competing companies.”
Additionally, the Tribunal stated that the number of actions initiated and the demands were as 
well a relevant aspect for the analysis of the legal character of the use of such legal actions: 
82 Resolución 026-2010-INDECOPI/CLC, date May 03, 2010.
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“(…) the number of actions filed by Pilot against each resigning pilot, as well as the demands 
in each of the processes initiated, evidence the intention of Pilot to impede resigning pilots to 
exercise their services through competing companies”. 
Finally, the Court also emphasized the limited possibility of companies competing with Pilot 
to get alternatives for the services of authorized pilots to operate in the port of Callao, and 
who were not rendering any services to Pilot, whereupon the strategy used through the use 
of legal actions had a greater impact on competition: 
“This situation, in practice, implied a restraint to competition considering that the operations 
of pilot’s managing companies are subject to the availability of professionals to carry out 
maneuvers inside the port, and considering as well that resigning pilots were the only 
choice available to cover the requirements of competing companies during the period of 
investigation.”
 c. Asociación de Operadores de Ferrocarriles del Perú (APOFER)   
  v. Ferrocarril Transandino S.A. (FETRANS), Perurail S.A.    
  (Perurail), Peruval Corp. S.A. (Peruval) and Peruvian Trains &   
  Railways S.A. (PTR) (2011)
FETRANS is the concessionaire of the infrastructure of South and South-East Railway 
that includes the stretch Cusco-Machu Picchu. Perurail is the company incorporated by 
FETRANS, in accordance with the stated in its concession agreement, in order to render the 
service of passenger and load transport in awarded railways. Peruval and PTR are companies 
related to FETRANS and Perurail, for having common shareholders or director and officials 
FETRANS, Perurail, Peruval and PTR filed different legal actions and began several 
administrative proceedings related to various subjects, which were of common interest to one 
or more of them, with one of the following objectives: 
•	 Question	 through	 the	 contentious	 administrative	 way	 Resolution	 1122-2007-TDC-
Indecopi, by which it was declared that FETRANS had committed an abuse of dominant 
position in the form of refusal to deal and was obliged to stop with the refusal to lease 
FERSIMSAC locomotives and rolling stock, that have been awarded as part of the 
concession of railway infrastructure and was imposed the right of non-discrimination for 
the company to provide the service in stretches administered by FETRANS, including 
the Cusco-Machu Picchu stretch.
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•	 Request	 the	 disapplication	 of	 Supreme	 Decree	 031-2007-MTC,	 which	 amended	 the	
National Railway Regulations, reducing the legal requirements for companies to obtain 
authorizations to operate railway services. 
•	 Request	the	amendment	of	the	Central	Railway	Concession	Agreement	entered	between	
Ferrovías Central Andina SA. and the Ministry of Transport and Communications, in 
order to maintain the obligation of concessionaire of not operating in South Railway and 
South-East Railway, awarded stretches to FETRANS and where Perurail operates.
•	 Oppose	to	requests	of	railway	operating	authorizations	in	South-east	Railway	presented	
by Andean Railways Corp., Wyoming Railways SA. and Inca Rail SAC.
•	 Adopt	 legal	actions	 to	extend	 the	process	of	amendment	of	 the	Access	Regulations	 to	
railways administrated by FETRANS.
The questioning in this case was that defendants had made improper use of various 
legal actions, in order to hinder or prevent competition in railway transport companies in 
the Ollantaytambo-Machu Picchu-Hydroelectric South-Eastern Railway (FSO). It was 
suggested that defendants were part of the same economic group, and they used the right 
to act and petition for purely predatory objectives, by initiating a series of legal processes 
and administrative proceedings aimed to preventing or delaying access to the market of 
competing operating companies for railway transport services of passengers in the FSO, thus 
contributing to maintain the dominant position of PERURAIL on those stretches. In this way, 
they would have carried out a behavior of abuse of dominant position due to the misuse of 
legal processes and administrative proceedings.
Defendant companies refused having committed the alleged behavior. Thus, Perurail and 
FETRANS stated that among defendants there was not an economic group. As well, they 
stated that claims and demands requested in legal actions questioned by APOFER were fully 
founded and were aimed to defend, lawfully, the model of business that was recognized to both 
companies by the Estate when the award was granted to FETRANS for the administration of 
FSO and the corresponding rendering of railway transport service through a related company. 
Peruval affirmed that its condition as shareholder of FETRANS and Perurail did not determine 
its participation in a joint legal predatory condition, even when legal actions in relation to 
the subjects matter to the case were filed. As well, Peruval stated that it did not participate as 
economic agent in the relevant market stated by APOFER, so it may badly have committed an 
act of abuse of dominant position and, moreover, it was not even evaluated if the action filed 
y Peruval has or not legitimate legal foundations.
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Finally, PTR affirmed that the corporate connection among defendant companies was 
inadequate for claiming responsibility and, as Peruval, it stated that it did not participate in 
the relevant market, so it had not committed acts of abuse of dominant position. 
The Commission considered that the
“(…) the retrospective and individual analysis of each legal action is inadequate 
to determine if the rights to act or petition were exercised for obtaining other illegal 
purposes, such as the one affecting free competition. For that reason, the Commission 
choses a prospective parameter that notice motivations that lie beneath a group or a 
pattern of legal actions” 
In this sense, it affirmed that instead of asking if there is a probable cause in each legal action 
taken, it shall ask if it is reasonably to consider if those actions respond to the interest of 
protecting the right of the plaintiff or if there is an ulterior or collateral purpose for affecting 
competition.
According to the analysis of the Commission, in these cases it is necessary to evaluate “(…) 
which is the real motivation of the plaintiffs”, for which it stated that “... if behind legal processes 
instituted it exists a real economic advantage that justify incurring in litigation costs.” It also 
should be noted that “... the number of legal actions brought may be as well an enlightening 
element regarding the motivations of the trial”, as “... the opportunity in which legal actions 
are started, the subjects against they are filed and the effects they may have on competition 
“, as this allows the verification of anticompetitive intention. Finally, the Commission stated 
that “... The result of processes is not a determinant factor if the rights of action or petition of 
an operator have been used legitimately.”
 
Based on the previous thoughts, the Commission considered that legal actions initiated by 
the defendants, taken together, did not constitute a valid exercise of the legally recognized 
rights to act and petition, but rather they were an strategy for abuse of legal processes with 
the objective to restrict, discourage or delay the entry of competitors into the market of rail 
transport in FSO. For this it was indicated that it was not necessary to determine the existence 
of an economic group between the defendant companies, but it was necessary to have 
different elements that may prove the existence of a common and shared interest between 
them, this is to say, such material proceedings of said companies related to the facts under 
investigation and property and management relations between them and management, being 
latter situation found in the analyzed case.
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As result of its analysis, the Commission upheld the complaint grounded and ordered the 
cessation of alleged abuse of dominant position through a strategy of abuse of legal processes. 
Additionally, it was fined with 657.5 UIT82.
At appeal, the Tribunal decided to take a different path to that proposed by the Commission 
and, instead of trying to identify the alleged intention of complaints when initiation legal 
actions, it decided to evaluate each of the processes and proceeding questioned, concluding 
that the defendants an objective foundation or probable cause that supported the regular 
exercise of the rights to act and petition.  In this regard, the Court noted that “... to the 
imputation of a predatory abuse of legal processes it is fundamental to analyze whether there 
is an objective foundation, this is to say, a reasonable expectation of success that supports the 
claim or the claims of the applicant.”
The Tribunal pointed as elements to determine the abuse characters of initiating legal actions 
to identify: “…the absence of an objective foundation against a plurality of deduced claims or 
petitions, which shall be evaluated prospectively, that is, in view of the reasonable expectation 
of success that they had when initiated legal proceedings “.
Therefore, it considered that the factors evaluated by the Commission were not suitable 
to reveal conclusively an anticompetitive intention. For example, did not accept the 
fact that a litigant tries to meet the same interest by initiating various processes or 
proceedings evidence an anticompetitive intention, because “... to increase the spectrum 
of possibilities to achieve a favorable outcome is a legitimate decision that falls within 
the procedural strategy that adopt each subject of law “. Similarly, the Tribunal also ruled 
that the consideration of economic costs that occasion a process against the expected 
economic benefit (cost of the process versus benefits obtained from an eventual favorable 
outcome), was a good indicator of anticompetitive motivation, as such consideration 
is not only very difficult to measure but gives way to arbitrary decisions of authority.
Rather, the Tribunal considered that if alleged actions initiated by the defendants had an 
objective foundation, their qualification as part of a strategy of abusive use of legal processes 
designed to prevent and affect competition in the market of transport services in the FSO shall 
be discharged. For that reason, it studied each of the legal actions initiated and concluded 
that they had an objective foundation. For example, it considered that FETRANS could have 
a reasonable expectation of achieving, through contentious-administrative proceeding, 
that the judiciary issues a judgment revoking the decision of Indecopi, which stated that 
83 Resolution 1351-2011/SC1-INDECOPI, dated August 27, 2011.
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it had committed an abuse of dominant position in the form of unjustified refusal to lease 
locomotives and rolling stock to FERSIMSAC. The Tribunal understood that although 
such contentious-administrative proceeding may delay the possibility of competition in the 
provision of railway services in FSO, this effect was admissible because the defendants had 
an objective foundation to proceed through the contentious-administrative way.
Consequently the Tribunal revoked the decision in first instance and declared it groundless83.
3.1.4. Behaviors of Exploitative Effect84
The approach of Indecopi to acts of abuse of dominant position of exploitative effect has 
changed over time, presenting diametrically opposed positions depending on the different 
interpretation  of Legislative Decree 701. However, the new law on that matter, Legislative 
Decree 1034, has come to close the debate and let those behaviors outside the scope of the 
regulation, after a wide selection of legal and economic arguments.
Following, the evolution of jurisprudence on exploitative behavior is briefly explained, 
showing the advances and forwards that have been registered in this area, up to the current 
position. While most of the discussion has focused on behaviors related to over-pricing 
(or abusive, as they are also called), as well other cases shall be described showing that 
exploitative behaviors may be reflected in other forms of abuse of dominant position and as 
well to identify the position taken by Indecopi on that subject. 
84 Regarding the forms of exploitative abuse of dominant position the  following may be seen: ADRIANZEN, Luis 
Carlos. (2007). “El Control de Precios Excesivos en el Derecho de la Competencia Europeo y su Aplicabilidad 
en el Perú”(“Price control in European Competition Right and its use in Peru”). In: Revista de la Competencia y 
la Propiedad Intelectual. No. 5. Lima, Indecopi, pp. 5-63. BULLARD, Alfredo. (2003b). Op. Cit., pp. 129-158. 
DIEZ CANSECO, Luis y PASQUEL, Enrique. (2004b). “Precios Abusivos: Una Mirada a la Luz del Derecho 
Comparado” (“Abusive Prices: a hint to Comparative Law”). In: Advocatus. No.10.Lima, pp. 355-364. DIEZ 
CANSECO, Luis  y PASQUEL, Enrique. (2004a). “El Excesivo Precio de una Decisión Impredecible. A Propósito 
del Caso de las AFP” (“The excessive price of an unpredictable decision Regarding the Case of AFSs”). In: 
Diálogo con la Jurisprudencia. No. 71. Lima, Editorial El Búho. FALLA, Alejandro y DRAGO, Mario. (2012). 
Op. Cit., pp. 158-182. HOLZ, Johanna y SAMANIEGO, Percy. (2007). “A veces sí, a veces no. Análisis de 
Prácticas Explotativas: Comentario al Reciente Precedente de la Comisión de Libre Competencia”(“Sometimes 
yes, sometimes No. An analysis to exploitative behaviors: Commenting the Recent precedent of the Commission 
of Free Competition”) . In: Actualidad Jurídica. No.168. Lima, pp. 288-291. MARTÍNEZ, Martha y QUINTANA, 
Eduardo. (2007). “La Necesidad de Tomar Nuevos Rumbos en la Aplicación de Políticas de Competencia en el 
Perú: a Propósito de las Prácticas Anticompetitivas de Precios” (“The need to take new paths in the application 
of Competition policies in Peru: regarding anticompetitive price behaviors”). In: Derecho & Sociedad. N° 28. 
Lima, Editora y Comercializadora Cartolan, pp. 116-136. ROJAS, Juan Francisco. (2005). “La Defensa de la 
Competencia en una Nueva Dimensión”(“The Defense of Competition in a New Dimension”) . In: Coyuntura. 
No. 4. Lima, CISEPA, pp. 16-22. 
85 Resolution 003-93-INDECOPI/CLC, dated August 31, 1993.
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Chart N° 10
Evolution of jurisprudence related to exploitative behaviors
MILESTONE
1993 - Fondo de Fomento para la Ganadería Lechera del Sur (Fongal Sur) vs. Gloria S.A. 
1998 - Empresa Editora El Comercio S.A. vs. Aero Continente S.A.
1995 - Asociación Peruana de Consumidores y Usuarios (ASPEC) vs. Los Portales S.A. and 
Corporación Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviación Comercial (CORPAC). 
2004	 -	 Central	 Unitaria	 de	 Trabajadores	 and	 Congressman,	 Mr.	 	 Javier	 Diez	 Canseco	 vs.	
Asociación de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones y cuatro AFP
2010 - Asociación de Ganaderos Lecheros del Perú (AGALEP) and Fondo de Fomento para la 
Ganadería Lechera de la Cuenca de Lima vs. Gloria S.A.
The position of Indecopi on over-pricing was quite clear during the first decade of the 
application of Legislative Decree 701. In effect, the rulings issued were relatively explicit 
in stating that such behavior was not within the scope of the law and was not Indecopi’s 
function to rule on the level of prices in the market, because they shall be set pursuant the 
rules of supply and demand. In this regard it is necessary to mention the following examples.
One of the first cases met by Indecopi in 1993 was related to the complaint filed by Fondo de 
Fomento para la Ganadería Lechera del Sur (Fongal Sur) v. Gloria SA. for abuse of dominant 
position. Fongal Sur affirmed that Gloria was paying an unreasonably low price for raw whole 
milk bought from breeders conforming said Fongal, taking advantage that it was the only 
significant buyer in the south of the country to which breeders could offer their product. This is to 
say, Fongal Sur accused Gloria of abusing of its position as monopsony in the purchase of milk, 
paying a price that did not allow breeders to get a reasonable return on their product and not 
even allowed them to cover their production costs. The ruling of the Commission discharging 
that this type of behaviors constituted an infringement to competition law was forceful:
“… with respect to the part of the complaint (...) which states that Gloria SA would be 
abusing of their suppliers by imposing them a price below their costs of production, it is 
necessary to remember that it is not competency of the Commission, in accordance with 
the provisions of Legislative Decree NO701, to establish or rule on the sale or purchase 
prices, for any product or service, because the shall be set according to the confluence of 
supply and demand” 85.
86 Resolution 004-98-INDECOPI/CLC, dated September 30, 1998.
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Years later, in 1998, the Commission ratified the aforementioned position, at the time of the 
complaint filed by Empresa Editora El Comercio SA. v. Aerocontinente SA. 
In this case, related to air transport service offered by the defendant and that El Comercio 
used to send its journal from Lima to different cities of the country, it was denounced that 
Aerocontinente had created a new special rate only for cargo corresponding to journals and 
magazines, which was 100% higher than the rate applicable to all other cargo with perishable 
characteristics (such as fertile eggs or material sent by courier service), resulting in an 
excessive price that said company attempted to charge by using its position as sole provider 
of the service on certain routes. Again, the Commission was explicit in refusing to make any 
ruling on this matter: 
“Regarding the alleged abuse of dominant position by setting over-pricing, pursuant 
to Legislative Decree NO701 and as stated in Resolution NO003-93-INDECOPI/
CLC, it is not competency of the Free Competition Commission to establish or 
rule on the level of sales or purchase price of any product or service, because they 
shall be set freely on the market. In this regard, it is relevant to indicate that (...) 
measures to prevent the abuse of dominant position cannot be converted in forms 
of price control, because it is inconsistent with the promotion of competition” 86.
Like this, the position was notoriously contrary to admit complaints against exploitative 
behaviors related to the level of prices fixed by companies, whereas prices shall be fixed 
freely on the market as a result of the confluence of supply and demand, so that regulations 
of free competition do not become price control mechanisms.
However, it is worth mentioning that the explicitly position stated by Indecopi on that time 
with regards to excessive prices did not extend to other forms of exploitative behaviors, as 
shown in the following example.
In 1995 the Commission declared grounded the complaint filed by Asociación Peruana 
de Consumidores y Usuarios (ASPEC) v. Los Portales SA. and Corporación Peruana de 
Aeropuertos y Aviación Comercial (CORPAC). One of the behaviors denounced was that 
Los Portales, as administrator of the parking lot of Jorge Chávez International Airport, had 
decided to charge for two-hour parking or fraction, rather than following the commercial use 
of charging for an hour or fraction. Thus, Los Portales, as sole provider of the parking service 
87 Resolution 057-95-INDECOPI/CLC, dated December 29, 1995. It is worth mentioning that this decision was 
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition 113
in said airport, this is to say, as dominant company, was accused of charging for the use of 
two-hour parking to the detriment of consumers requiring to access the airport with their 
vehicles and park them only for an hour or less. 
The Commission qualified the behavior as an act of abuse of dominant position in the form of 
tied sales (conditioning the use of an hour or fraction of the parking service to the acquisition 
of an additional hour of service) and imposed a fined of 50 UIT for each defendant87. 
In this case, the behavior denounced, directly affected users of Jorge Chavez International 
Airport parking lot, without having any restrictive effect on competition. This is to say, it 
qualified as an act of abuse with exploitative effect as well as behaviors like over-pricing 
abovementioned; but in this case, the Commission recognized the complaint and ruled on it 
agreeing with the plaintiff.
In 2004, the position held for a decade against over-pricing also suffered a substantial 
variation. This drastic change of position was presented in a case in which Central Unitaria 
de Trabajadores and Congressman, Mr. Javier Diez Canseco, filed a complaint against 
Asociación de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones and four AFP operating in the 
Peruvian market for abuse of dominant position by charging its affiliates an excessive amount 
of portfolio management fees.
In the complaint it was stated that the excessive amount of fees was typified and prohibited 
by article 5, paragraph f) of Legislative Decree 701, as a behavior of equivalent effect to the 
acts of abuse of dominant position, explicitly typified by that law. The Commission analyzed 
the acts of abuse of dominant position explicitly typified in the law and declared that all 
acts referred to behaviors of exclusionary effect, this is to say, with anticompetitive effects, 
whereby a behavior of exploitative effects such as over-pricing would not qualify as a behavior 
of equivalent effect. In this regard, it concluded that:
“The imposition of ‘abusive prices’ is not a behavior that is contained in paragraph f) of 
Article 5 of Legislative Decree 701, because it lacks the necessary exclusionary effect to 
qualify as a form of abuse of dominant position with ‘equivalent effect’ to those explicitly 
contained in paragraphs a), b) and c), so that the complaint at that end shall be unjustified”88
approved by the Tribunal through Resolution 1003-96-INDECOPI/TRI, dated June 19, 1996.
88 Resolution 054-2003-INDECOPI/CLC, dated December 10, 2003.
89 Resolution 0225-2004/TDC-INDECOPI.
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The Tribunal revoked the first instance decision and concluded that Indecopi was competent 
to investigate cases of over-pricing and, moreover, that Legislative Decree 701 not only 
prohibited the acts of abuse of dominant position that have the effect of excluding competitors 
from the market, but also those who sought to exploit consumers directly by cutting out part 
or all of the consumer surplus. 
The Tribunal stated that the typical figure of exploitative abuse was in over-pricing and that 
although such behavior was not expressly defined by Peruvian regulations, as happens with 
the unjustified refusal to hire or lock-up agreements, it had the same exploitative effect that 
these two figures, whereupon it was prohibited as a behavior of equivalent effect. As well, 
it noted that there was no practical difference between the analysis carried out to sanction 
discriminatory prices or price fixing, and the one required to investigate alleged over-pricing, 
because in all these cases prices were evaluated, having no reason to consider that Indecopi 
may not rule on the last figure. Finally, it added that over-pricing was also prohibited by other 
laws and that there was foreign jurisprudence which had sanctioned this conduct89.
Given the new position of the Tribunal, in 2005, the Commission sought to delimit 
the scope of the cases in which complaints of over-pricing shall be analyzed. 
Thus, the Commission stated that it would only consider that over-pricing may 
have a detrimental effect on the market if the following conditions are met: 
a) The level of existing barriers to access is too significant to prevent potential 
competition.
b) The defendant is a monopolist, this is to say, it has 100% of the market share.
c) There is no economic regulation or authorized regulatory body to fix prices 
or rates. Only at this scenario consumer choice would be severely restricted 
and market conditions may allow the significant appropriation of consumer 
surplus by company in question90.
90 Resolution 005-2005-INDECOPI/CLC, dated February 02, 2005. Decision issued in the proceeding started by a 
complaint filed by Representaciones Tecnimotors EIRL. against Luz del Sur S.A.A.
91 Resolution 052-2007-INDECOPI/CLC, dated September 14, 2007. 
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However, in 2007 the Commission questioned again the possibility of knowing over-
pricing complaints pursuant to Legislative Decree 701. This ruling was in the context of the 
complaint filed by Asociación de Agencias de Turismo del Cusco v. Consorcio de Servicios 
de Transporte Turístico Machu Picchu (CONSETTUR) for abuse of dominant position in the 
form of imposition of over-pricing and discriminatory deal (exploitative discrimination) in the 
passenger transport service on the stretch Aguas Calientes-Puente Ruinas-Ciudadela Inca 
de Machu-Picchu.
The Commission restated that prohibited conducts by Legislative Decree 701 were those 
that exclude competitors or prevent their access to the market, this is to say, exclusionary 
effect behaviors. As for over-pricing, it stated that although the Tribunal had noted that “... 
the Commission is empowered to declare the existence of a behavior that constitutes abuse 
of dominant position on the market in the form of over-pricing”, which is opposed to the 
stated in article 4, of Legislative Decree 757, which states that “... the only prices that may be 
fixed administratively are the rates of public services”, as it was contradictory for Indecopi to 
sanction a company for charging a price that in accordance to its criterion was too expensive, 
but was impeded of determining the top from which that price was excessive or what the 
allowable profit margin for this company.
Based on the abovementioned, the Commission concluded that Legislative Decree NO757 
prevented it from hearing cases of over-pricing, and also that punish them as a form of abuse 
of dominant position was an inefficient and unpredictable remedy, since Indecopi would not 
be able to define what the top price or the corresponding reasonable profit margin, for lack of 
tools designed for regulatory bodies. Finally, the Commission stated that consumer protection 
through the application of competition regulations was as protection of the competitive 
process, because it was in benefit of consumers. This means that protection afforded by free 
competition regulations to consumers is indirectly given through its impact on the proper 
functioning of the competitive process91.
Contrary to the stated in 2004, this time the Tribunal (comprised of new members) confirmed 
the first instance decision, noting that the current Peruvian Constitution prevents the authority 
of defense of competition to hear cases of over-pricing and exploitative discrimination, by 
which the debate on this matter was closed92.
92 Resolution 0027-2008-SC1/INDECOPI, dated October 16, 2008. 
93 Resolution 005-2010/ST-CLC-INDECOPI, dated April15, 2010.
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The current approach on exploitative behavior with the new law is shown in the case of 
the complaint filed by Asociación de Ganaderos Lecheros del Perú (AGALEP) and Fondo de 
Fomento para la Ganadería Lechera de la Cuenca de Lima v. Gloria SA. (2010). AGALEP and 
Fondo filed a complaint against Gloria for alleged abuse of dominant position in the form of 
predatory pricing, price discrimination and handling of the system of milk quality analysis, 
noting that as a buyer with a dominant position, Gloria established base and end prices using 
an incentive scheme for producers of fresh milk according to a set of criteria established by 
itself (milk quality, location of livestock, etc., among others), allowing it to obtain greater 
economic benefits in the sale of their products. According to plaintiffs, Gloria behaviors were 
intended to pay a low price to producers of fresh milk, causing the exit of said milk producers 
from the dairy market. Paying a lower price for the input would allow to sell their products 
at lower prices than their competitors, affecting competition in the secondary dairy market.
In applying the regulations on admission of complaints to proceedings, foreseen in Legislative 
Decree 1034, the Technical Secretariat of the Commission assessed the complaint and 
declares it groundless.93
For that, it considered that reported behaviors qualified as acts of exploitative effect, as 
plaintiffs had not provided evidence that there was a competitive relationship between Gloria 
and fresh milk producers allegedly involved in the primary dairy market, so that the behaviors 
reported could not cause an improvement in the participation of Gloria in that market at the 
expense of the output of fresh milk producers.
Additionally, the Secretariat considered that, unlike exclusionary behaviors that generate 
direct impact on the competitive process (by reduce levels of competition) and indirect impact 
on consumer welfare (by reducing the options available to consumers), exploitative behaviors 
do not affect the competitive process but they even, may expedite it, encouraging the entry of 
new competitors attracted by the profits of the dominant. It also took into account that: 
Current law, Legislative Decree N°1034, defines explicitly that the only 
acts of abuse of dominant position prohibited by law are behaviors of 
exclusionary effect, leaving behind the debate in the application of 
Legislative Decree 701 on the possibility of punishing any act of exploitative 
effect. 
94 Resolution 0708-2011/TDC-INDECOPI, dated March 16, 2011. 
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“… the sanction of exploitative behaviors would be contrary to the regime of social 
market economy, established by Article 58 of the Political Constitution of Peru, to the 
prohibition of administrative price fixing, contained in Article 4 of Legislative Decree 
N°757, as well as to the practical need to avoid distortions that may lead to the existence 
of a competition agency dedicated to determine the level of prices (or profit margins) 
that is ‘acceptable’ in the market”.
According to the abovementioned, the Secretary concluded that “... acts of abuse of dominant 
position prohibited by both Legislative Decree 701 and Legislative Decree 1034 are behaviors 
of exclusionary effect, that nor the Technical Secretariat or the Commission are the competent 
authorities to recognize behaviors of exploitative effect“.
At appeal, the Tribunal settled the decision of the Secretariat on the inadmissibility of the 
complaint94. In this Resolution, the different arguments that had been used during the term of 
Legislative Decree 701 against the sanction of acts of exploitative abuse has been quite fully 
consolidated and, more importantly, the correct interpretation of Legislative Decree 1034 on 
this subject has been stated.
First, the Tribunal makes a relevant conceptual distinction when noting that:
“Unlike the abuse of an exclusionary dominant position that directly affects the 
dynamics of competition as it prevents or hinders access or permanence of competitors 
in the dominant market, the abuses qualified as exploitative are focused on punishing 
how much a dominant economic agent earns in detrimental of consumers or providers”. 
As regards to the application of Legislative Decree 701, it indicates that
“... restraining exploitative behaviors such as “over-pricing” may lead the competition 
agency to sanction how much a specific economic agent earns and to establish a limit 
to said profits, which may indirectly intervene in price fixing, although this possibility is 
expressly prohibited by Article 4 of Legislative Decree 757 “.
As Legislative Decree 757 is subsequent to Legislative Decree 701, it precluded any 
interpretation in the sense that it may have allowed something proscribed by the first law. 
Additionally, the Tribunal reiterates that all forms of abuse of dominant position typified in 
Legislative Decree 701 had exclusionary character, so it is incorrect to argue that behaviors of 
95 See in this regard ROJAS, Juan Francisco. (2005). Op. Cit., pp. 16-22. 
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exploitative effect were also prohibited by paragraph f) of article 5 as acts of equivalent effect, 
since there is no equivalence between the effects of both types of practice.
Regarding Legislative Decree 1034, the Tribunal states that for the existence of abuse of 
dominant position number 10.1 of the law requires that the dominant company unlawfully 
restricts competition, obtaining benefits and causing harm to real or potential competitors, 
direct or indirect. As well, it also notes that number 10.2 states that alleged abuse behaviors 
may only consist on behavior of exclusionary effect, that “... are those by which it is intended 
to exclude or prevent the entry of competitors to the market thus affecting the competitive 
process.”
As a final argument, the Tribunal explained that number 10.5 of the law expressly establishes 
that there is no abuse of dominant position if that position without affecting real or potential 
competitors is simply exercised. Undoubtedly, this provision demonstrates “the requirement 
of the exclusionary character of abuse of dominant position” and discharges any sanction on 
exploitative behaviors. To the extent that
“... price fixing by a dominant company at a level that only involves maximizing its 
benefits-as is the case of denominated ‘exploitative behaviors’ (for example, over-
pricing’) -, is a behavior that only represents the exercise of that position, but that is not 
in the field of law enforcement, since it does not affect the competitive process because 
is not directed to real or potential competitors.”
3.1.5 Impact and Contribution of Indecopi
As it is observed in the selection of jurisprudence described and commented before, the 
experience of Indecopi on investigation and sanctioning of acts of abuse of dominant position 
dates since the beginning of its work, is broad and deep, covering an important variety of 
practices and commercial strategies.
 
There has been an investigation on complaints against all kind of entities, such as private 
companies from different economic sectors (electricity distribution, financial services, 
commercial air transport services, dairy production or beer, commercialization of hydrocarbons, 
etc..), public companies (Electrocentro, Petroperú, Córpac) intermediary organizations 
(Asociación de Productores del Mercado de Santa Anita, Comité de Fabricantes de Cerveza 
of SNI) and economic groups (case against FETRANS and others).
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition 119
“The monitoring of compliance of the prohibition of acts of abuse of 
dominant position by Indecopi had allowed an adequate balance among 
the free exercise of rights of dominant companies, proper of a social market 
economy and the protection of a competitive process for the welfare of 
consumers”.
In effect, the prohibition of acts of abuse of dominant position is a manifestation of the 
regulatory power of the State concerned with controlling the behavior of economic agents 
with substantial market power, in order to ensure that competition may be carried out 
maximizing the welfare of consumers. Through the prohibition of acts of abuse appropriate 
limits are set on the free exercise of rights of free company, creating special conditions so that 
those economic agents exercise different rights on the market. Thus, for example, limits are 
set on the right to hire, demanding a justification for refusals to deal; the right to define their 
strategies and commercial policies, demanding them objective reasons to create differentiated 
treatments; to the rights to act and petition, demanding one objective basis or a reasonable 
expectation of success. 
Recognizing the broad scope of the limits imposed on the exercise of rights of economic agents 
that have a dominant position, Indecopi has measurably managed the power that has been 
given. On one hand, it has sought to be prolix in defining the existence of a dominant position 
in the market, thus it does not unduly extend the limitations imposed by the prohibition 
of acts of abuse of dominant position to companies or entities that do not have substantial 
market power. On the other hand, it has been careful to determine that there has been an 
act of abuse, considering that the reasons and justification raised have been reasonably and 
fairly explained by economic agents investigated to support their market behavior.
The careful examination of Indecopi explains why the percentage of investigations on abuse 
of dominant position declared grounded is not very elevated compared to the number of 
proceedings initiated due to this matter, as shown in the following graph.
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Graph N° 20
Abuse of dominant position: grounded proceedings (1993-2012)
Sanctions imposed by Indecopi in cases declared grounded have been applied to both 
companies and individuals (case against Pilot Station), and the amounts calculated responded 
to the evaluation of the negative effects on the market, being noted that comparatively such 
sanctions have been considerably lower than those imposed by other prohibited conducts, 
such as agreements or concerted behaviors between competitors. The following chart presents 
the sanctions for acts of abuse of dominant position.
First quinquennium
(1993 - 1997)
Second quinquennium
(1998 - 2002)
Third quinquennium
(2003 - 2007)
Fourth quinquennium
(2008 - 2012)
15
4
2
3
Source: Technical Secretariat.
NUMBER OF FOUNDED PROCEEDINGS
APD
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Graph N° 21
Abuse of dominant position: fines imposed (1993-2012)
Another aspect of great importance in terms of contribution to Indecopi’s practice in matters 
of supervision of acts of abuse of dominant position is that, through the compliance of this 
function, through the years, new types of behaviors of dominant economic agents that may 
harm the competitive process have been identified. This has been very useful to enrich the 
process of policy development. 
In this regard, the majority of cases discussed in previous sections has been investigated and 
ruled while Legislative Decree NO701 was in effect. After almost 15 years, the task to elaborate 
a new law in matters of free competition was assumed, giving rise to Legislative Decree 1034. 
This process of policy development has been notoriously enriched by prior experience of 
Indecopi in the supervision and sanction of acts of abuse of dominant position. In particular, 
said experience has had first-order importance when typifying prohibited behaviors.
As examples of the aforementioned, it is sufficient to mention that within cases of acts of abuse 
typified in Legislative Decree 1034 it is “unreasonably to hinder a competitor from entering 
or remaining in an intermediary association or organization”. The origins of this prohibited 
figure may be traced in the proceedings followed against Asociación de Productores del 
First quinquennium
(1993 - 1997)
Second quinquennium
(1998 - 2002)
Third quinquennium
(2003 - 2007)
Fourth quinquennium
(2008 - 2012)
260
35
245,5
690,5
Source: Technical Secretariat.
FINES IN THE UIT
APD
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Mercado de Santa Anita or against Backus and others. Similarly, it has also been typified the 
“Abusive and repeated use of legal processes or administrative proceedings, which effect shall 
be to restrict competition.” Undoubtedly, this prohibition responds to the experience gained 
in the proceedings against Acosa and Pilot Station.
In addition to the abovementioned, the experience gained by Indecopi, including drastic 
changes in posture that may have been registered in its instances for decision-making, has 
enabled to adequately clarify the scope of the application of the regulation of free competition 
and how it protects and contributes to consumer welfare. Proof of this is the extensive and 
detailed jurisprudential development of arguments for and against the prohibition and 
punishment of acts of exploitative effect through competition regulation. The knowledge 
generated through jurisprudence was then appropriately transferred to the development of 
policies that led to Legislative Decree 1034. Effectively, this regulation only prohibits acts 
exclusionary effect leaving aside any option to interpret that also includes acts of exploitative 
effect. This line of reasoning has been explicitly confirmed, in major pronouncements of 
Indecopi decision making instances (proceedings followed by AGALEP v. Gloria). 
Additionally, the experience acquired by Indecopi has been used to influence the criteria to 
evaluate prohibited behaviors under the new law and to define more precisely the conditions 
required to qualify as abusive the behavior of agent in a dominant position. An example of 
this has been shown with the abuse of legal actions, figure for which the conditions required 
for the exercise of rights to act and petition to be considered as abusive has been duly 
defined. Although these conditions are challenging- raising the standard of proof required 
for a complaint in this matter to be grounded-, the energy shown by Indecopi when defining 
them is acceptable, considering how delicate is to question the free exercise of those rights.
Abuse of Dominant Position
Indecopi’s Contributions
•	 Identifying	 new	 types	 of	 behavior	 of	 dominant	 economic	 agents	 that	may	
harm the competition process, which is very useful to enrich the regulatory 
development.
•	 Properly	 elucidate	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 free	 competition	
concerning the acts of abuse of dominant position and how it protects and 
contributes to consumer welfare, regardless of the possibility of punishing 
acts of exploitative effect.
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Concerning the most controversial subjects, it should be included, first, the acts of exploitative 
effect. Positions on this subject have been completely opposite. Those in favor of sanctioning 
such acts through the competition act posed that behaviors such as over-price fixing are 
the typical expression of abuse of dominant companies, and they understood Indecopi must 
intervene to directly ensure consumer rights95. Those opposing to it, produced not only legal 
arguments but economic and competition policy arguments as well. These arguments were 
gathered, in great extent, by further Indecopi jurisprudence which denied the possibility of 
sanctioning acts of exploitative abuse96.
Another subject that has also generated an interesting discussion is that of essential facilities 
and how the prohibition of unjustified denials of treatment should be applied in cases where 
the dominant company controls an essential facility. In this regard, opinions have been 
coincident, although there were different nuances about avoiding the indiscriminate use of 
this concept and qualifying any good as essential, since it may result in enforceability to 
dominant companies in the obligation to cooperate with their competitors97. 
Finally, discussion has also arisen about the need for the existence of a competitive relationship 
between the dominant company and the competitor affected by the behavior complained as 
abusive, so that a punishable act of abuse of dominant position is set98.
The last issue that deserves a comment is that Indecopi’s practice in terms of acts of abuse 
of dominant position has been mainly reactive, i.e., as a result of ex Parte orders. This is 
understandable, to the extent that the acts of abuse of dominant position typically affect 
other economic agents competing in the market and, therefore, have an incentive to directly 
defend their interests and, thereby, allow Indecopi to indirectly meet its protective role for the 
customers’ welfare, ensuring a healthy competitive process.
96 See: BULLARD, Alfredo. (2003b), Op. Cit., pp. 129-158. DIEZ CANSECO, Luis and PASQUEL, Enrique. (2004b). 
Op. Cit., pp 355-364. DIEZ CANSECO, Luis  and PASQUEL, Enrique. (2004a). Op. Cit. HOLZ, Johanna and 
SAMANIEGO, Percy. (2007). Op. Cit., pp. 288-291. MARTÍNEZ, Martha and QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2007). 
Op. Cit., pp. 116-136. 
97 In this regard, it may be reviewed: DIEZ CANSECO, Luis. (2012). Op. Cit., pp. 65-93. FALLA, Alejandro. (2004). 
Op. Cit., pp. 69-76. HARO, José Juan. (2005).  Op. Cit., pp. 151-167. KRESALJA, Baldo and QUINTANA, 
Eduardo. (2005). Op. Cit., pp. 59-89. 
98 On this subject it may be seen: FALLA, Alejandro. (2004). Op. Cit., pp. 69-76. HARO, José Juan. (2005). Op. Cit., 
pp. 151-167. HIGA, César and CIGÜEÑAS, Francisco. (2011). Op. Cit., pp. 95-99. QUINTANA, Eduardo and 
VILLARÁN, Lucía. (2008). Op. Cit., pp. 317-326. 
99 On horizontal cartel behaviors it may be seen: BOZA, Beatriz. (2005). “Case Study 1: Making Room for 
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•		 Acts	of	exploitative	effect.
•		 Essential	facilities.
•		 Set	 a	 punishable	 act	 of	 abuse	 of	 dominant	 position,	 with	 and	 without	 a	
competitive relationship.
However, Indecopi has the tools to identify markets and situations in which the probability 
that economic agents affected by acts of abuse of dominant position file a complaint is very 
low, either for fear of reprisals, for the high transaction costs to agree in case of several 
agents, etc. In these cases, the damage to the consumer welfare may be higher, and justify the 
authority’s intervention. Should both conditions are met, Indecopi’s ex officio action would 
be justified as it happens on investigations against cartels of competitors. 
The aforesaid would be very important if the improvement levels that may be produced in 
the markets performance are taken into account remediating situations of abuse of dominant 
position, i.e., in markets far from urban areas or affecting the small business. 
3.2. Horizontal Cartel Behaviors99
Investigation of cartel behaviors among competitors is one of the areas where Indecopi’s 
work has a higher impact, both in the consumers’ welfare and the efficient performance of 
the market. 
Competition Policy” and “Case Study 2: Knowing One´s Own Strength”. In: Tailor-Made Competition Policy in 
a Standardizing World: The Experience of Peru. Lima, Instituto Apoyo – Ciudadanos al Día. Chapter “Cuando 
Concertar es Malo. Prácticas Restrictivas de la Competencia” (“When Settlement is Wrong. Restrictive Practices 
of Competition”) in BULLARD, Alfredo. (2003a). Derecho y Economía. El Análisis Económico de las Instituciones 
Legales. (Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Legal Institutions) Lima, Palestra Editores, pp. 747-814. 
It can also be seen chapters “El Cartel de Precios en el Mercado Avícola” (“Cartel of Prices in the Poultry 
Market”), “La Settlement de las Primas del Seguro Obligatorio de Accidentes de Tránsito (SOAT)” (“Settlement 
of Primes for the Mandatory Insurance for Traffic Accidents (SOAT)”), and “La Supuesta Settlement de Precios 
en las Licitaciones Convocadas por EsSalud para la Adquisición de Oxígeno Medicinal” (“The Alleged Price 
Settlement on Tenders Announced by EsSalud for Procurement of Medical Oxygen”) in FERNÁNDEZ-BACA, 
Jorge. (2012). Experiencias de Política Antimonopólica en El Perú. (Experience of Antitrust Policy in Peru) Lima, 
Universidad del Pacífico, pp. 41-86, 87-117, and 157-208, respectively. GAGLIUFFI, Ivo. (2003). “Derecho de 
la Competencia: ¿Cómo debe Evaluarse una Settlement de Precios según la Legislación Peruana” (“Right to 
Competition: How to Evaluate Price Settlement according to Peruvian Law?”). In: Diálogo con la Jurisprudencia. 
N° 60. Lima, Editorial El Búho. MARTÍNEZ, Martha and QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2007). Op. Cit., pp. 116-136. 
QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2011c). “Prácticas concertadas entre competidores y estándar de prueba requerido”. 
(“Agreed practices between competitors and test standard required”). In: Revista de Derecho Administrativo. N° 10. 
Lima, Tarea Asociación Gráfica Educativa, pp. 15-45. 
100 Comments on conceptual issues formulated below are also applicable, as appropriate, for the market-sharing 
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Given the importance of these cases, most of the investigations have been initiated ex officio 
by the Commission or, currently, by the Technical Secretariat. This is very useful since these 
investigations demand a very intense production of evidence, as it will be seen below in 
the description and analysis of cases. In the following graph it is shown the evolution of the 
number of proceedings initiated for horizontal cartel behaviors (See Graph N° 22):
Graph  N° 22
Evolution of the number of proceedings initiated for horizontal cartel behaviors
 
Below is an explanation and analysis of a selection of cases that allows reviewing the 
experience of Indecopi and identifying the interpretative criteria and evolution in the 
treatment of the main modality of horizontal cartel behaviors, particularly those involving 
cartels of competitors. The development and explanatory level of the selected cases varies 
according to their relevance.
3.2.1 Price Fixing100
The most characteristic cases of Indecopi in terms of horizontal cartel behaviors are for 
price fixing cartels. Indecopi’s concern on investigating and punishing these types of 
illegal behaviors has been shown since the beginning of its functions. As a general rule, 
investigations have been initiated through Indecopi’s own initiative.
First quinquennium
(1993 - 1997)
Second quinquennium
(1998 - 2002)
Tercer quinnquenium
(2003 - 2007)
Fourth quinnquenium
(2008 - 2012)
28
17
15
21
Source: Technical Secretariat.
NUMBER OF PROCEEDING INITIATED
PC
cartel behaviors evaluated in the next chapter.
101 The investigation was even initiated because of the increase in the price of bread, which producers argumented 
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Indecopi’s statements in this subject show that agreements or settlements among competitors 
in order to coordinate price fixing – and, in general, all those behaviors qualified as 
cartels among competitors – are automatically qualified as illegal, once their existence is 
demonstrated, and regardless of their specific effects on the market or the eventual reasons 
that may be formulated to justify them. In this regard, Indecopi’s statements have used the 
rule of illegality per se to analyze these types of infringements and, currently, this rule is 
expressly included in Legislative Decree 1034 as the absolute prohibition.
Indeed, Indecopi’s decision-making bodies have been clear stating that an infringement is 
committed when companies agree not to compete for prices, and that negative effects this 
behavior may cause in the market are not an element required to set the infringement, and 
they are evaluated only when qualifying the seriousness and sanction to be imposed.
Two exceptions to the rule of illegality per se for cartels are embodied in the rulings. On one 
side, the need to evaluate if the agreed practice caused damage to the general economic 
interest was formulated since, if it did not cause such effects, the practice should be deemed 
legal. On the other side, the need was specified to consider if agreements between competitors 
were accessory or supplementary of other legal agreements, in which case they were no 
longer illegal per se. As it will be explained, the first exception was further dismissed and, 
currently, it is not admissible according to Legislative Decree 1034, while the second keeps 
its validity and has been even included in the current rule.
On the other hand, cases exposed show that it is usually very hard to prove the existence of 
cartels of competitors for price fixing, except in cases where the illegal behavior is embodied 
in an agreement or commitment formally assumed by the offenders. This is due to the fact 
that economic agents usually are very careful and do not leave traces that may involve them 
in such practices. This is particularly true in the case of settlements, in which it is necessary 
to turn to material evidence in order to demonstrate the infringement.
The analysis of these illegal practices requires studying coordinated behavior of competitors 
in the market, as well as preparing inferences or presumptions through indications that allow 
concluding that such behavior is a result of a prior agreement between the participants. 
Indecopi has fought tirelessly, and we should say successfully, so that the validity of the use 
of this type of evidence is recognized to sanction cartels of competitors. 
In the absence of direct evidence, Indecopi’s decision-making bodies follow, as a general 
rule, an evaluation method to solve the following matters:
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•	 If	the	market	conditions	facilitate	an	agreed	behavior.
•	 If	 a	 similar	 or	 same	 behavior	 is	 verified	 among	 competitors	 (such	 behavior	 is	 called	
behavior parallelism).
•	 If	 there	 are	 concurrent	 indications	 that	 suggest	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 there	 has	 been	 an	
agreement or arrangement between competitors (such indications are called “plus factors”).
•	 If	they	acted	in	compliance	of	an	arrangement.
•	 If	 contra	 indications	 and/or	 alternative	 explanations	 formulated	 by	 the	 persons	 being	
investigated weaken or dismiss the settlement hypothesis (this evaluation is called 
counterfactual analysis).
Indications considered by Indecopi include official information, submitted to the authorities 
by the investigated companies, such as internal documentation between officers of the 
companies, e-mails, handwritten notes, mere details or coincidences, among others. The 
large number of indications is not necessary to conclude the existence of the infringement. In 
certain cases, notorious and repeated coincidences in the economic agents’ behavior, that do 
not appear to have a reasonable explanation, may be considered by Indecopi as a relevant and 
different indication to mere behavior parallelism, which joint evaluation has allowed finding 
such coincidences. In these cases, Indecopi has seek those coincidences are completely clear 
and vanish all doubts concerning the existence of a settlement.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the evaluation of contra indications or alternative explanations 
facing the settlement hypothesis is acknowledged as an issue of major relevance in the 
production of evidence made by Indecopi. 
Chart N° 11
Horizontal cartel behaviors - Price fixing cases
PRICE
FIXING
CASES
Ex officio investigation v. the Wheat Mills Committee of the National Society of Industries 
and 18 wheat flour producing companies (1996).
Ex officio investigation v. Peruvian Poultry Association (APA) and 21 poultry producing 
companies, breeding companies and incubators (1997).
Miguel	Ciccia	Vásquez	EIRL.	(CIVA)	v.	Empresa	Turística	Mariscal	Cáceres	SA.	-	Mariscal	
Cáceres (1997).
Ex officio investigation v. Peruvian Association of Insurance Companies (APESEG) and 
nine insurance companies (2003).
Ex officio investigation v. Central Regional de Transporte Público de Pasajeros (Passenger 
Public Transportation Regional Headquarters), Sierra-Ancash Zone, its representatives 
and several transportation companies (2010).
Ex officio investigation contra la Freight Forwarders Union –Ancash Region, Sierra – Unión 
Zone, six former members of its Board of Directors, and 72 carriers (2011).
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 a. Ex officio investigation v. Wheat Mills Committee of the National Society 
  of Industries and 18 wheat flour producing companies (1996)
This was the first notorious experience of Indecopi persecution of cartels of competitors. It not 
only involved a high impact product in the economy of the large majorities of the population, 
while it was the main input for bread production101, but it was also the first investigation 
against a group of number of long tradition companies in the Peruvian market.
Investigation conducted by Indecopi not only involved the requirement of a big amount 
of statistical information, but also surprise visits the premises of the companies subject to 
investigation, interviews to their officers, gathering and reproducing documentation in situ, 
among others, all this with the purpose to gather evidence on the alleged infringement.
As a result of analyzing the statistical information submitted by the companies, the Commission 
found that there were parallel movements in the sale prices of wheat flour and, also, that price 
dispersion had been reduced since March 1995 for sales higher than 300 sacks. In particular, 
the difference between the highest and the lowest prices was significantly reduced since mid 
March, 1995. 
The companies’ public price list was usually higher than the effective sale price but, since the 
first half of March, 1995, the difference was notoriously reduced for sales over 300 sacks. The 
Commission explained that reduction of this difference had been a mechanism to facilitate 
collusion: “The reduction of that breach would constitute a mechanism to facilitate verifying 
the compliance of the agreement by the companies involved since, by supporting the price 
policy in price lists known by the public, the margin for the companies is reduced in order to 
apply discount policies at their discretion”.
In addition, the Commission found that the average prices or wheat flour in Lima had been 
increased in parallel since March, 1995, before the international prices of wheat raised, so 
the price of wheat flour was increased before their costs. Finally, it also demonstrated that 
by the end of 1994, competition in the wheat flour market was strong – qualified as a “war 
of prices” by the industry players -, embodied in sales with discounts on list prices; this 
competition would have led most of the companies to a difficult financial situation. 
with the increase, in turn, of the price of wheat flour. 
102 A media reported in an anecdotal way the details of this finding of the Commission: “That investigation shows 
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The following chart, included in the resolution of the Commission, shows the time of the “war 
of prices” since the last months of 1994, the reduction of the difference between the list price 
and the effective sale price between March and April 1995, and further prices increase (See 
Graph N° 23).
Graph N° 23
Milling Companies: weighted list price v. weighted effective price.
Volume: 300 sacks and up (Aug.94 –Sep. 95)
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 Source: Resolution N°047-95-INDECOPI/CLC.
With this, the Commission considered that since March 1995 a notorious change in price 
policy of the investigated companies had occurred, which indicated the existence of an 
agreed practice between competitors. 
This hypothesis, originated in the behavior of the investigated companies, was later sustained 
with circumstantial evidence on an agreement to fix sale prices of more than 300 flour sacks, 
which had been adopted in a camaraderie meeting on March 23, 1995. 
In this regard, one of the proves used by the Commission was the meeting minutes of Molinera 
Valencia Sucesores SA. Board of Directors, dated March 27, 1995, which stated the following: 
“In several the Manager reported that on March 23, 1995, he had a meeting with milling 
businessmen which, this time, also held with businessmen from La Fabril S.A.; they 
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discussed about the positive perspective that glimpse from this month on since the war 
of prices started by La Fabril S.A. is over”102.
Other minutes of the Board meetings of the investigated companies were submitted, such as 
the minutes of the meeting dated March 16, 1995, held by the Board of Directors of Industrias 
Teal SA., in which one of the attendants summarized the information as follows: 
“Anyway, she had the impression that 1995 was going to be a better year, financially, 
since from the sale of La Fabril industrial complex to Peru Pacífico company, subsidiary 
of Banco de Crédito, an agreement had been reached with competitor firms in order to 
make a readjustment, rise product prices to reasonable levels, because the phenomenon 
in our company is not an isolated case, but it is shown in all companies”. 
In addition, the Commission showed evidence that the agreement was executed and its 
compliance was permanently monitored by the investigated companies. As shown above, 
communication submitted by the Flour Supervisor to the Sales Management of Molino Italia 
SA company on May 8, 1995, was submitted, which reported how prices of the companies 
were being applied, in the following terms: 
“Nicolini:  Respects prices
Peru:  Respects prices.
Sta. Rosa:  Respects prices.
Cogorno:  Respects prices.
Triunfo: Respects prices, but sometimes receives deferred checks for 
 cash purchases.
Cogorno Trujillo:  Its prices are as follows:
 1 to 100 49.50 credit
 100 and up  48.40 credit
 1 to 100 48.10 cash def. check 15 days
 100 a + 47.40 cash deferred ch. 15 days
Inca:  Respects prices, but from 200 sacks and up does not charge freight to 
 the client. Cash is made with deferred checks on one week.
that even a friendly grill leads to burning dangers [sic]. According to the document, on March 23, 1995, La Fabril 
(Romero Group) organized the get-together. Among sausages and steaks they would have glimpsed ‘the positive 
perspective in the sector since the war of prices started by La Fabril S.A. is over as it has been bought by the 
Argentinian group Bunge Born’, as stated by the general manager of Molinera Valencia, Humberto Delgado, 
in the Board minutes dated 03/27/95. (…). On its side, La Fabril, although it accepts the organization of the 
grill, it states that the appointment was merely a camaraderie meeting between the main executives of milling 
companies, and strongly denies there had been a meeting to discuss prices”. Caretas N° 1391, November 30, 
1995 (section Mar de Fondo).
103 Resolution 047-95-INDECOPI/CLC, dated November 23, 1995. 
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Sayón:  Its prices are as follows:
 45.20 cash without scales
 48.20 credit without scales
Finna: Respects prices. From 200 sacks and up does not charge freight to 
 the client”.
The weekly sales report dated July 22, 1995, was also considered. It was directed by the 
Marketing Manager to the General Manager of Molinera Inca SA. In this document, the 
following was stated: “Concerning prices, in Lima, we have been informed that Nicolini, 
Molitalia, Cogorno and Fabril mills made effective an increase [sic] in prices since the 24th 
day, as it had been agreed. For Molinera Peru, Finna, Lugón and Triunfo it is stated [sic] that 
they will change their prices since the 27th day”.
Taking into consideration the aforesaid, the Commission concluded that 11 of 18 companies 
investigated had settled prices for the marketing of wheat flour, infringing art. 6 letter a) 
of Legislative Decree N° 701. Therefore, it imposed each one of them the highest sanction 
applicable according to the current law at that time103: 
Chart N° 12
Sanctions to Milling Companies
Company Commission 
(Tax units)
Cía. Molinera del Perú S.A. 50
Consorcio de Alimentos Fabril Pacífico S.A. 50
Corporación Molinera S.A. 50
Eugenio Cogorno Molino Excelsior S.A. 50
Eugenio Cogorno Molino Trujillo S.A. 50
Industrias Teal S.A. 50
Molinera El Triunfo S.A. 50
Molinera Inca S.A. 50
Molinera Valencia Sucesores S.A. 50
Molino Italia S.A. 50
Nicolini Hermanos S.A. 50
                            Source: Own development.
104 Resolution 1104-96-INDECOPI/TRI.
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition132
After that, almost all the sanctioned companies decided to pay the fine imposed and end the 
proceedings.
However, as it is the first high-profile investigation performed by Indecopi against a cartel, 
the use of circumstantial evidence to determine the responsibility of the offenders was 
questioned by two of the sanctioned companies, who appealed the first instance decision. In 
particular, they stated that the existence of similarity in prices and movement they showed 
in the market (i.e., parallel behavior) was no proof of settlement and the existence of this 
infringement could not be deduced merely from indications. 
These questionings were reviewed by the Tribunal in an appeal, being entirely dismissed, 
taking into consideration that the Commission had full powers to investigate infringements 
in Legislative Decree 701, and the Peruvian legal frame acknowledged the validity of 
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the existence of administrative offenses104. 
However, one of the companies appealed to the Judiciary, requesting to declare null and void 
the Resolution of the Court and, therefore, to dismiss the charge of price settlement against 
it. In determining this question, the Supreme Court of the Republic not only recognized 
Indecopi’s authority to use circumstantial evidence, but confirmed its validity to demonstrate 
the existence of concerted practices in general, and of wheat flour price settlement in 
particular, in the following terms:
“As noted by the plaintiff company, it may be that the simple price parallelism is not 
enough to state that prices are “agreed”, but instead, this fact added to other proven acts 
lead to the conviction that there was a settlement (...) That the proof of ‘indication’, before 
belonging to criminal law, is the action or signal disclosing what is hidden, is the suspicion 
that a fact allows concerning another unknown fact. No evidence offers as much variety 
as indication; it is based on facts or circumstances that are supposed to be proven and 
try by means of reasoning and inference to establish the relationship with the fact being 
investigated, the mystery of the problem (...) That, as a premise, it is noticed that indications, 
in order to meet their purpose, i.e., to be used as evidence, should be considered as a whole 
and not individually (...) That indications identified in the challenged decisions based on 
the ex officio investigation conducted by Indecopi (...) are facts that lead to establish that 
the plaintiff did participate in price settlement in conjunction with the other companies 
investigated and sanctioned (...) that, for the probative value of the ‘indications’, it is 
required that they meet certain requirements, such as the fact that there be no ‘Contra 
105 Judgement dated October 18, 1999, entered on the la administrative complaint filed by Corporación Molinera 
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Indications’ that cannot be reasonably disregarded and diminish the evidence of the 
indications (...) In this case file there is an absence of Contra Indications (…)”105.
Thus, an important chapter in the experience of Indecopi as the authority in charge of 
persecuting the cartels of competitors was closed.
 b. Ex officio investigation against Peruvian Poultry Association (APA) and 21  
  poultry producing companies, breeding companies and incubators (1997)
The investigation was initiated for several anticompetitive behaviors of the investigated 
companies in the market of trading of live chicken in Lima, during the period between May 
1995 and July 1996. On one hand, the investigated companies were attributed the settlement 
of the prices of chicken; on the other hand, eleven of them were attributed the settlement of 
prices, marketing conditions and production volumes, as well as establishing of barriers for 
the entrance of potential competitors and forcing the exit of others.
This was the most famous case of settlement between competitors Indecopi has known in its 
entire history to date, due to the characteristics that converged on it. The price of chicken 
has a direct and immediate impact on the family budget - unlike investigation in the wheat 
flour production market, which impact was indirect -; the number of companies involved was 
quite high, the behaviors investigated were several and their complexity was higher, as it was 
evaluated whether within the overall settlement a group of companies had incurred, in turn, 
into a more complex and particular infringement, through the so-called Poultry Strategic 
Alliance (AEA).
Along with the above, on April 1996, the Executive Branch had issued the Legislative Decree 
NO807, by which it granted Indecopi increased powers of investigation and punishment. 
The investigation against the poultry market cartel was a “trial by fire” for Indecopi that 
did not hesitate to use its new powers, particularly when requesting information from the 
investigated companies, including that of a confidential nature, either during the number of 
inspection without further notice, or during the processing of the proceedings.
The details of the investigation were quickly moved to the media, thus creating anticipation 
for the results of the procedure.
S.A. against Resolution 1104-96-INDECOPI/TRI.
106 Resolution 001-97-INDECOPI-CLC, dated January 15, 1997. 
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The Commission, based on the report issued by the Technical Secretariat, deemed that the 
defaulting behavior had been implemented in four periods, identifying on each of them 
different behaviors or formulas, as shown in the following chart:
Chart N° 13
Defaulting behaviors detected in the poultry market cartel
Period Defaulting behaviors
Mayo - agosto
de 1995
Settlement	for	determining	(stabilization)	of	prices.
Settlement for creating entrance barriers to potential competitors (importers).
Septiembre - diciembre 
de 1995
Settlement	for	determining	(reduction,	increase	and	further	stabilization)	of	prices.
Forming of the AEA which involved an agreement for the agreed price fixing, production 
volumes and creation of entrance barriers and permanence of competitors.
Enero	–	marzo
de 1996
Settlement for determining (increase) of prices.
Continuous operation of AEA.
Abril - julio
de 1996
Settlement for determining (reduction and further increase) of prices.
Continuous operation of AEA.
Source: Own development.
For purposes of evaluation, it was first taken into consideration how the chicken production 
process was organized, which can be seen in the following graph (See Graph N° 24):
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Graph N° 24
Chicken production process
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Source: Technical Report N° 001-97-CLC.
Also, the organization of chicken trading process was taken into account, as it can be seen 
below (See Graph N° 25):
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Graph N° 25
Chicken trading process
Having defined the above, the Commission examined whether the market characteristics 
could be considered as elements facilitating settlement between competitors, stating the 
following:
“Chicken meat is the meat product of highest demand among Peruvian consumers; 
its price is below the price of meat and most of the fish flesh, which makes it the 
most accessible choice for Peruvian families. In the live chicken trading market 
in Lima and Callao there is a high concentration of both production and trading; in 
conjunction with the main producers, other companies participate in that market 
which, due to their smaller size, do not substantially affect the market. They trade 
their production through systems other than those used by the main producers.
Companies of higher participation in that market are grouped into the Chicken Meat 
Producers Committee of the Peruvian Poultry Association, which representatives have 
held periodic meetings during the investigation period – at least once a week. In those 
meetings, the market behavior and the behavior of each company in particular from 
the information exchanged was evaluated or gathered directly by professional bodies.
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107 Resolution 001-97-INDECOPI/CLC, dated January 15, 1997. Below is included the value of the fine imposed to 
In that market, there are conditions facilitating the creation of entrance barriers 
to potential competitors, that derive from the currently existing trading system, 
which is implemented primarily through 14 Distribution Centers and less than 240 
wholesalers who are directly controlled by producers grouped within the APA” 106.
After that, the Commission assessed the behavior of companies in the market, to identify 
whether there was a parallel behavior, and identified that there was coincidence between the 
different dates on which meetings of a large part of the investigated companies in the APA 
and relevant changes in prices. Also, it found that the difference between the prices of the 
different companies was coincidentally reduced in times were price increases were given. 
The following graph shows this (See Graph No. 26):
Graph N° 26
Chicken sale: prices without VAT
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                 Source: Technical Report N°001-97-CLC
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In view of that, miscellaneous documentation gathered in the inspection visits was evaluated 
to determine whether the behavior of companies could be explained as a result of an 
agreement or settlement.
The evidence indicated that early in the second quarter of 1995, the companies belonging to the 
APA identified that a considerable overproduction of chicken was approaching which, if sold 
in the market, would cause a reduction in price would cause them losses. Thus, in the minutes 
of the meeting Chicken Meat Producers Committee of the APA (CPPC) dated April 13, 1995, 
the following was stated: “[it was] shown to those present the Baby Chicken Meat Production 
Projection Period April 1995 - September 1995. Concerning this point, the team that has been 
preparing these figures will suggest the different alternatives that may be adopted by the sector.” 
The Commission found that in this session the document entitled “Projected BB Meat Chicken 
Production Period April 1995 - September 1995”, and the chart entitled “Real and Theoretical 
Production of Baby Chicken Meat”, in which there was a projection indicating that national 
chicken production would reach 22 million in the month of September, the following being 
stated:
“(...) as it can be seen in Baby Chicken Theoretical Production, from the month of March 
there is a clear upward trend. In the 8 months curve it exceeds 17 million in February 
to 18 million in March, 19 million in April, 20 million in May, 21 million in June and it 
continues increasing until reaching 22 million in September.
If this projection is complied, we would have a major problem in the market, because of 
the overproduction that would happen. The market easily absorbs only about 17.5 million 
baby chickens.
 
We should not forget that a drop in farmgate price of S/. 0.10 cents of Nuevo Sol in a month, 
represents a lower income for the poultry companies of approximately US$ 1,500,000 
Dollars.” 
In addition, in the document entitled “Determination of Baby Chicken Meat Excess in the 
coming months”, which was also distributed at the session subject to comment, the expected 
surplus level for the months of June to November 1995 was specified, as well as the losses that 
it would cause according to the chosen alternative:
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition 139
Chart N° 14
Determination of Baby Chicken Meat Excess in the coming months
MONTH MONTH CARGO BB CHICKEN POLLO BB SURPLUS
SALE DOM. POLLO BBMILLIONS
IMPORTED
MILLIONS
EXPORTED
MILLION MILLION
MAR JAN 17.400
APR FEB 17.544 (0,649)
MAY MAR 17.903 (0,454)
JUN APR 19.335 (0,854) 0,400 1,789
JUL MAY 20.145 2,145
AUG JUN 21.029 3,029
SEP JUL 21.277 3,277
OCT AUG 21.581 3,581
NOV SEP 21.967 3,967”
Chart N° 15
Hypothetical case of an increase of 290,000 baby chicken in the domestic placing
VALUATION OF LOSSES PER ALTERNATIVE. 
LOSSES EXPRESSED IN SOLES PER MONTH S/. POR MES
Sell live poultry = (17 300.00 + 290 000) *0,95*2,2*0,1 =  3 676 000
Slaughter excess poultry = 290 000*0*0,95*2,2*0,65 =     394 000
Dispose of BB chicks = 290 000*0,60 =     174 000
Dispose of H.F. of BB chicks = 290 000/0,85*0,40 =     136 000
Remove	excess	breeding	flocks	=	290	000/13*3,5*0,7 =       55 000
Export H.F. of BB chicks =     136 000
Export BB chicks =     174 000
Export slaughtered poultry =     144 000
Cut down imports
Reduce cargo
Select *
Source: Resolution N°276-97-TDC.
The topics discussed at the meeting on April 19, 1995 were explained in the Memorandum 
223-95, dated April 24, 1995, which was found in the inspection visit carried out on the 
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premises of the company Avícola El Rocío SA. In the referred document, an official of the 
company who attended the meeting explained what happened to the director of the company 
which head office was in Trujillo:
“At the last meeting of the Chicken Meat Producers Committee, Mr. Victor Eyzaguirre 
made  a presentation on the crisis that may occur with overproduction of Cargo Baby 
Chicken, which I am enclosing.
The corrective actions planned to be taken in the event that the cargo data are verified 
are as follows:
1.- Trying to sell baby chicken fertile eggs to the companies that are importing, which at 
the moment are:
a) ROSMAR S.A.    c) MOLINOS MAYO 
b) CORPORAC. GANADERA  d) MOLINERA SAN MARTIN
2.- The second measure would be to freeze chickens for those integrations which average 
exceeds 2.30 Kg.
3.- The elimination of breeding companies for those integrations exceeding the agreed 
weight.
These are the measures to be discussed at the meeting on Wednesday this month”. 
The next session of CPPC was held on May 03, 1995. Again, an internal memorandum of 
Avícola El Rocio was submitted by the Commission to explain the details of what happened:  
“At the meeting held at the Chicken Producers Committee on Wednesday 03 this month, 
extremely important issues were treated:
1.- Maintain a standardized average weight. The motion was approved unanimously.
2.- Average monthly Load of Chicken Meat each integration should have.
Mr. Polo Suárez and Mr. Fernando Fabres Ikeda, submitted the following chart, attached 
in annex sheet, based on average cargoes of the last three (03) months.
By viewing this chart a voting process was performed among all attendants to eliminate 
their May surplus, which were the closest, via drowning of embryos or Baby Chickens. 
This was accepted by the majority in the first voting, except for TAKAGAKI; who put into 
consideration a number of reasons why it could not give an immediate answer.
On the other hand, Mr. Fabres made the following proposals:
1.- Reduction of Import by breeding companies.
2.- Cancelling of Baby Chicken or Fertile eggs imports and proposed they were bought 
nationwide.
3.- Elimination of breeding companies.
4.- Chicken freezing.
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 (...) Mr. Bellido’s proposal to form with all members of the Chicken Meat Committee a 
company that would buy the Frozen Chicken, sell it to the provinces or try to export it was 
added to this measure. (...)
Chicken managed by the new company would be the production surplus for the month 
of May and the following months. The new company would work without profit breaking 
the entrance to Chilean chicken. According to their calculations these will represent a 
loss of 0.05 per kilo of chicken, a less amount than that resulting from not freezing and 
allowing these groups to approach each time more to Lima, as well as sales of Live Chic-
ken due to the subsequent drop in prices.
(...)
At 01.30 p.m., a recess was asked until tomorrow so that each of the members of the 
Committee thinks and, in the special case of Mr. Pedro Komatsudani who opposes the 
measure, makes its cash flow and sees if it is convenient for him, since he opposes clai-
ming that months ago the Committee has proceeded to work as a Free company.”
Another evidence of later dates showed that the investigated companies agreed to implement, 
jointly, some of the measures proposed as an alternative to face overproduction, and thus 
avoid all chicken produced to be sold in the market, causing the price drop. It can also be 
mentioned other evidence considered by the Commission, for example, the minutes of the 
Board meeting of Alimentos Protina SA dated June 12, 1995, which stated the following: 
“The Engineer (...) reported on the agreement recently taken by the Chicken Producers 
Committee, stating the imminent decision to slaughter and freeze chickens to avoid drop 
in prices. He finally stated that the company achieving an average weight level of 2,200 
Kg. or less, shall not be affected with the agreement of slaughtering and freezing.”
The evidence also showed that the arrangements had been implemented, with difficulty 
at first, but more regularly after. The implementation of the agreements required the recall 
involved comply with information on their production levels as well as on volumes of frozen 
chicken. The CPPC Circular/053/95, dated May 11, 1995, sent to all member companies, is 
proof of this:
“We are pleased to address to you, in order to express our serious concern, because we 
do not timely have information on your company’s Baby Chicken Meat production.
As agreed in the Committee dated 05.10.95, companies should send their information 
on a weekly basis.
This will help to make more intelligent decisions in the right time.”
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Subsequently, on 06 July 1995, the General Manager of CPPC sent letters to all companies, 
communicating with the quantities that would participate in the program “take for slaughter 
and freeze” of chicken. The text of the letter was as follows:
“We are pleased to address to you, as agreed at the meeting of the Committee held 
on 07.05.95, to attach a copy of the Program for the slaughter and freeze of 160,000 
chickens, in which your company is involved with (X QUANTITY) of chickens.
In this regard, we would very much appreciate you to kindly send at least on Friday 
07/07/95, the corresponding pickup orders on behalf of the Peruvian Poultry Association.”
In addition, memorandum dated August 12, 1995, addressed by an official of Alimentos Protina 
SA to two officers from Molinera San Martín de Porres SA., not only referred explicitly to the 
existent agreement, but also reported about the freezing quota to meet the said agreement 
(See Graph N° 27):
Chart N° 39
Memorandum from Alimentos Protina S.A.
Source: Resolution N°276-97-TDC.
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Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the schedule for the execution of the 
agreement was demonstrated, regularly reporting the monthly volume requested to withdraw 
from the market and the corresponding quota to be frozen for each participating company.
The following stages of the agreement were also studied and demonstrated through various 
types of circumstantial evidence. Just as an example, the formats titled “Wholesale prices 
of domestic products sold in the country” can be cited, which were found at the premises of 
Molinera San Martin de Porres SA. There, the company submitted to the National Institute 
Statistics and Information Technology (INEI), data on the evolution of prices of chicken. 
In the “Comments” section of the format submitted on October 23, 1995, the following was 
stated: “The 10/18/95 the price recovered. In the market it still cannot be observed the demand 
for the product, since it depends on the average price of chicken and the agreement taken by 
the group of farmers.”
In the “Comments” section of the format submitted a month later, i.e., on November 23 of the 
same year, the mentioned company informed the INEI that the farmgate price of chicken had 
been S/.3.20 on October 30 and S/.3.10 November 09, including the following explanation: 
“The price of S/.3.10 is being maintained because all integrations [i.e., the poultry companies] 
have reduced their production by means of an agreement, since the market needs to stabilize.”
As for the measures taken in 1996 by all investigated companies, the Commission also 
submitted various indications, such as the following manuscript, found a copy of the report 
entitled “Supply Week April 16 to 22, 1996”, that the investigated companies discussed in 
the CPPC meeting on April 24, 1996, a document that was found at the premises of Avícola 
Rosmar SA.
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Chart Nº 40
Manuscript found in a copy of the report entitled “Supply Week April 16 to 22, 1996”
Source: Resolution N°276-97-TDC.
To explain this manuscript it should be mentioned that, according to the findings of the 
Commission, at the time corresponding to the date of this document, poultry companies had 
agreed to conduct a joint advertising campaign to promote an increased consumption of 
chicken, in order to rapidly control production surplus that was going to show again, and then 
coordinate raising the price again.
Thus, the Commission concluded that the investigated companies had participated in a 
settlement to fix the price of chicken together, managing to do different variables that allowed 
them to coordinately control the volumes that would be traded.
In addition to the above, the Commission considered that a smaller group of the investigated 
companies had incurred in additional illegal behavior through the establishment of the AEA, 
which was a more complex agreement within the overall settlement, and which they tried 
to hide through the figure of an alleged transit to an integration of the companies involved.
In particular, the Commission deemed to have proven that the agreements adopted by the 
companies of the self-named AEA have had the objective or purpose to agree the price of 
chicken, by direct settlement of prices and different issues related to the production and 
trading (volumes and quality of chicken, input purchase unification, joint determination of 
the wholesale margin, unification of the trading system, etc.). Similarly, it realized that it had 
proved the existence of agreements within the AEA which purpose was to prevent or restrict 
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the entry of competitors -marginal producers, informal or foreign – to the market through the 
development of financial, business and governmental access barriers.
As evidence of the aforesaid, the Commission took into account the document entitled “Poultry 
Strategic Alliance - AEA. Defining AEA Strategic Guidelines”, which stated the following:
“The general description of each of the objectives linked to the sub-strategy of creating 
entrance barriers is as follows:
(...)
b) Determine the wholesale margin: drive standardization marketing margin of 
wholesalers at a fair level.
(...)
d) Corner farms and hatcheries: carry out activities related to avoid having idle capacity 
outside the AEA, so that it can be purchased or used by others.
e) Lobbying in Banks, IPSS, SUNAT, etc: looking forward to discuss with them so that 
they do not favor uneven growth of the sector.
f) Sanitary Barriers: suggest SENASA to approve the “rules of farms” in order to meet 
certain health standards in the industry. “
(…)
a) Action Plan “lobbing with Banks”
This plan aims at creating entrance barriers for potential investors and in turn, makes 
the financial sector gain confidence in the AEA and its members. Specific activities to be 
implemented in this action plan are:
(...)
- Inform them not to promote distortions in the sector by wrongly encouraging some 
investors who want to enter the poultry sector.
b) Union attitude
This plan focuses on a series of proactive activities that must be implemented to strengthen 
the AEA while creating entrance barriers for certain investors. Ongoing activities would 
be as follows:
(...)
- Propose a review of the problems that would be generated by imports of breeding 
chickens and baby chickens.
- Pressure SENASA to approve regulations for farms, slaughterhouses, storage centers, 
etc.”
Therefore, the Commission declared to be well founded (i) the charge of price fixing against all 
investigated companies, and in addition, (ii) the charge of price fixing and implementation of 
other measures to control production and the creation of entrance barriers (through the AEA) 
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against a smaller number of companies. Consequently, differentiated fines were imposed to 
them according to their level of participation, size in the market, number of illegal behaviors 
made , etc. The whole amount of the fines imposed by the Commission amounted to 6,373 
Peruvian Taxation Units107.
On the appeal the use of circumstantial evidence was questioned, the alleged abuse in 
the use of investigative powers, improper use of circumstantial evidence, particularly the 
implications of settlement that the Commission had deduced from the evidence obtained, and 
the existence of alternative explanations for the documents found, other than an agreement of 
competitors. In addition, companies sanctioned for participating in the AEA also questioned 
who would have thought that through it an additional illegal behavior was committed and 
they were more severely punished for it.
The Tribunal dismissed the questions related to the use of the Indications, as well as on the 
powers of investigation, noting that the Commission’s approach was completely according to 
law and at all times had allowed companies to fully exercise their right of defense.
For analysis of indications found, the Tribunal agreed that there was evidence of the existence 
of an agreement by the majority of the investigated companies for a coordinated price fixing 
through a set of measures for overproduction control, jointly applied. In the words of the 
Tribunal:
“To conclude this point, the Court considers that it can be concluded from the evidence 
and indications jointly assessed, that on the CPPC meeting dated May 3, 1995, the poultry 
companies attending, except Takagaki (today Avinka SA) agreed to tackle the problem 
that would mean to their companies the “overproduction” they had confirmed that would 
occur based on the information collected at the end of the month of April and prepared 
by Mr. Izaguirre. To this end, these companies adopted a series of measures to restrict 
competition designed to be implemented jointly and simultaneously. The measures 
agreed at these meetings were to decrease the levels of breeding (e.g., reducing the 
importation of fertile eggs, exporting fertile eggs jointly and/or eliminating fertile eggs 
and embryos), standardization of the weight of chickens and the joint management of 
surpluses through their freezing and sale outside the Lima market. For this, Mr. Rafael 
Bellido, representative of Corporación Ganadera SA, suggested forming a company that 
each of the companies, in a comparative chart with the fines fixed by the Tribunal. 
108 Resolution 276-97-TDC, dated November 19, 1997. 
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would be responsible for selling the surplus production - that is, the frozen chicken - in other 
markets, mainly in provinces (Cuzco and Puno, places where, unlike Lima, it is primarily 
traded frozen) and institutions (e.g., the Navy of Peru). This suggestion was accepted, 
entrusting Mr. Bellido to develop a project for the creation of the new company.”108
In this regard, the Tribunal upheld the first instance decision regarding the charge for settlement 
price against fifteen producers and traders of chicken and the APA. Notwithstanding this, it 
considered that there was no evidence that incubator companies and breeding companies, 
which were included in the investigation after it was initiated, had committed the said offense, 
therefore it dismissed the first instance decision in this regard.
Finally, the Tribunal considered that any violations that may have occurred within the AEA 
“have occurred simultaneously with the settlement of prices, production conditions and 
restrictions involving all investigated companies”, so that any restriction of competition 
within the AEA “would have juxtaposed to the agreements and behaviors generated within 
the frame of a larger settlement and, therefore, should be considered as part of the settlement 
acts involving other companies”.
Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal reduced the fines imposed by the first instance to the 
infringing companies, as outlined in the following chart:
109 This situation has been reported ironically, but true, by Alfredo Bullard: "After 13 years of litigation, the Supreme 
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Chart N° 16
Fines imposed to infringing poultry companies
Company / Entity Commission (UIT) Tribunal (Peruvian 
Taxation Units)
Peruvian Poultry Association (APA) 100 50 
Agropecuaria Contán S.A. 30 20
Agropecuaria El Pilar S.A. 56 25 
Agropecuaria Villa Victoria S.A. 149 --
Alimentos Protina S.A. 348 130
Avícola del Norte S.A. 64 --
Avícola El Rocío S.A. 64 30
Avícola Galeb S.C.R.L. 113 50
Avícola Rosmar S.A. 75 30
Avícola San Fernando S.A. 1 055 450
Avícolas Asociadas S.A. 115 50 
Corporación Ganadera S.A. 1 045 340
El Palomar E.I.R.L. 60 20
F.Car SA. 37 15
Germán	Orbezo	Suárez 384 140
Granja Los Huertos S.A. 1 055 --
Granja de Reproductoras El Hatillo S.A. 10 --
Haidarliz	S.A. 10 --
Molinera San Martín de Porres S.A. 300 220
Molinos Mayo S.A. 1 055 450
Redondos S.A. 248 100
Source: Resolutions 001-97-INDECOPI/CLC y 276-97-TDC
Own development.
An additional issue of the highest importance in the Tribunal’s decision is that, as a result 
of the theoretical analysis and the interpretation given to the Legislative Decree N° 701, it 
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decided to establish the mandatory compliance precedent (rule of mandatory application by 
Indecopi’s decision-making bodies) for subsequent cases of settlement between competitors:
Resolution N° 276-97-TDC-INDECOPI
“According to the rules contained in Legislative Decree Nº701, the 
settlements of prices, market sharing, allocation of production quotas and 
production limitation or control must be punished according to the per-se 
rule. This implies that the mere performance embodiment of the forbidden 
practice constitutes an administrative offense to which the required legal 
sanction must be applied. In that sense, to consider the offense configured 
it is not necessary to take into account the detrimental effects of the practice 
on the market, or their reasonableness, i.e., the fact that the practice is 
appropriate or not to produce detrimental effects on the market.”
Thus, in 1997, Indecopi took the illegality criterion per se to sanction price settlements and 
other behaviors classified as cartels of competitors. Under this rule, these behaviors should be 
classified as illegal with the mere demonstration that the participants had agreed to restrict 
competition, without the need to demonstrate detrimental effects on the market or to assess 
the reasonableness of such practices.
As it has been already discussed in the first chapter, the strictness of this rule is explained 
because the behaviors that qualify as a cartel allow competitors to act in coordination in the 
market, as if they were a single company but simulating to compete. Thus, they achieve in a 
veiled way the market power they do not have individually and get monopolistic benefits that 
would not have been possible had they not coordinated their behavior.
A very relevant issue concerning this case is that the infringing companies took the dispute to 
the Judiciary, requesting to declare null and void the Resolution issued by the Tribunal. The 
judicial process culminated at the last instance by the end of 2010.
Although its term in court was exaggerated (about 13 years), the final and definitive outcome 
was notoriously positive for Indecopi. Both the Provisional Civil Division of the Supreme 
Court, as the Constitutional Law and Permanent Social Division of the Supreme Court, which 
heard the case at first and second instance courts, respectively, confirmed and supported 
Indecopi’s decision.
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition150
Among the most interesting aspects of the judgment should be mentioned that the Supreme 
Court concluded that the settlement of poultry companies was duly proven by circumstantial 
evidence and evaluated used by Indecopi instances. Additionally, it fully confirmed, according 
to the Legislative Decree 701, the criterion of illegality per se was the applicable rule of 
analysis to this type of conduct forbidden.
Given the importance of the case, as one of the key processes in the development of Indecopi’s 
practice in the persecution of cartels of competitors, we deem appropriate to reaffirm what we 
have already noted in a previous work on the final and definitive judgement of the Judiciary:
“In fact it is one of the most important rulings of the Supreme Court in this matter, which 
supports an investigation properly made  and a duly supported analysis by Indecopi in one 
of the most emblematic cases of this institution. Although it draws the attention, and can 
cause a fair critic, it has taken a long time to arrive to the final decision, it should not lose sight 
that this decision has not been a consensus or was not free of opposing positions. Rather, it 
is the product of a large dispute between the members of the Supreme Court who vote to vote 
were considering three different positions in regard to the matters dealt background109.
(…) 
The majority vote concluded that the settlements type committed by poultry companies 
are punishable under the per-se rule, i.e., that such behaviors are automatically 
illegal for their mere performance without needing to evaluate their impact on the 
market. To reach this conclusion it was considered that, although Article 3 of L.D. 
701 stated that there should be a detriment to the general economic interest110, such 
policy referred to an abstract economic interest, not to a specific interest, therefore 
it not necessary to evaluate the effects of investigated practice on the market”111.
Court finally gave its final judgment: the poulterers made a settlement and must be punished. Already in the 
first instance the Provisional Civil Division of the Supreme Court had declared that the offense was made with a 
non-substantial reduction of the fine imposed. The poulterers appealed and the case (simple and clear) became 
complicated. Suddenly, all the members began to vote against Indecopi’s decision. A total of five members (with 
formalist arguments which were not related to the core problem) voted for the annulment of the case. Some sought 
to bring it back to the judicial first instance, others to Indecopi itself (imagine, 14 years). With the game against 
Indecopi, it did not give up to have the case settled properly. It turned the game into the poulteres and was given 
four votes in favor of confirming the decision in the first instance and declaring poultry companies guilty”. See: 
http://blogs.semanaeconomica.com/blogs/prohibido-prohibir/posts/gallina-vieja-da-buen-caldo-el-final-feliz-de-
la-concertacion-de-precios-del-pollo#ixzz2I50jLBbA (visited on December 17, 2012).
110 It should be noted that Art. 3 of the Legislative Decree Nº 701 stated the following: "It is prohibited and it will 
be punished, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, any act or behavior related to business, that constitute 
an abuse of dominant position in the market or that limit, restrict or distort free competition, so as to generate 
detriment to the general economic interest in the country”.
111 QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2011b). Op. Cit., pp. 340-341. 
112 Resolution 003-97-INDECOPI-CLC, dated February 11, 1997.
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition 151
Notwithstanding the positive judgment, it should not be forgotten that the fines imposed 
were even lower, because of 2,120 Peruvian Taxation Units which the Tribunal had imposed 
altogether, the Supreme Court stated that they should be reduced to 1,224 Peruvian Taxation 
Units altogether.
 c. Miguel Ciccia Vasquez E.I.R.L. (CIVA) vs. Empresa Turística   
  Mariscal Cáceres SA. - Mariscal Cáceres (1997) 
CIVA signed a “Transportation Agency Services Agreement” with Mariscal Caceres, under 
which the latter agreed to allow the use of the facilities of the bus station for the sale of tickets, 
receipt and delivery of parcels, loading and unloading of passengers of Civa. For this purpose, 
Mariscal Caceres would set up a sales service counter for CIVA to sell its tickets. Meanwhile, 
CIVA agreed to pay the corresponding consideration for, and to respect the Internal Regulations 
and decisions of the person responsible for the administration of the terminal, being the breach 
of this obligation ground for the termination of the contract.
The aforementioned Internal Regulations stated the routes served by user companies of the bus 
station, in the following terms:
“The users, as for the use of the terminal, are four interprovincial transportation 
companies that own the following routes:
•	Transportes	Soyuz	S.A.:	Lima-Ica	and	intermediates;
•	CIVA:	Lima-Chiclayo	and	other	points	to	the	north	and	northeast	of	Chiclayo;
•	Empresa	de	Transportes	Mariscal	Cáceres	S.A.:	Lima-Huancayo;	and,
•	Expreso	Cruz	del	Sur	S.A.:	Lima-Chimbote-Trujillo-Chiclayo-Piura-Tumbes,	Lima-Ica-
Arequipa-Moquegua-Tacna, Lima-Juliaca-Puno-Yunguyo-Sicuani-Cuzco-Cotahuasi-
Orcopampa, Lima-Huacho-Barranca.”
Additionally, it provided that “User companies, subject to these regulations, shall undertake 
not to use the routes of another user, except pursuant to a written agreement in which one of 
the companies granted the other a number of frequencies; such document shall be a part of 
this document.”
Regarding rates, the Regulations stated that “... these will be determined by the management” 
and also stated: “Only in the cases mentioned in the twelfth point, companies can reduce rates 
after having demonstrated the need for a technical and economic study, and obtained approval 
from the administration.”
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Although among the routes assigned to CIVA by the Regulations it was not provided the route 
the Lima-Tacna-Lima, the company obtained from the Ministry of Transport, Communications, 
Housing and Construction concession to provide services on that route. Then CIVA informed 
Mariscal Caceres this and started to provide services on this route from the bus station. 
Therefore, Mariscal Caceres asked it to stop serving this route, with a deadline of 72 hours to 
withdraw the service. Since CIVA ignored this request, Mariscal Caceres stated it would order 
to prevent the entrance or exit from the bus terminal to the buses serving that route and also 
warned CIVA that, if it persisted, it would be forced to suspend the service of all CIVA’s routes.
CIVA initiated an action for constitutional guarantees against Mariscal Cáceres and it 
terminated the “Transportation Agency Services Agreement” for breach of its contractual 
obligations, with a deadline of 30 days to clear and return the terminal sector it had rented, 
after which its vehicles would be prevented from entering. Finally, Mariscal Caceres began 
an eviction process against CIVA.
CIVA reported that Mariscal Caceres was incurring in a restrictive practice to competition 
through the Internal Regulations, which limiting the operation of new user companies in 
routes in for public passenger transportation served by any of the user companies already 
operating in the terminal. In particular, it reported that it was being prevented to work on 
the route Lima-Lima-Tacna, in order to benefit the company Expreso Cruz del Sur SA that 
was already assigned that route. It also questioned whether the terminal manager fixed 
transportation service prices.
The Commission found that through the Regulations of the terminal several competing 
transportation companies (which served or could serve the same routes, either fully or 
partially), had reached a market sharing agreement by assigning routes for each company 
and service operating limitation with the prohibition of serving other routes already assigned. 
However, the Commission found that those agreements did not constitute an illegal restraint 
of competition, since they did not prevent CIVA to serve other routes authorized, provided it 
does so from other terminals. In particular, the Commission stated that: 
“This kind of agreements are common in the market when companies providing 
complementary services share the same physical space and usually are aimed at 
achieving greater efficiency - reducing transaction costs, new services and products, 
etc. - and generating competition at higher-level organizations. In this regard, it 
is not itself contrary to the rules of the Legislative Decree Nº701 that in the internal 
regulations of any bus station bringing together companies that serve different 
routes, establishing a limitation on routes which may be covered by companies 
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from the said terminal, as companies are free to take another route different from 
other terminals. Even in some cases this may contribute to increase competition”. 
Concerning price fixing, the Commission noted that although the Regulations provided that 
the terminal management would set the rates, it did not violate the rules of free competition 
because it covered only the routes that were operated from the terminal, without preventing 
CIVA or other transportation company to set different rates for different routes served from the 
said terminal, or even for the same routes but served from another terminal.
Based on the above, the Commission dismissed the complaint112. CIVA appealed this decision, 
reaffirming the same arguments and noting that Mariscal Caceres and the other companies 
using its bus terminal had engaged in a cartel agreement for market sharing and price fixing.
On appeal, the Tribunal considered that the four transportation companies operating in 
Mariscal Caceres’ terminal agreed to join and provide their services from the said terminal, 
for which they agreed to divide the routes to be covered and that the service fee is fixed by 
the administrator of said premises. In this regard, the Tribunal stated that the agreement did 
not constitute an infringement of Art. 6 Legislative Decree Nº701, then: 
“A distinction cam be made between restrictions on competition: on one side are 
pure restrictions, which are those considered illegal per se, i.e., objectively forbidden, 
regardless who may or may not cause damage to the market, and on the other side are 
accessory or complementary restrictions”.
In this regard, the Tribunal stated that the restrictions are considered pure when the agreement 
is given not to improve certain productive activity but with the sole purpose and effect of 
restricting production and competition. Instead, accessory or complementary restrictions are 
part of integration situations for several companies to perform certain productive activity 
and thus create the possibility of generating efficiency and reduce costs for the consumer, 
even when they reduce competition. In the latter case, the main issue is not the price fixing 
or market sharing agreement, but the partnership agreement, joint venture or the way of 
productive integration.
As an example of complementary or accessory arrangements, the Tribunal raised the case 
of a law firm consisting of members that can compete with each other, but they agree to 
eliminate that rivalry and integrate their activities in order to provide more effective 
113 Resolution 206-97-TDC-INDECOPI, dated August 13, 1997. 
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customer service by sharing costs. Lawyers participating in the agreement may provide for 
the prohibition of working on their own, the sharing of certain areas of work, and charge for 
their services a common fee jointly established by all. Such a business model should not be 
seen as a mechanism to restrict production, but rather, to compete with other law firms or 
independent lawyers operating in the market. In this regard, it is understood that this law 
firm is a professional association contract in which a common fee is established incidentally 
and complementarily to make the association feasible or more efficient. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that such agreements should not be considered illegal per se.
As it is a complex matter, the Tribunal defined the conditions to be verified in order to consider 
an integration agreement measures as accessories restricting competition:
•	 They	should	be	performed	as	a	result	of	an	integration	agreement	or	business	developed	
jointly by the members, and should be able to increase the efficiency of the integrated 
group and be applied within the limits necessary to achieve such efficiencies.
•	 The	market	quotas	for	each	member	of	the	agreement	should	not	jeopardize	competition.
•	 Members	of	the	agreements	must	not	have	the	primary	purpose	or	intent	of	restricting	
competition.
The Tribunal found that the three conditions were present in the case subject matter of the 
complaint, as the agreements between transportation companies operating in the Mariscal 
Cáceres terminal contributed to greater efficiency of the service provided, since they allowed 
offering consumers a greater variety of destinations and routes, providing a comprehensive 
service. The purpose of participating companies was not to restrict competition, but provide 
a more comprehensive and beneficial service for users from the terminal. Finally, the 
agreements in question only restricted competition between those companies mentioned 
concerning interprovincial transportation services that were provided from the terminal; 
therefore, restriction of competition generated no damage to the market, while companies 
could provide even the same service from another terminal or by themselves.
Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the first instance decision and also decided to establish the 
following mandatory compliance precedent on accessory or complementary agreements113:
114 Resolution 025-2002-INDECOPI/CLC, dated December 11, 2002.
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Resolution N°206-97-TDC-INDECOPI
“The price fixing and market sharing agreements are illegal per se when they 
aim and have the essential and unique purpose to restrict competition, i.e., when 
they are naked or pure contracts. On the other hand, those price fixing and market 
sharing agreements which are ancillary or complementary to an integration 
or association agreed and have been adopted to achieve greater efficiency 
of productive activity in question, should be analyzed case by case in order to 
determine the reasonableness or otherwise of them.
(...) 
When the integration can be beneficial but is not considered essential to carry 
out certain production activities, the integration agreement and accessory and 
complementary agreements restricting competition shall be allowed if they meet 
three characteristics:
	 •	 Price	 fixing	 or	market	 sharing	 agreements	 are	 performed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 an	
integration contract, meaning that members must be performing an economic 
activity together. Also, these agreements should be able to increase the 
efficiency of the integrated group and must be applied within the limits required 
to achieve such efficiency.
	 •	 The	market	quotas	for	each	member	of	the	agreement	do	not	lead	to	determining	
that the restriction of competition resulting from the integration will cause 
damage.
	 •	 Members	of	the	agreements	must	not	have	the	primary	purpose	or	intention	of	
restricting competition.
Should the presentation of the three conditions described above fails, the 
agreement will be considered illegal”.
 d. Ex officio investigation against the Peruvian Association of Insurance 
  Companies (APESEG) and nine insurance companies (2003)
Art. 30 of Act Nº 27181, Transport and Traffic General Act, published on October 8, 1999, 
prescribes that every motor vehicle circulating within the territory of the Republic must have 
a Mandatory Insurance for Traffic Accidents (SOAT) covering all persons, occupants or third 
parties non-occupants, who suffer injury or death as a result of a traffic accident. 
The term to make SOAT enforceable for vehicles used for public passenger transportation, 
taxis and private and school vehicles was extending in time. However, it was determined that 
the vehicles should have SOAT later than January 01, 2003.
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On the other hand, the Regulations on Insurance Policies, approved by SBS Resolution Nº52-
99, establishes the obligation of the insurance companies to submit to the Superintendency 
of Banking and Insurance (SBS) the policy draft, the policy summary, riders, technical note 
and the rate of each of the insurance products offered on the market.
Through Multiple Official Letter Nº18538-2001-SBS, dated November 19, 2001, the SBS 
communicated insurance companies to submit the SOAT sticker model, policy and certificate, 
as well as the rate and corresponding technical note.
This technical note is the technical support pure hazard rate – i.e., the expected cost of the 
risk assumed by the insurer - of casualty insurance. It is prepared according to statistical 
sampling of the risks assumed established in a homogeneous and representative way, using 
figures of at least four years before the corresponding study, and making projections for the 
two following years.
As the SOAT is a new product on the market, insurers who made part of the Automobile 
Committee of APESEG hired actuary Mr. Amadeo Vallejo, to prepare the Technical Note for 
the SOAT, in order to comply with the requirements of the SBS through Multiple Official Letter 
Nº18538-2001-SBS, as stated in the minutes of the meeting of the Automobile Committee on 
December 04, 2001: 
 “MINUTES N°15/2001
AUTOMOBILE COMMITTEE
MEETING, DECEMBER 04, 2001
(…)
1.- TECHNICAL NOTE
In connection with the subject heading, the Chairman indicated that, as it is necessary 
to meet the laws, there should be a prompt answer to the Multiple Official Letter received 
from the Superintendency of Banking and Insurance, by which that institution reminds 
us to meet some requirements such as submitting the Technical Note before starting 
trading the Mandatory Insurance for Traffic Accidents.
After an exchange of ideas, the following was agreed:
Entrust Mr. Amadeo Vallejo the preparation of the corresponding Technical Note to 
submit to each insurance company that will operate in this new insurance. The Note 
will be developed on the basis of market statistics to decrease deviations, therefore the 
figures should be those previously used in the calculations for the implementation of this 
insurance. The cost of this work will be made as usual by every company in the accounts 
of the Clearing House of this month. Mr. Vallejo must send APESEG the 10 of this month 
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition 157
the corresponding technical notes. The members of this Committee will meet the next 
day after receiving (sic) these technical notes, in order to evaluate them.”
Subsequently, in the meeting of the Automobile Committee on December 11, 2001, the 
insurance companies approved the Technical Note prepared by Mr. Vallejo for the SOAT, 
according to the corresponding minutes:
“MINUTES NO16/2001
AUTOMOBILE COMMITTEE
MEETING, DECEMBER 11, 2001
(…) 
MANDATORY INSURANCE FOR TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS – SOAT
Mr. Richard Mauricci noted the need to verify compliance with the resolutions adopted 
at the meeting held last December 4, and take measures that help to make feasible the 
beginning of this new insurance operations for the category.
In that regard, he said that it was necessary to emphasize the following topics:
1. - TECHNICAL NOTE
In connection with the subject of the category, the Chairman indicated that Mr. Amadeo 
Vallejo had submitted us the Technical Note he had prepared for the members of this 
Plenary review and approve it.
Mr. Gustavo Sardinia explained the methodology and referred to the statistical bases 
that had been used for the development of this document; also, he explained in detail 
its structure.
After an exchange of ideas, the following was agreed:
Approve the development of the Technical Note, APESEG having to meet within 24 
working hours the proceedings of the order established for these cases, in order to meet 
as soon as possible the provisions on the matter.”
Subsequently, between December 18, 2001 and January 18, 2002, eight insurance companies 
submitted to the SBS the corresponding SOAT Technical Note. All these Technical Notes 
indicated identical surcharge percentages for external and internal management, utility and 
issuance fee, i.e., the commercial premium. This being so, once added to those items the 
corresponding pure hazard premiums and the VAT, end premiums (also called sale premiums 
or rates) of all insurers’ Technical Notes proved equal in all categories, as shown in the 
following chart:
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition158
Chart N° 17
Comparative chart of the Technical Standards for SOAT submitted 
by the insurance companies
En dólares americanos (US$)
SOAT Pacífico Sul América
Wiese 
Aetna Generali Mapfre Rimac
Royal 
& Sun 
Alliance  
La 
Positiva
Automobile 60,00 60,00 60,00 60,00 60,00 60,00 60,00 60,00
Trucks 150,00 150,00 150,00 150,00 150,00 150,00 150,00 150,00
Taxis 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Long distance bus 1 250,00 1 250,00 1 250,00 1 250,00 1 250,00 1 250,00 1 250,00 1 250,00
Combi 200,00 200,00 200,00 200,00 200,00 200,00 200,00 200,00
Urban bus 350,00 350,00 350,00 350,00 350,00 350,00 350,00 350,00
Source: Technical Report N° 012-2002-CLC
     
Subsequently, in the meeting of the Automobile Committee on January 02, 2002, the insurance 
companies agreed to reduce the SOAT prime for automobiles from US$ 60 to US$ 55, as it is 
shown in the corresponding minutes:
“MINUTES N°02/2002
AUTOMOBILE COMMITTEE
MEETING, FEBRUARY 05, 2002
(…) 
1. MANDATORY INSURANCE FOR TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (SOAT).-
Mr. Richard Mauricci said the purpose of this session was to determine the position of 
the Committee on the approach of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 
in relation to the Mandatory Insurance for Traffic Accidents - SOAT:
Then, he stated that the topics discussed last Thursday with consultants from the Ministry 
focused on the application made to us regarding cost reduction of around 30%, subject 
on which he offered further analysis of the changes suggested in SOAT rules and send 
a reply jointly with our ruling on their request to cover the SOAT within the coverage of 
automobile insurance, which earned a unanimous response of non-acceptance because 
both insurances have a different nature and are, therefore, incompatible.
(...)
Based on the above, and after an exchange of ideas, the following was agreed:
1. With respect to Private Service insurance, a maximum reduction of the minimum 
premium from $ 60.00 to U.S. $ 55.00, which is equivalent to 8.33% reduction
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2. Regarding the Public Service insurance, taking into consideration its complexity and 
in order to give a corporate response to the Ministry, companies that operate this risk will 
meet on Wednesday 6 at 11, to make a decision on the matter.
(…)”.
Therefore, the Commission opened an ex officio investigation against APESEG and nine 
insurance companies for the price settlement of the SOAT during the period between July 28, 
2001 and April 20, 2002.
In evaluating the facts, the Commission considered that if in the Automobile Committee 
meeting of February 5, 2002, the nine investigated companies jointly agreed to reduce the 
SOAT fee for private automobiles (from U.S. $ 60 to U.S. $ 55 ), they had also agreed to fix the 
price of SOAT at U.S. $ 60. Additionally, the Commission found that the above was verified by 
the fact that eight of the nine companies informed the SBS identical rates, six offered SOAT 
(through advertising) at rates similar to those reported to the SBS and, finally, four sold SOAT 
to the said rates.
At the discretion of the Commission, “The joint analysis of this evidence, along with price 
reduction agreement of February 5, 2002, allows to infer that on the meeting of December 11, 
2001 the companies reached an agreement on the SOAT rate fixing for six types vehicles”.
The Commission noted that although nine companies investigated gave their consent to the 
price agreement, one of them (Interseguros) did not execute the agreement rates for neither 
advertised nor SOAT sold at that price. However, the Commission noted that this would 
only be considered when evaluating the severity of the sanction, to the extent that the price 
agreement was subject to the rule of illegality per se, for its very existence.
Finally, the Commission also considered APESEG as a participant in the offense because 
inside of it not only the decision to hire an actuary and approve an only Technical Note he 
prepared was taken, but also the guild had facilitated companies absent from the meeting of 
December 11, 2001 to become aware and give their consent to the agreement.
The investigated companies formulated some alternative explanations and tried to justify 
the absence of detrimental effects on competition. Thus, they stated that the Technical Note 
communicated to the SBS contained merely referential calculations. They also noted that 
the SOAT market was incipient and product sales were still lower, therefore the effect that it 
might have caused was not serious.
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The Commission rejected the above arguments, noting that the values  specified in the 
notification to the SBS were not referential as several companies had advertised the service 
at prices equal to the final premium amounts set forth in the Technical Note forwarded to the 
SBS, and also, a group of companies sold SOAT at those prices. It also noted that the existence 
of the agreement was independent of the fact that during the investigated period few SOAT 
sales transactions have been registered, or that consumers had just begun to know the market.
Therefore, the charges against the nine insurance companies and APESEG declared to be 
well founded, and they were imposed the fines indicated below, for having settled the SOAT 
price during the period between December 2001 and February 2002114.
The insurance companies appealed the decision in first instance, with the following 
arguments:
•	 The	cartel	behaviors	should	be	evaluated	by	applying	the	rule	of	reason	rather	than	the	
per-se rule, in response to art. 3 of Legislative Decree Nº701, which requires that damages 
are verified for general economic interest to determine the existence of an infringement, 
having to address the legislative history of that rule (as the Free Competition Act of 
Argentina).
•	 The	Technical	Note	submitted	to	the	SBS	did	not	contain	SOAT	prices,	but	referential	
rates and was developed following the request of the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications (MTC) to report SOAT costs.
•	 The	 similarity	 in	 the	 risk	 premium	 is	 explained	 since	 this	 insurance	 has	 conditions	
determined by law and is oriented to the same user group.
•	 Reduction	on	the	rate	answered	to	a	request	from	the	MTC	to	the	insurance	companies.
•	 APESEG	merely	served	as	a	link	between	the	MTC	and	the	insurance	companies.
When deciding on the appeal, the Tribunal openly moved away from the interpretation 
criterion used by the Commission and that was formulated in the mandatory compliance 
precedent issued in 1997 to settle the case of the settlement in the poultry market. Indeed, 
the Tribunal understood that the cartel behaviors between competitors aimed at fixing prices 
should be analyzed according to the effects they had on the market and not based on the 
criterion of illegality per se. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Tribunal stated that APESEG 
and six insurance companies had incurred in an infringement of art. 3 and 6 letter a) of 
Legislative Decree Nº701, by making a settlement of the price of SOAT between December 
2001 and April 2002, holding harmless two insurance companies115.
115 Resolution 0224-2003/TDC-INDECOPI, dated June 16, 2003.
116 It should be noted that, pursuant to its investigation powers for infringements of Legislative Decree Nº1034, the 
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Regarding the interpretation of price settlements, the Tribunal noted that the implementation 
of Legislative Decree Nº701 did not apply the rule of illegality per se or the rule of reason, as 
they were the result of the United States judicial creation, not compatible with the Peruvian 
legal system of European tradition.
Also, it said that the precedents of mandatory compliance previously established in the case 
of the poultry market settlement (illegality per se for cartels of competitors) and CIVA v. 
Mariscal Cáceres (accessory or complementary arrangements) neither clarified the reason or 
the application assumptions of the per-se rule, nor the limitation to apply the rule of reason. 
It also stated that those interpretive precedents were ignoring art. 3 of the Legislative Decree 
Nº701, which requires impairment to general economic interest to constitute an infringement.
Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that, subject to art. 3 of the Legislative Decree Nº701, to 
qualify a cartel behavior between competitors as illegal, it required to be able to produce the 
effect of restricting, preventing or distorting competition and also to run on the market.
Regarding the behavior of the investigated companies, the Tribunal noted that the 
communication from several insurance companies to the SBS with the same premiums for 
SOAT had no explanation other than an agreement, to the extent that if insurers stated that 
they offered differentiated services according to their customers, it was hard to understand 
why they sent a report to the SBS on “... identical margins for internal and external expenses, 
and utilities; and they offered and advertised in the market those services with prices for 
commercial premium rates also identical to those contained in the Technical Note “.
Concerning the last item, the Tribunal understood that it had been established that Sul 
America, La Positiva, Mapfre, Royal & SunAlliance, Generali and Pacifico had offered the 
public prices equal to the rates notified to the SBS, which was not the same for Interseguro 
and Wiese Aetna. In this regard, the first six companies had entered into the price fixing 
agreement and also had executed it by offering SOAT to the public at the prices previously 
fixed within the Automobile Committee of APESEG, being the damaged general economic 
interest. This damage distorted the SOAT market and contributed to a greater public 
resistance to the process of implementation of such insurance, regardless of the number of 
SOAT effective sales. Additionally, the Tribunal noted the following:
“It can be seen that the motive of insurance companies to fix SOAT prices through a 
settlement was not helping to reduce the access costs to the information required to 
implement the SOAT, neither improving production or distribution of this new product nor 
promoting technical or economic progress, not even to benefit consumers. On the contrary, 
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the insurance companies’ motive was to prevent an increased level of competition in the 
traditional vehicle insurance market – an existing and fully operational market - as a 
result of the intrusion of a new element like SOAT, the outcome of a legal imposition”.
Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal concluded that seven insurance companies had violated 
Art. 3 and letter a) of Art. 6 of Legislative Decree Nº701, by agreeing price fixing settlement 
that did not contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods, or to promoting 
technical or economic progress. It also stated that APESEG was responsible since one of its 
bodies, the Automobile Committee, adopted the decision to approve the Technical Note with 
the agreed prices, and also facilitated the adoption of the agreement. Finally, he noted that 
there was not enough evidence gathered that would prove the execution of the agreement 
by Interseguros and Wiese Aetna, therefore they had not violated the law. The Tribunal’s 
decision included a reduction of the fines imposed by the first instance, as shown in the 
following chart:
Chart N° 18
Fines imposed to offender insurance companies
Company / Entity Commission 
(Peruvian Taxation 
Units)
Tribunal 
(Peruvian 
Taxation Units)
Peruvian Association of Insurance Companies (APESEG) 20 10 
El	Pacífico	Peruano	Suiza	Compañía	de	Seguros	y	Reaseguros 60 40
Generali Perú Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros 100 28
Interseguros 5 --
La Positiva Seguros y Reaseguros S.A. 100 40
Mapfre Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros 60 35
Rímac Internacional Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros 100 36
Royal & Sunalliance Seguros Fénix 80 20
Sul América Compañía de Seguros S.A. 100 26
Wiese Aetna 50 --
Source: Own development.
It should be added that leaving aside the mandatory compliance precedents established in 
cases of settlement in the poultry market and CIVA against Mariscal Caceres, the Tribunal 
decided to issue a new precedent for mandatory compliance precedent for qualifying the cartel 
between competitors and illegal behavior, which is quoted below in its most outstanding parts:
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Resolution N°0224-2003-TDC-INDECOPI
“1. The grading of any behavior as restrictive of competition and therefore 
illegal, requires that such behavior is able to produce the effect of 
restricting, preventing or distorting competition and to run on the market 
and that it is run on the market. The ability of that behavior to produce the 
effect of restricting competition and its execution on the market constitutes 
the damage to the general economic interest referred to in Article 3 of 
Legislative Decree Nº701, in accordance with the positive assessment of the 
legal institution of competition contained both in the Constitution of Peru 
and in the Legislative Decree Nº701 (…).
3. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 3 of Legislative Decree Nº701, as 
to prejudice to the general economic interest, exceptionally, and provided 
that it can be credited sufficiently, accurately and consistently, beneficial 
effects on the behavior challenged that overcome the damage to consumers 
and the legal institution of competition, such behavior will be qualified as 
restrictive of competition, but exempt from reproval and punishment due to 
their positive balance concerning the effect on general economic interest.
4. The determination of the exceptional cases exempt from reproach and 
punishment mentioned in the preceding number should be analyzed in 
each case, considering the concurrence of the following requirements for 
exemption:
•	 If	 questioned	 behaviors	 contribute	 to	 improving	 the	 production	 or	
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
reserving consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit;
•	If	the	restrictive	behavior	is	the	only	mechanism	to	achieve	the	beneficial	
objectives outlined in the above requirement; and,
•	 If	 those	 behaviors	 become	 indirectly	 a	 way	 that	 facilitates	 companies	
involved eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
market in which they participate.
5. The price fixing settlement (...) directly contravenes the very essence of 
the legal institution of competition. Consequently, to exempt from reproach 
to such behavior it is required of a qualified analysis very thorough, 
demanding and rigorous of indubitable and precise compliance of all the 
requirements for exemption set out in the preceding number”.
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Thus, Indecopi modified a rule of interpretation it had created to drastically treat competitors 
who incurred in very serious behaviors for competition, the so-called cartels, noting that 
these behaviors were illegal only if they ran on the market, and while there were no reasons 
to justify them in terms of greater efficiency and consumer benefit.
This precedent has been set aside now. Indeed, with the new law on protection of competition 
in force since July 2008, i.e., after Legislative Decree Nº1034 entered into effective, cartels 
are treated as behaviors subject to an absolute prohibition, a regulation equivalent to illegality 
per se. So, Indecopi has returned to the sanctioning cartels of competitors more drastically.
 e. Ex officio investigation against the Passenger Public Transportation 
  Regional Headquarters, Sierra-Ancash Zone, its representatives and 
  several transportation companies (2010) 
The Headquarters is an association of transportation companies of the city of Huaraz, which 
groups several transportation companies.
In August 2008, Indecopi became aware of the increase in urban and interurban passenger 
transport in Huaraz through the media. Indecopi’s Regional Office in Ancash (ORI Ancash), 
reported the Technical Secretariat of the Commission that it had received information 
from a person related to the transportation sector in Ancash, about actions adopted by the 
Headquarters to increase prices. 
Subsequently, the Technical Secretariat met with such person, who gave it the Multiple 
Official Letter Nº001-2008-Central Transp.Hz.C.Hy. / P, dated August 15, 2008, in which the 
scope of an agreement to increase transportation prices was explained116. This Official Letter 
stated the following:
Technical Secretariat gave protection to the person who provided help in identifying illegal behavior, keeping 
private the identity of that person throughout the procedure, naming him/her only as the "collaborator”.
117 Resolution 069-2010/CLC-INDECOPI, dated October 06, 2010. At the time of preparing this work, the decision 
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“SUBJECT.- SETTLEMENT OF URBAN INTERURBAN FARE INCREASE IN THE 
COLLECTIVE TAXI MODE DUE TO THE FUEL INCREASE AND OTHER OPERATING 
EXPENSES.
(...) The current social and economic situation forces us to set aside differences to make 
way for coincidences, for the defense of common interests; among them is the permanent 
increase in the operation cost of the service we offer to users in urban and interurban 
COLLECTIVE TAXI transportation in the province of Huaraz (...) so it is necessary to also 
increase the cost of urban and interurban passenger evenly and it must be obeyed by 
all companies so that users have no reason to question the increase or on the pretext of 
some charge less, consequently, sabotage these new costs. (...) we inform you that from 
the day Saturday 16 of this month all companies will apply this new cost. Collective: 
Urban S/.0.70. Cents, from the center of Huaraz to EsSalud S/.1.00 Nuevos Soles, Urban 
TAXI S/ 2.50 Nuevos Soles.
(...)
Without further ado, we say goodbye to you, and we are sure to count on your participation 
and willingness to serve and fulfill the stated purpose.”
Taking this evidence into consideration, the Technical Secretariat initiated this Ex officio 
investigation, for horizontal cartel behaviors in the categories of agreements and decisions or 
recommendations aimed at agreed price fixing of the urban and interurban passenger service 
and transportation in the city of Huaraz.
As part of the investigation, inspection visits were made to the Headquarters, which also found 
copies of that Official Letter. Additionally, surveys were conducted to different transportation 
companies on the dates the price increase was given.
According to the information obtained, a majority of transportation companies said the price 
increases occurred after August 13, 2008, which matched with the date from which the new 
price would start being in force according to the aforesaid Official Letter. Additionally, we 
found that the member companies of the Headquarters had made price increases for collective 
and taxi service, according to what was indicated in the aforementioned Official Letter and, 
also, after the meeting called by the Headquarters.
As a defense, those being investigated indicated that the meeting convened by the 
Headquarters had other purposes, but spontaneously and unexpectedly the suggestion came 
up to standardize prices. They also noted that there was no premeditation to fix prices, and 
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the agreement was rather in response to companies that set their prices unfairly, below their 
operating costs. Finally, it was argued that the Headquarters represents only 15% of vehicles 
in Huaraz.
When settlíng, the Commission concluded that “the behavior of transportation companies in 
Huaraz after the meeting convened by the Headquarters was similar to that proposed in the 
Headquarter’s Official Letter, a circumstance showing the execution of the agreement between 
the investigated companies.”
However, the Commission found that the market share of the Headquarters was significantly 
lower than that of the other agents. Regarding collective taxi service, it determined that there 
were 25 companies that provide it and only three of them belonged to the Headquarters. 
Furthermore, in terms of number of vehicles, the companies belonging to the Headquarters 
represented only 11%. As for the collective service, it identified 18 companies operating in 
Huaraz, from which only three belonged to the Headquarters, and regarding the number of 
units, these three companies represented 19%.
On that basis, the Commission concluded that seven transportation companies had incurred 
in a price fixing agreement, although its impact was not as severe in the market, because:
“(...) The transportation companies associated to the Headquarters have a negligible 
market share in the passenger transportation market in the city of Huaraz. Consequently, 
to ensure the effectiveness of the agreement, it was necessary to ensure that 
transportation companies not associated to the Headquarters adhere to the horizontal 
cartel behavior. Otherwise, the competitive pressure would have prevented transportation 
companies to reach the extraordinary profits derived from the agreed price. “
Additionally, the Commission submitted evidence that the Official Letter had not only 
been forwarded by the Headquarters to its members, but also to other transportation 
companies, therefore it considered that the Headquarters and its executives had incurred in 
a recommendation practice.
Therefore, the Commission fined the companies, to Central and its directors, with the 
following fines117(See Chart N° 19):
was already in appeal proceeding before the Tribunal.
118 Resolution 008-2009/ST-CLC-INDECOPI dated May 21 2009. It must be mentioned that the investigation also 
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Chart N° 19
Multas impuestas a empresas de transporte y a la Central
Company / Entity / Individual Commission 
(Peruvian Taxation 
Units)
Mars Soledad E.I.R.L. 17,1
Empresa de Transportes 12 S.A. 15,1
Empresa de Transportes Shasho S.R.L. 8,5
Empresa de Transportes y Turismo 18 S.A. 8,3
Empresa de Transportes Turismo Huascarán S.R.L. 5,2
Empresa de Transportes Cordillera Negra 13 S.A. 2
Empresa	de	Transportes	Suiza	Peruana	S.R.L. 0,4
Central Regional de Transporte Público de Pasajeros, Zona Sierra – Ancash Amonestación
Macario	Sáenz	La	Rosa	Sánchez 1
Plácido Condori Ccalla 1
Gabino Araucano 1
            
 Source: Own development.
Currently, the appeal filed by those being investigated is pending before the Specialized 
Tribunal for the Defense of Competition.
 f. Ex officio investigation against the Freight Forwarders Union – Region 
  Ancash Sierra Zone - Union, six former members of its Board of Directors, 
  and 72 carriers (2011)
The origin of this investigation is in the criminal complaint filed before the First District 
Attorney’s Office with Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses of the city of Huaraz by Mr. Juan 
Crisolo Molina v. Mrs. Ana Huerta, Mrs. Elvira Toledo Chauca, Mrs. Elizabeth Huerta Poma 
and others, on charges of abuse of economic power and hoarding. The criminal complaint 
was brought to the attention of the Technical Secretariat on July 25, 2005.
In that complaint, it was being questioned that La Union prevented normal circulation of 
carriers, restricting the entry of cargo to the city of Huaraz and distorting free competition; 
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and that it was speculating on the price of freight from Lima to Huaraz and vice versa, 
leveraging the increased demand for cement existing in that part of the Callejon de Huaylas, 
a consequence of which was the price of the service increased by approximately 32%. 
As part of the documents attached to the criminal complaint was the following and most 
relevant texts, which are reproduced below:
•	 The	Engagement	Agreement	dated	November	8,	2004,	by	which	twenty	heavy	freight	
forwarders decided to increase their prices for transporting cement to S/.60 metric tons 
and S/.2.50 per bag, on the route Lima-Huaraz and vice versa, as from November 8, 2004. 
The text is shown below:
Carrier’s Engagement Agreement
 Source: Resolution N°008-2009/ST-CLC-INDECOPI.
•	 Circular	No.	001-2004-Hz,	dated	November	27,	2004,	in	which	Mrs.	Ana	Huerta	Rondán,	
as coordinator of the aforementioned carriers, informed Constructores Hardware the 
decision contained in the Engagement Agreement, noting that begin to apply as from 
December 01 2004. The text of the circular is as follows:
ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT
Huaraz,	november	8th	200
4
The undersigned, transportat
ion companies, which provide
 transportation 
services	from	Lima	to	Huar
az	and	vice	versa,	aware	o
f	the	unsustainable	
and critical situation that the 
freight transportation is under
going, affected 
by the continuous rise of the f
uel, tyres, vehicle spare parts
, etc. We found 
it necessary increasing the f
reight price to S/. 60.00 TM 
and the bag of 
cement at S/. 2.50 from nove
mber 8th, 2004, we ask all ou
r users for their 
understanding.
We call upon all the unde
rsigned to duly comply wit
h the present 
document hereunder, that in 
fact will continue providing ou
r services with 
responsibility,	punctually	an
d	security	that	characterize
s	us.
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Circular N°001-2004-Hz, dated november 27, 2004
 Source: Resolution N°008-2009/ST-CLC-INDECOPI.
•	 La	Union	Act	 of	Constitution,	dated	December	15,	 2004,	which	 stated	 the	agreement	
reached by the Members Assembly to “regulate prices of freight rates” under the 
following terms:
“After a heated debate, the Assembly agreed to regulate freight rate prices; for such 
accomplishment an analysis on current costs and those actually charged was made, to 
prevent unfair competition it was agreed to unite prices as follows: for those effective as 
from 12-20-04, Cement, transfer from Lima to: Huaraz two Soles and fifty cents, Carhuaz 
two Soles and sixty cents; Yungay and Caraz two Soles and seventy cents. 
Bricks from Lima to: Sixty five Nuevos Soles and 00/100 cts. for unloading per ton; 
Carhuaz Seventy Nuevos Soles and 00/100 cts.; Yungay and Caraz seventy five Nuevos 
Soles and 00/100 cts. unloading per ton shall cost three Nuevos Soles and 00/100 cts.
Circular No. 001-2004-Hz
Ferretería Constructores.
Hereby, we inform you tha
t the freight transportation 
companies, 
which provide transportatio
n services from Lima to H
uaraz have 
met on November 8
th in order to normalize the c
ost of freight due 
to the continuous rise of the
 fuel, tyres, vehicle spare pa
rts, etc. We 
found it necessary increasin
g the freight price to S/. 60.
00 TM and 
the bag of cement at S/. 2
.50; those prices will be a
pplied on the first 
of December; this will allow
 to continue providing our s
ervices with 
responsibility, punctuality, a
nd security that characterize
s us.
Expecting your kind underst
anding, we thank you for you
r attention.
(Signature) Illegible
LIMA, NOVEMBER 27
TH, 2004
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Iron, transfer from Lima to: eighty Nuevos Soles per ton; Carhuaz eighty two Nuevos 
Soles; Yungay and Caraz eighty five Nuevos Soles. 
(…)”
•	 Official	Letter	No.	002-2004-UTC-C.H./CD-Hz,	dated	December	18,	2004,	whereby	La	
Union informed their clients about “the agreements reached regarding rates”, comprised 
in the Act of Constitution, according to the following text: 
“We request your understanding and support, by hiring the services of our guild members 
and respecting the established rates; therefore attached herewith we send you copy of 
the act of constitution and of the agreements reached regarding rates to be effective as 
from December 20 of the current year”.
In view of the serious content of the referred documents, the Technical Secretariat started 
an investigation on price agreement118. As part of the procedure, it made unannounced 
inspection visits to the premises of La Union and to the carriers; furthermore, information 
was also requested to those under investigation. As part of the obtained information by the 
Technical Secretariat, ample evidence was found on implementation and details of the prices 
agreement, including its duration until the beginning time of investigation. 
As an example of the formerly mentioned evidence, the following excerpts from La Union 
Assembly minutes can be quoted.  In the minute of the meeting of May 28, 2008, the following 
is mentioned:
“1.- Whereas, with reference to freight, the reference rate is currently in effect, and shall 
be respected by the cargo originators and by carriers, under the following prices:
Lima – Caraz S/. 4.00 Per cement bag
Lima – Yungay S/. 4.00 Per cement bag
Lima –Carhuaz S/. 3.85 Per cement bag
Lima – Huaraz S/. 3.71 Per cement bag
Lima – Catac S/. 3.41 Per cement bag”.
In the extraordinary members’ assembly of September 21, 2008, the following is found:
“The third point of the Board of Directors’ scheduled report was discussed:
Madam President, Mrs. Felicitas Ana Huerta Rondán stated that the freight increase 
is everyone’s concern and it is the reason for the meeting in Lima with Mr. Diego de la 
included a client’s allocation agreement as an imputation, charge which was also proved during the proceeding. 
The case review herein only refers to the prices agreement.
119 In this regard, the Commission considered that although the investigated behaviors had started during the 
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Piedra Minetti, general manager of LA VIGA S.A. and with engineer Owen Cisneros 
Rafael, general manager of Consorcio CAF S.A.C. who are worried by the document they 
have received from Indecopi; and therefore they consider t it is not the appropriate time 
for freight increases due to Indecopi’s investigation of the freight price issue..
However, the lawyer hired by us states that there should not be any reason for concern as 
we are collecting lower freights than those in the Reference Table (…)” 
In the extraordinary members’ meeting of October 05, 2008, the following is noted:
“The second point of the agenda was discussed:
Report from the Board of Directors about freights: 
Mr. Jaime Benites, Chairman of the Assembly give the floor to Madam President, Felicitas 
Ana Huerta Rondán, who informed that she held several meetings with representatives of 
both cargo originators which are: LA VIGA S.A. and Consorcio CAF S.A.C., but that there 
was some concern from the mentioned cargo originators due to Indecopi’s intervention 
which could impose exorbitant fines if it becomes aware that we have agreed to fix new 
freight rates; however she said that afterwards a contract will signed with the two cargo 
originators and that it is already prepared by the lawyer hired by the board of directors 
in the city of Lima”.
Given the evidence forcefulness, the investigated parties submitted the following arguments 
of defense:
•	 The	agreed	price	fixation	was	not	due	to	carriers’	decision	but	was	due	to	regulations	
issued by the Transport and Tax sector as the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
established minimum costs for the cargo transport service by truck, Supreme Decree 
049-2002-MTC dated December 30, 2002, and the National Superintendency of Tax 
Administration (SUNAT) (acronym in Spanish), established that the Carrier Waybill 
should record the minimum costs to be valid, in agreement with Superintendency 
Resolutions 004-2003/SUNAT and 005-2003/SUNAT dated January 09, 2003.
•	 Prices	fixed	by	carriers	were	always	lower	than	the	minimum	costs	fixed	by	the	MTC.	
•	 The	agreements	reached	were	supplementary	to	other	agreements	intended	for	a	better	
organization of La Union associates and to increase their Productivity. 
The Commission discarded the former arguments and pointing out that the minimum costs 
approved by Supreme Decree 049-2002-MTC were only referential values to facilitate the 
tax auditing as established by the regulation itself, and that it did not imply as obligation 
to fix a determined price.  Furthermore, in a statement dated January 31, 2003, SUNAT 
informed that the carriers could be audited when the actual income declared by the carrier 
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were lower or inconsistent with the minimum costs approved by Supreme Decree 049-2002-
MTC. Therefore, according to the Commission: 
“… neither the minimum costs approved by Supreme Decree 049-2002-MTC nor the 
possibility to be audited by SUNAT implied the obligation to the carrier to fix a determine 
price. Consequently, none of these aforementioned circumstances justified the agreed 
fixation of the heavy cargo transport service price”.
With reference to prices fixed by the investigated parties, the Commission made it clear that 
“in order to determine the fact of prices agreed fixation by the investigated parties, it is 
irrelevant to analyze if amounts of the agreed prices were higher or lower than the referential 
values established by Supreme Decree 049-202-MTC”.
Regarding the supplementary nature of the agreements, the Commission stated that no 
evidence was furnished to support it but rather, the existing information indicated that the 
agreement had “…as a sole goal to maximize the benefits of those under investigation, by 
making a larger surplus from clients through a coordinated behavior” which was proved “…by 
the fact that, in repeated opportunities those under investigation adopted measures oriented to 
prevent the competition of non-associated carriers with them”.
As a consequence of the above, the Commission stated that the investigated parties had 
incurred in infringement of dispositions stipulated by Legislative Decree 1034119 through a 
prices agreement, releasing of such accountability to only one of them after finding evidence 
that he did not participate in the agreement and had opposed to the accomplishment of 
infringing behavior. 
Fines imposed to the 71 infringing carriers (including individuals dedicated to the transporting 
activity) summed up 720.7 UIT (Peruvian Taxation Unit). Additionally, another fine of 1 UIT 
was imposed to each of the six La Union ex-directors and one admonishment addressed to 
La Union120.
At present, the appeal submitted by the investigated parties is pending of decision before the 
Specialized Court in Defense of Competition. 
validity period of the Legislative Decree 701, their implementation had continued until Legislative Decree 1034 
came into effect.
120 Resolution 056-2011/CLC-INDECOPI dated October 11, 2011. At the time of preparation of this work, the 
relevant decision was still under appeal proceeding before the Court.
121 Resolution N° 004-97-INDECOPI-CLC, dated february 21, 1997.
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3.2.2  Market Sharing
Chart N° 20
Horizontal Collusive Practices Market Sharing
MARKET
SHARING
Petroleos del Peru S.A. (Petroperú) v. Rheem Peruana SA. (Rheem), and Envases 
Metálicos SA. (1997)
Ex officio investigation against Productos Químicos Industriales SA. (PROQUINSA) 
and Silicatos SA. Under Liquidation (1998)
Ex officio investigation against Praxair Perú SRL. (Praxair), Aga SA. and Messer 
Gases del Perú SA. (Messer) (2010)
 a. Petroleos del Peru S.A. (Petroperu) v. Rheem Peruana SA. (Rheem) and 
  Envases Metálicos SA. (1997)
In this case, Petroperú complained about price fixing and quantities agreements between 
the two 55-gallon steel cylinder manufacturers to pack lube oils in Peru, occurred in tenders 
carried out by the complaining company between October 1995 and March 1996. 
The main consensus indication was the selling conditions offered by both companies, which 
were exactly the same regarding price while slightly different regarding quantity, despite 
the fact that, in previous tenders, offers submitted by both companies had been significantly 
different. Given the similarity of their offers, the bid was jointly awarded to these two 
companies in the last three tenders, in contrast to the more than 10 former tenders where only 
one of them had won after submitting a more aggressive offer.  The main information used by 
the Commission to conduct its analysis is shown in the following Offer Comparative Chart.
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Chart N° 21
Offer comparative chart of steel cylinder manufacturers
Date Requirement from Petroperú
Rheem Peruana Envases Metálicos
Price Quantity Price Quantity
apr-92 900 30,98 900
apr-92 1 000 31,83 1 000
may-92 1 000 28,82 1 000
jul-92 900 28,07 900
aug-92 900 28,07 900 28,00 900
dec-92 600 27,85 600
dec-92 600 27,80 600 27,85 600
jan-93 600 27,70 600 27,50 600
jan-93 600 27,20 600 27,50 600
feb-93 600 27,20 600 26,90 600
feb-93 600 26,85 600
mar-93 600 27,20 600 26,60 600
mar-93 600 27,20 600 26,55 600
mar-93 600 26,50 600 26,35 600
apr-93 600 26,00 600 26,25 600
apr-93 600 23,35 600
feb-94 3 500 22,00 3 500 22,34 3 500
mar-94 30 000 19,95 30 000 17,95 30 000
nov-94 10 000 17,94 10 000
jan-95 10 000 20,50 10 000 19,50 10 000
apr-95 20 000 17,70 20 000 18,97 20 000
oct-95 10 000 23,80 5,020 23,80 5 090
feb-96 10 000 23,80 5,100 23,80 5 090
mar-96 10 000 23,80 5,102 23,80 5 000
Source: Report Nº003-97-CLC-INDECOPI.
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The interesting thing about this case was that no documentary evidence was found that 
constituted a settlement indication, as in the other cases we have previously discussed. Although 
the Commission recognized this fact, it took into account the inexplicable coincidences 
that occurred in the last three procurement processes, as well as the characteristics of such 
processes, noting that:
“…Although in this procedure no a direct evidence revealing the existence of agreements 
or agreements between the companies complained about the prices and/or volumes 
offered to Petroperú has been found, a series of events coincidental in time compared 
to the same buyer occurred after a large prices level competition, events that in no way 
appear to respond to a situation of effective competition and can only be explained as 
the result of a prior agreement between the respondent companies”.
In particular, the Commission analyzed the strange behavior that the two respondent 
companies had as from the buying process awarded in October 1995, after a long period of 
competition between them through the gradual reduction of prices:
“(...) The facts to conclude the existence of anticompetitive behavior in these proceedings 
were produced exactly from the quotation request by Petroperú in October 1995. First, 
both companies complained simultaneously modified prices quoted to Petroperú in 
October 1995. Second, the price quoted by both companies in October 1995 and then in 
two subsequent opportunities - February and March 1996 - was completely identical, i.e., 
U.S. $ 23.80 U.S. dollars per unit. Third, both Rheem and Metal Packaging SA submitted 
their offer reducing the volume of cylinders offered to a figure almost equivalent to 50% 
of those required by Petroperú, in the three orders that the company placed consecutively. 
To this sum of coincidences it must be added that in the three preceding years such 
companies had submitted their offers to Petroperú for the total quantity of cylinders 
required and in a clear situation of price competition.
The facts mentioned, when occurred isolated or sporadically, do not constitute proof of a 
settlement, but when they occur repeatedly, for three consecutive times in just six months, 
within a process of procurement of closed and confidential nature in which the only 
possibility to know the offers is at the time of opening the envelopes and, finally, where 
the only two companies producing the goods required by Petroperú had been competing 
at such price level maintained for three years in a row, there is clear evidence of the 
existence of a settlement by the companies complained concerning the sale proposals of 
55 gallon cylinders submitted to Petroperú as from October 1995.“
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Based on the above, the Commission concluded that there was no other alternative explanation 
for the events of the last three procurement processes conducted by Petroperú, other than the 
existence of a price settlement between the companies complained. Therefore, it imposed 
them a fine of 20 Peruvian Taxation Units each.121
The sanctioned companies appealed the first instance decision, questioning they were 
convicted without any major settlement indications of which they were accused. Also, one of 
them said that during the investigation period it had been unable to offer Petroperú the entire 
order as it had to supply its other customers.
The Tribunal reviewed the facts again and concurred with the analysis made by the 
Commission, strengthening the joint assessment of the extraordinary coincidences found. 
It also noted that such coincidences were not only inexplicable, but met both conditions 
necessary to maximize the benefits of the offenders in a sales sharing agreement:
“Thus, it appears that the competition processes convened by Petroperú, were held in 
strict confidence, therefore none of the bidders had the opportunity to learn the bids 
submitted by the other before the opening of the envelopes. (...).
The simple fact that an exact price coincidence had occurred is an important element to 
presume the existence of an agreement. Note that in the previous three years an exact 
coincidence in prices had never been produced. (...).
But the coincidence not did only occur with respect to price. The quantities offered by 
both companies suddenly changed. In previous years each of them offered the full of 
the quantity Petroperú ordered each time. However, in the three procurement processes 
referred and in which there is equality of prices, both companies reduce the quantity 
offered to approximately 50% of the quantity requested by Petroperú in each case.
These data are consistent with the existence of an agreement and reflect extraordinary 
coincidences that can hardly be explained by different reasons. If there were a 
settlement that seeks sharing the sale between the two companies, both conditions 
should be met precisely in order to maximize the utility of the two companies in 
the process: (i) the price given should be the same to avoid an offer to be preferred 
over the other, and (ii) the quantities must be close to 50% so as to give the award, 
it should be divided between the two companies involved in almost equal parts.
The succession of coincidences and perfect consistency with an agreement that maximizes 
the utility of both companies in the context of market sharing, are evidence that create 
conviction in the Court on the existence of an agreement between the companies complained.”
122 Resolution 255-97-TDC/INDECOPI, dated October 22, 1997. 
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Notwithstanding that analysis, the Tribunal also dedicated itself to confront alternative 
explanations of the events brought by the sanctioned companies, stating that such explanations 
were not true: 
“The parties have argued that the coincidence in prices is explained by a coincidence in 
the costs of making the cylinders. However, this explanation is totally inconsistent with 
the information available in the file. Prices were always different in the offers made in 
earlier proceedings convened by Petroperú and there is no element of judgment made 
by the companies complained demonstrating the existence of any fact or factor that 
would lead to the fact that, as from October 1995, there was a exact balance of the costs 
of both companies, not even that such standardization is reflected in prices. Further still, 
after that date, the prices at which cylinders of identical characteristics were offered to 
customers other than Petroperú did not match the price offered to the latter company. If 
an identical cost structure explains the identity of prices, these prices would be identical 
to the other customers of these companies in the market, which does not occur in the 
available information obtained from the companies themselves.
As for the near identity of the quantities offered to Petroperú reflecting in each case 
50% of the quantity of cylinders requested (...) it has been explained by the companies 
in the fact that there were other customers in the market and that Petroperú fell behind 
in payment, so it was not convenient for them to cover the whole order, and they must 
leave free production capacity to cover other possible orders from other buyers who did 
pay promptly.
The companies have not submitted any evidence to prove their claims in this regard. Not 
accredited Petroperú order effect on their ability to meet orders from other customers has 
been proved (...).
In the aforementioned months, Envases Metálicos addressed orders from other 
customers, who (...) have not undergone significant changes in orders placed during the 
investigation period.
Rheem’s situation is not very different. (...) In the months mentioned, Rheem addressed 
orders from other customers, who, also, have not undergone significant changes 
regarding orders placed during the investigation period (...)”
 
Ruling out alternative explanations by the Tribunal in this case is a good example of so-
called “counterfactual analysis”, through which the settlement hypothesis is confronted 
with potential Contra Indications or alternative explanations identified or formulated by the 
investigated companies. Only when the aforementioned hypothesis is the only reasonable 
explanation for the behavior of agents in the market, having ruled out alternative explanations, 
it can be concluded that there was a settlement of competitors.
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In this case, the counterfactual analysis developed by Indecopi was not only strong, but 
properly reinforced the lack of documentary indications that refer or allowed deduction of a 
prior agreement between the investigated companies.
Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the conviction of first instance decision and the sanctions 
imposed122. 
 b. Ex officio investigation against Productos Químicos Industriales SA. 
  (PROQUINSA) and Silicatos SA under Liquidation (1998)
In this case the market of sodium silicate sale (quality 2.0 and 1.6) was investigated; a product 
used primarily for the production of detergents and has no close substitutes. In this market 
only two investigated companies participated until September 1994, then a third competitor 
entered, generating a restructuring of the business involvement and a competition period 
identified by them as the “price war”.
On the behavior of the companies in the market, it was found that the investigated companies 
had registered fairly similar prices from April 1993 to November 1994, and as from December 
1994 until the date Silicates SA ceased operations, prices of both of them showed a greater 
differentiation from the previous period.
Regarding sales volumes of sodium silicate (quality 2.0) and income collected by major 
consumer sales from April 1993 to December 1994, both Silicatos and Proquinsa registered 
quite similar volumes and revenues.
The Commission found that the market behavior reflected a price fixing and market sharing 
agreement, so it sought if there were indications supporting that hypothesis. Its search was 
not in vain, as it identified several details about exchanges of sensitive information between 
the investigated companies, which allowed inferring the existence of that agreement.
Thus, for example, it was considered as indication of settlement that in a letter addressed to 
a customer from PROQUINSA making a quotation of a product, the ballot that indicating a 
successful referral via fax was stapled to it, and that the fax number printed on the said ballot 
was not from the customer but that of Silicatos. This indicated that the companies exchanged 
confidential information.
123 Resolution 020-97-INDECOPI/CLC, dated August 25, 1997.
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It was also considered as a settlement indication that in two private quotations from 
PROQUINSA to its clients (which already had the reception seal from them) there was a 
handwriting that said: “Att: Mrs. Linda”. This was not the name of any official of the client 
that was recipient of the quotation, but coincidentally there was a high official of Silicatos 
named Linda Rios. In addition, after inquiries made by the Commission it was found that no 
officer or employee of PROQUINSA answered to that name during the investigation period.
Another indication taken into account by the Committee was the handwriting on the back 
of a letter dated August 24, 1994, by which Silicatos informed Procter & Gamble it was able 
to supply the product at a price of S/.565.00 per metric ton. The aforementioned manuscript 
text was the following: “the price indicated in the letter for S/.565.00 was coordinated x J of 
C and B. Alecchi”, being general managers of Silicatos and PROQUINSA José de Cardenas 
and Bruno Alecchi, respectively.
Manuscript text on the back of the letter dated August 24, 1994
 Source: Resolution N°020-97-INDECOPI/CLC 
Based on the above, the Commission considered that the documents containing indications 
as those already mentioned showed unusual exchange of sensitive information between 
the investigated companies. Such exchange of information was given in a market where 
transactions were not made on a daily basis, but answered to specific and eventual requests 
from specialized industrial consumers, and where sales were direct, without intermediaries 
or dealers who might be a way to spread price lists and other terms of sale.
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Consequently, the Commission concluded that at least from August 1993 until October 1994, 
Silicatos and PROQUINSA agreed on prices and allocated customers or, more precisely, 
the volumes demanded by each customer. Therefore, it imposed them a fine of 25 Peruvian 
Taxation Units each.123.
On appeal, the Tribunal upheld the first instance decision regarding the infringement 
constituted by the price settlement since August 1993 until October 1994, although revoking 
concerning the market sharing, for which it said there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate 
such behavior. Finally, it also confirmed the sanctions imposed on each infringing company124.
 c. Ex officio investigation against Praxair Perú SRL. (Praxair), Aga SA and 
  Messer Gases del Perú SA. (Messer) (2010)
The origin of this procedure dates back to January 2003, when the Social Health Insurance 
(EsSalud) informed the National Control System about the existence of repeated overlaps 
in the economic proposals from Praxair, Aga and Messer in public tenders conducted by 
such entity in the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the purchase of liquid and gaseous medical 
oxygen, nationwide. According to EsSalud, such coincidences may indicate a geographic 
market sharing of medical oxygen supply.
Some years later, after the preliminary investigation, the Commission decided to initiate an ex 
officio investigation against Praxair, Aga and Messer for alleged anticompetitive practices in 
the form of market sharing, in the selection processes convened by EsSalud for procurement 
of liquid and gaseous medical oxygen, nationwide, during the period between January 1999 
and June 2004, offense under art. 6 of Legislative Decree Nº701125.
In a similar way to what happened in the case against Rheem and Metal Container, in this 
case no documentary evidence was found that would identify the existence of a settlement. 
However, the Commission based its analysis on the offers submitted by the bidders, the 
characteristics of the procurement process and the behavior modification of the companies 
due to external events derived from the change in the design of the tenders by EsSalud. 
124 Resolution 0082-1998-TDC/INDECOPI, dated March 25, 1998. 
125 Resolution 003-2008-INDECOPI/CLC, dated January 25, 2008.
126 Resolution 051-2010/CLC-INDECOPI, dated August 13, 2010. At the time of preparing this work, the decision 
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The findings that serve to support the research considered, among other issues, the following:
•	 The	investigated	companies	were	awarded	in	different	zones	(of	lower	dimension)	to	their	
respective areas of influence, which were determined by the location of their production, 
the characteristics of the country and the specificity of the selection processes made by 
EsSalud.
•	 Repeatedly,	 the	 awards	 determined	 that	 Aga	 supplied	 the	 north	 zone	 of	 the	 country,	
Messer the central zone and Praxair the southern zones and Lima, with prices close 
to 110% of the reference value set by EsSalud. In parallel, losing companies were self-
disqualified by offering prices higher than 110% of the reference value in areas that some 
of the other won.
•	 The	 investigated	 companies	 had	 enough	production	 capacity	 to	meet	EsSalud’s	 total	
demand of oxygen.
•	 After	five	years,	the	investigated	companies	began	to	win	the	award	in	new	areas	and	
their prices were close to 70% of the reference value.
The defense of the companies investigated was based, to a greater or lesser extent, in the 
arguments described below:
 
•	 The	 submission	 of	 bids	 higher	 than	 110%	 of	 the	 reference	 value	 was	 due	 to	 the	
implementation of a signaling strategy, which purpose was to indicate EsSalud that the 
reference values  established for each process were lower than expected.
•	 The	fall	in	the	price	of	medical	oxygen	in	subsequent	processes	as	to	June	2004	was	a	
result of changes in design in the basis of the awards conducted by EsSalud, changes 
that caused an increase in the number of competitor companies. 
•	 The	 market	 subject	 to	 analysis	 should	 be	 broader,	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	
substitutability of medical oxygen produced by the PSA system, the high elasticity of the 
supply of the companies with the ASU system and the existence of imports.
•	 The	modality	of	auction	on	sealed	bid	reduces	the	likelihood	of	conducting	a	settlement,	
since it eliminates effective mechanisms for monitoring and control.
In the absence of documentary evidence that would directly infer the existence of a settlement, 
the Commission assessed the behavior of the investigated companies in the different 
procurement processes conducted by EsSalud, in the period considered to have been given 
the settlement and subsequently. In particular, the Commission stated:
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“(...) It is not necessary to find direct evidence, such as a signed document or recording 
of a meeting, to prove that certain companies agreed to restrict competition, but enough 
indications and assumptions determined by the competition authority to prove the 
existence of an agreed practice.
A useful tool in analyzing indications and assumptions is called event-analysis, in 
which, from an exogenous fact, it is possible to demonstrate the anticompetitive behavior 
of the agents investigated. It should be noted that this analysis assumes the exogeneity 
of the event concerning the behavior of the agents investigated because, otherwise, they 
could anticipate and adjust their expectations or behaviors, especially those related to 
prices and quantities offered.
In this case, there is no direct evidence of the existence of a market sharing agreement 
between the investigated companies. Therefore, to identify or rule out the existence of an 
agreed practice, the evidence substitutes will be drawn on, consisting of the indications 
and assumptions. The program will use the so-called ‘event analysis’ to evaluate the 
performance of the investigated companies facing the change implemented by EsSalud 
on how to organize its medical oxygen demand as from Bidding 0199L00052 (September, 
2002)”.
Based on the above, the Commission divided the processes into two periods. The first period 
extends from August 1998 tender to September 2001 awards (including three tenders and 
some direct awards at the end), and the second, from September 2002 tender to November 
2005 tender (includes three tenders and several intermediate awards). To distinguish the 
two periods it was taken into account the changing conditions of the Tender Bases since 
2002, when the number of items for which the companies could compete was increased and 
the required amount of each of these items was reduced (the purpose was to facilitate the 
submission of new bidders). This change was considered by the Commission as an exogenous 
event to regular suppliers of oxygen (i.e., the three investigated companies) that modified the 
characteristics of the market and the incentives to compete.
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Chart N° 22
Selection processes convened by EsSalud during the analysis period
* This process consisted of 3 calls. In this sense, the volume demanded as well as the reference value correspond to be 
required. 
*** All the while, the allocations confer at national level and independently. There is not a joint date for the Awarding Grant.
Source: EsSalud.
Author: Technical Secretariat 
Period Process Call Supplying period Awarding 
Volume
 Required (m³)
Reference 
value
(S/.)
Fi
rs
t p
er
io
d
018-IPSS-98 Nov-08
From January 
1999 to 
December 1999 Jan-99
Gaseous: 
756,867.00
Liquid: 
1’609,426.00
11 352 999,30
053-EsSalud-99’ May-00
From June 2000 
to June 2001 Jun-00
Gaseous: 
1’704,187.96
Liquid: 
971’937,07
14 074 870,65
01999-L00051 Jul-01 null and void Sep-01
Gaseous: 
348,148,00
Liquid: 
406,920.00
5 634 845,81
Allocations Sep-01
From October 
2001 to 
November 2002 …
Gaseous: 
502,565,00
Liquid: 
721,305.00
29 250 185,13
Se
co
nd
 P
er
io
d
0199-L00052 Sep-02
From November 
2003 to June 
2004 Nov-02
Gaseous: 
1’099,711,00
Liquid: 
2’029,220.00
17 654 195,95
allocations Oct-03
From November 
2003 to June 
2004 …
Gaseous: 
307,223.95
Liquid: 
1’190,490.73
10 702,479,43
0399-L00091 Apr-04
From June 2004 
to June 2005 June-04
Gaseous: 
1’351.991.00
Liquid: 
1’267,836.00
15 024,068,44
Allocations Jun-05
From June 2005 
to January2006 …
Gaseous: 
223’913.00
Liquid: 
54.811.00
926,012,40
0599-L00081 Nov-05
From February 
2006 to 
February 2007 Jan-2006
Gaseous: 
1’606.205.00
Liquid: 
2’362.515.00
11 751,275,30
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According to the assessment, during the first period, the share of the investigated companies 
in the procurement processes showed repeated uncommon coincidences. In the first two 
tenders for the period (1998 and 2000) the companies submitted offers very close to 110% of 
the reference value set by ESSALUD in all areas where they were awarded, while in areas 
where they were not awarded, it was because they did not submit or submitted offers higher 
than 110% of the reference value, thus being automatically disqualified. In the third tender 
(2001) all companies agreed to refrain from participating, informing ESSALUD that the 
expected reference prices were not enough, and the process was cancelled. Then there were 
direct awards (2001), in which the investigated companies were awarded in the areas they 
were serving in previous years.
Chart N° 23
Award bidders during the first period 
(Liquid and gaseous medical oxygen).
Area Entity LP 018IPSS98 (Nov. 1998)
LP 053 EsSALUD-99 
(May. 2000)
LP 0199L00051 
(Jul. 2001)
Allocations 
(Sep. 2001)
N
or
th
H.N.A. Aguinaga A A
Cancelled
-
G.D. Lambayeque A A A
G. D. Piura A A A
G.D. Tumbes A A A
G.D.	Amazonas A A A
G.D. Cajamarca A A A. C.
G.D. San Martín A A A
G.D. Ancash A A A
G.D. La Libertad A A A
Inst. Peruano Ophtalmology A -
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Area Entity LP 018IPSS98 (Nov. 1998)
LP 053 EsSALUD-99 
(May. 2000)
LP 0199L00051 
(Jul. 2001)
Allocations 
(Sep. 2001)
C
en
tr
e
G.D. Huánuco M M
Cancelled
M
G.D. Junín M M M
G.D. Pasco M M M
G.D. Huancavelica M M M
G.D. Ucayali M -- --
So
ut
h
H.N.A. of the South P P
Cancelled
--
G.D. Apurímac P P P.OC
G.D. Ayacucho P P P.OM
G.D. Ica P P P
G.D. Cusco P P P
G.D. Madre de Dios P P --
G.D. Puno P P P
G.D. Arequipa P P P
G.D. Moquegua P P P
G.D. Tacna P -- P
Li
m
a*
H.N.E. Rebagliati M. P P
Cancelled
P
H.N.G. Almenara I. P P P
G.D. Lima P P P
Hemodialysis center P P --
G.D. Loreto -- -- --
G.C. Programs -- P P
*It should be pointed out that initially, the G.D was included in the present item.
A: Aga         OM: Oxyman         C: Caxamarca gas         P: Praxair         M: Messer         Not available         OC: Oxycusco                                       
Source: EsSalud          Author: Technical Secretariat
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The result of this behavior, according to the Commission, was that in the first period each 
company managed to have the exclusive supply of all departments in an area of Peru: Praxair 
in Lima and the southern area, Aga in the north, and Messer in the middle area, as shown in 
the map below (See Graph N° 27):
Graph N° 27
Award bidders during the first period, by geographic zone
In the interpretation of the Commission, the results of the procurement processes conducted 
by EsSalud were consistent with the existence of a settlement between the investigated with 
the aim of sharing the market. In particular, the Commission stated that:
Aga
Messer
Praxair
Acquisition is not registered
Source: EsSalud.
Author: Technical Secretariat.
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“(...) The way in which one of the investigated companies obtained the Award with a 
price close to the maximum allowed (110% of reference value) and the other two did not 
win, offering prices higher than 110% (auto disqualifying) or not submitting offers is 
consistent with the existence of an anticompetitive practice in the form of geographical 
market distribution. Indeed, ensuring that there would not be effective competition 
(represented by the strategy of self-disqualification or non-submission of tenders) 
allowed investigated companies to extract the maximum surplus from EsSalud. It is 
worth remembering that is characteristic of geographical market distribution schemes 
that each of the operators involved in the agreement act as if it were a regional monopoly 
in the area that has been assigned by the cartel”.
In the second period, EsSalud introduced the modification in the design of biddings, 
allowing other providers to participate, such as Oxycuzco and Oxyman, in order to result in 
increased competition. In this period there was initially a coincidence in the behavior of the 
investigated companies, since they all continued supplying the areas they had traditionally 
served, but then all of them participated and won processes to supply areas where they had 
not previously won.
Thus, in the first bid (2002) companies managed to maintain the supply of the area traditionally 
served, but became involved in all processes, even with non-competitive offers (i.e., stopped 
refraining from participating or submitting offers higher than 110% of the reference price). 
Then there were direct awards (2003) in which the three companies maintained their 
traditional areas of supply.
In the second and third bid (2004 and 2005) and companies did not follow the pattern 
of behavior they had in the previous five years, starting to submit competitive offers and 
awarding processes to serve areas where they had not previously won, and at prices close to 
70% of the reference value set by EsSalud. As proof of this, it is included below the behavior 
of the investigated companies in 2005 processes.
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Chart N° 24
Awards convened in June 2005
Type Area Entity Volume (m3) Value Assigned (S/. X m3) Winner
G
A
SE
O
U
S
NORTH
G.R.A. Lambayeque
G.D. Piura
G.D. Tumbes
G.D.	Amazonas
G.D. Cajamarca
G.D. San Martín
G.D. Ancash 700,00 3,81 M
G.D. La Libertad 18 294,00 3,59 M
CENTRE
G.D. Huánuco 2 250,00 3,81 A
G.D. Junín 4 789,00 2,67 P
G.D. Huancavelica - - -
G.D. Pasco 2 060,00 3,81 A
SOUTH
G.D. Apurímac - - -
G.D. Ayacucho - - -
G.D. Ica - - -
G.R.A. Cusco 19 440,00 3,81 P
G.D. Madre de Dios - - -
G.D. Puno - - -
G.R.A. Arequipa 93 600,00 3,48 P
G.D. Moquegua - - -
G.D. Tacna - - -
LIMA
Headquarters 35 840,00 2,64 I
H.N.A Sabogal S. 3 360,00 3,14 A
H.N.E. Rebagliati 11 600,00 2,96 P
H.N.G. Almenara 31 980,00 2,59 A,I
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Type Area Entity Volume (m3) Value Assigned (S/. X m3) Winner
LI
Q
U
ID
NORTH
G.R.A. Lambayeque 7 358,00 4,36 A
G.D. Piura 11 924,00 3,87 A
G.D. Ancash 21 742,00 3,60 A
G.D. La Libertad - - -
CENTRE
G.D. Huánuco - - -
G.D. Junín - - -
SOUTH
G.D. Arequipa 87,49 5,95 OM
G.R.A. Cusco 13 700,00 3,60 P
LIMA
H.N.E. Rebagliati M. - - -
H.N.A. Sabogal S. - - -
H.N.G. Almenara I - - -
G.D. Lima - - -
A: Aga                 I: Indura         OM: Cayman        P. Praxair          M: Messer              - : Not available
Source: EsSalud               Author: Technical Secretariat.
    
The Commission interpreted that what happened in the second period, showed that the 
investigated companies were indeed able to submit competitive offers and win in areas 
other than those they had traditionally supplied since 1999. Thus, the Commission noted the 
following facts as the main indications of settlement:
•	 The	companies	were	awarded	in	the	same	areas	since	1998	until	October	2003	biddings.
•	 The	companies	had	a	strategy	to	offer	prices	above	110%	of	the	reference	value	or	not	
to participate in processes in areas other than those they traditionally supplied. This 
happened in biddings for the years 1998, 2000 and 2001.
•	 The	 companies	 changed	 the	 strategy	 used	 since	 the	 1998	 to	 2001	 biddings,	 to	 start	
offering low prices in 2002 bidding and 2003 awards, retaining each company the area 
they had traditionally been supplying since the 1998 tender.
Based on the above, the Commission concluded that:
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“(…) These Indications or coincidences are duly proved and, analyzed as a whole, they 
allow to presume the existence of an anticompetitive practice in the form of market 
sharing for the provision of medical oxygen to EsSalud, since Public Tender IPSS-98-018 
(November, 1998) until October 2003 Awards, so that Praxair would always serve Lima 
and southern areas, Aga the northern area and Messer the central area”.
The settlement hypothesis was, in turn, faced with alternative explanations raised by the 
investigated companies, which have been advanced to be the following:
•	 The	geographical	distribution	observed	in	the	provision	of	medical	oxygen	to	EsSalud	
was the result of inefficient design of the selection processes.
•	 The	submission	of	bids	higher	than	110%	of	the	reference	value	that	caused	automatic	
disqualification responded to a signaling strategy, so that EsSalud increases the reference 
value. 
•	 No	competitive	bids	were	submitted	in	areas	other	than	those	in	which	they	traditionally	
won, because it was too expensive for them to venture into other areas (due to infrastructure 
and logistics issues), and because they had no available productive capacity. 
The Commission analyzed each of the arguments indicated. As to the first, it stated that:
“(...) Although the organization of the EsSalud’s selection processes during the First 
Period implied that its demand was divided into only four major geographical areas, 
this does not mean that the companies investigated had been forced to win the Award 
always in the same areas. On the contrary, the investigated companies were always free 
and able to provide medical oxygen to EsSalud in any area. The fact that every item 
has comprised a particular geographical area, does not justify that each investigated 
company had obtained the Award, steadily over time, in a single area.
(...) Since Public Tender 0199L00052 (September, 2002) this organization was redesigned, 
defining smaller areas divided into twenty-four items. (...) The geographical distribution 
may not have answered the demand organization of EsSalud, for when this change, the 
investigated companies continued to win the Award solely and exclusively in the areas 
they traditionally supplied.
(…) From the Public Bidding 0399L00091 (April, 2004), (...) the investigated companies 
began to participate competitively in areas other than those traditionally supplied, a 
fact which shows that they were always able to participate competitively in other areas 
and that the initial organization designed by EsSalud not forced to always win Praxair 
southern and Lima, Aga in the north and in the southern Messer”.
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Regarding the second argument, the Commission stated that:
“(...) In the selection process there was a direct mechanism by which companies could 
send EsSalud information about the reference value recorded in the database. This 
mechanism is in the stages of consultation and observations on the bases (...).
According to the above, the investigated companies had the opportunity to formally 
communicate EsSalud their nonconformity and expectations concerning the reference 
value.
Additionally, even if an investigated company had made remarks on the reference value 
and EsSalud had decided not to consider them, the investigated company could have 
chosen not to participate in the selection process, since it had already used the existing 
formal mechanism to communicate its expectations and its willingness to participate in 
other areas if conditions changed.”
Finally, on the third argument of the investigated companies, the Commission considered the 
following:
“In regard to the cost of supplying other areas, although it is true that the winner of 
a selection process in a certain area gets some competitive advantage (experience 
and logistical cost savings), in this case, that advantage cannot have been significant 
or exclusive since, as from Tender 0199L00052 (September 2002), the investigated 
companies lowered their prices and, from Public Tender 0399L00091 (April 2004), they 
supplied other areas “.
After all the evaluation, the Commission concluded that the only reasonable explanation for 
the behavior of the investigated companies was the existence of a market sharing settlement, 
therefore it declared to be well founded the charges against them. It also imposed them the 
following fines126:
was already in appeal proceeding before the Tribunal.
127 See, for example: BULLARD, Alfredo. (2003b). Op. Cit., pp. 129-158.
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Chart N° 25
Fines imposed to liquid and gaseous medical oxygen suppliers
 
Company / Entity / Individual
Commission 
(Peruvian
Taxation Units)
Praxair Perú S.R.L. 3 836,82
Aga S.A. 1 333,90
Messer Gases del Perú S.A. 578,98
     Source: Resolution N°051-2010/CLC-INDECOPI.
Currently, the recourse of appeal submitted by the investigated companies is pending decision 
before the Specialized Defense of Competition Chamber.
3.2.3 Indecopi Impact and Contribution
The selection of pronouncements that have been described and commented shows that 
Indecopi has acquired significant experience in the investigation and sanction of horizontal 
cartel behaviors, particularly on sanctioning cartels of competitors to fix prices or share the 
market.
The investigations that have been conducted include different sectors, although there is a 
marked tendency of sanctioning collusion on goods or services markets that have great demand 
of general population. Thus, most of sanctioned price-fixing agreements or settlements 
have taken place in products markets or services of mass consumption (chicken, urban land 
transportation services, SOAT) or consumables used to produce that type of goods (wheat 
flour). In cases of market-sharing do not exist this tendency, because they have been verified 
in both intermediate goods markets (steel cylinders, sodium silicate) and goods markets that 
can be considered of mass consumption (medical oxygen). These investigations have usually 
been initiated against private companies, but have also included unions or associations to 
which those belong. In some cases, individuals have also been involved as offending agents, 
denoting the thoroughness with which Indecopi treat cartels, chasing them up until reaching 
individuals who heads and drive them.
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Cartels of competitors have been drastically treated by Indecopi, qualifying 
them as a per se or automatic illegal practice. Notwithstanding, Indecopi has 
also sought to generate a balance, considering that some price-fixing or market-
sharing agreements can be permissible when they are complementary or 
accessory of other most relevant legal agreements. 
Thus, since 1997, Indecopi established the per se illegality rule that sanction most firm 
agreements or settlements among competitors (precedent of mandatory compliance 
established in the investigation regarding poultry market cartel). This harsh treatment is 
understood because through such practices, competitors collude to act as if they were a single 
economic agent although they pretend to compete, resulting in “market fraud”. According 
to Indecopi’s instances, the effects that cartels of competitors may have in the market will be 
considered only to quantify the applicable sanction.
Without limiting the foregoing, that same year of 1997, Indecopi introduced the category 
of agreements among competitors that were accessory or complementary of other legal 
agreements, mainly of integration, which aims to achieve greater efficiency in a particular 
productive or commercial activity; in order to specially exonerate such per se illegality 
agreements (precedent of mandatory compliance established in the proceedings initiated by 
CIVA v. Mariscal Caceres). With this exception, some rationality was allowed when evaluating 
agreements involving the integration of a group of competitors, enabling them to compete 
more aggressively with the other remaining competitors.
On 2003, the indicated rules analysis were left without effect in order to demand the inclusion in 
horizontal cartel behaviors evaluation of its concrete effects to the detriment of general economic 
interest (precedent of mandatory compliance established in the investigation regarding SOAT 
price-fixing). At that time, this change received hard and valid critics for increasing the authority 
discretion degree127 leading to a broad debate on its suitability or utility128.
Seeing this issue in perspective and with the benefit of the elapsed time, this change can be 
considered to be an episode in the evolution of Indecopi’s interpretive criteria, in which fact 
cannot be considered as a substantial modification regarding severe persecution of cartels of 
competitors.
 
128 In this regard, it may be reviewed round table of FELICES, OLAECHEA, REBAZA y ROJAS. (2003). “¿Regla Per 
Se o Regla de la Razón? Premisas y Efectos de un Cambio”. In: Themis. No. 47. Lima, pp. 287-296. Likewise, it 
may be seen: MARTÍNEZ, Martha y QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2007). Op. Cit., pp. 116-136.
129 This would have happened in case of SOAT price-fixing, in which two of the investigated insurance companies 
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In effect, interpretation rule change required the authority to demonstrate that illicit practice 
had been conducted to verify its detrimental effects on general economic interest. Additionally, 
those who were investigated could give the reasons that, according to their opinion, justified 
agreements or settled practices, to produce efficiencies and benefits to consumer. Therefore, 
while rule change could complicate Indecopi’s work to verify illegality of infringing conducts 
(for raising test standard), there was a limited possibility to prevent sanction of a harmful 
conduct for the competitive process.
On one hand, competitors’ agreements implementation are common and, regarding 
settlements, their execution in the market are usually an inherent requirement of illegality, 
thus its existence is normally demonstrated through the competitors parallel conduct. 
Nevertheless, once an agreement has been reached, it is possible that some may decide not to 
align themselves, while others put it into practice, showing a certain degree of execution129. In 
summary, rule change only prevented to sanction agreements that remain in a mere attempt 
for its participants’ integrity.
On the other hand, cartel behaviors that qualify as cartels of competitors are usually harmful 
for the competitive process. It is highly unlikely that real justifications can be argued to restrict 
competition generated by that type of agreement, thus it would have to be demonstrated 
to produce greater efficiency and consumer welfare. If those beneficial effects could be 
demonstrated, the agreement could probably fit within the conditions required to qualify 
as accessory or complementary of other legal agreement, so that they could have just been 
exempt from per se illegality according to CIVA’s precedent. Consequently, it was difficult 
that those whose behaviors had clearly negative effects will be released from responsibility 
due to rule change130.
As a result, main disadvantages regarding rule change are:
•	 Rise test standard required to sanction cartels.
•	 Prevent sanctioning attempts.
•	 Reduce market signs against cartels of competitors.
were clear of all responsibility because no evidence of involvement was found.
130 Regarding SOAT price-fixing case, for example, no justifications raised by the investigated companies on 
the agreement reduced effects according to the number of product sales were accepted, for not showing the 
agreement significant benefits.
131 The legal definition of this interpretation rule has been considered to be correct by authors: PATRÓN, Carlos. 
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However, these major difficulties, which could be created for cartels persecution policy, did 
not prevent sanctioning those who had really harmful effects.
More importantly, experience gained by Indecopi as a product of this interpretive evolution 
was fully exploited during the regulatory development process that gave rise to the Legislative 
Decree 1034. As it has already being explained, through absolute prohibition, the existing 
law collects the per se illegality rule for cartels of competitors. Additionally, when defining 
behaviors subject to absolute prohibition, there is possibility according to the new law to 
qualify the agreements subject to this prohibition as accessory or complementary of other 
legal agreements, which might be released from the absolute prohibition. The Legislative 
Decree 1034 legally restores thereby two interpretation rules in force until 2003, separating it 
from the criterion tested in the investigation regarding SOAT price-fixing131. 
Continuity of Indecopi severe treatment of cartels of competitors can be seen on the proceedings 
statistics declared founded, as it shown in the following graph (see Graph N° 28).
Graph N° 28
Cartels of Competitors: founded proceedings (1993-2012)
First quinquennium
(1993 - 1997)
Second quinquennium
(1998 - 2002)
Third quinquennium
(2003 - 2007)
Fourth quinquennium
(2008 - 2012)
12
7
3
9
Source: Technical Secretariat.
NUMBER OF PROCEEDINGS STARTED
PC
(2008). Op. Cit., pp. 122-144. QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2011a). Op. Cit., pp. 19-59. RUIZ, Gonzalo. (2011). Op. 
Cit., pp. 163-182.
132 Sentences issued by the Judicial Branch on these matters have been discussed in the presentation of 
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
Free Competition196
It has been seen that Indecopi’s sanctions on cases declared founded have been quite higher 
than those concerning abuse of dominant position, already revised on the previous item. 
Total of applied sanctions to participants in cartels have been calculated according to the 
caused negative effects, mainly considering the affected market, practices duration, number 
of agents involved, probability of infringing conducts detection and illegal benefit gained. 
The following chart presents imposed sanctions for horizontal cartel behaviors. (See graph 
N° 29).
Graph N° 29
Imposed fines for horizontal cartel behaviors
Treatment of the circumstantial evidence is another relevant aspect on Indecopi’s experience 
on sanctioning horizontal cartel behaviors. The Judicial Branch, as supervisory authority 
of Indecopi’s decisions, has validated and confirmed that Indecopi is fully enabled to use 
circumstantial and presumption evidence. The Judicial Branch has furthermore confirmed 
based on the known cases that Indecopi given interpretation of found indications is correct132.
First quinquennium
(1993 - 1997)
Second quinquennium
(1998 - 2002)
Third quinquennium
(2003 - 2007)
Fourth quinquennium
(2008 - 2012)
7047
879,5
60,1
11523,3
Source: Technical Secretariat.
FINES IN PERUVIAN TAXATION UNITS
PC
cases (Petroperu against Rheem and Envases Metálicos and investigation of the poultry market cartel).
133 Regarding this matter, it may be seen, for example: QUINTANA, Eduardo. (2011c). Op. Cit, pp. 42-43.
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Although there are matters that Indecopi can strengthen and improve133; it cannot be 
denied that Indecopi’s decision-making bodies have improve its analytical and contrasting 
capacities of indications and against indications which, undoubtedly, improves the quality of 
its decisions.
Attention should be given to the exercise Indecopi’s bodies powers of investigation. One of 
the aspects that was strongly questioned on the investigations against cartels of competitors 
was the so-called excess that could be made using those powers134. However, Indecopi’s 
performance has been usually careful on this matter, gaining credibility on the exercise of its 
powers. This is a crucial aspect to ensure its legitimacy at the moment of collecting evidence 
as complex as those required to demonstrate the existence of competitors settlements.
In this regard, the Technical Secretariat and Commission of one of Indecopi’s major 
investigations referred to the poultry market cartel was questioned on obtaining and evaluating 
evidence, based on the violation of the right of defense and due process of investigated 
companies and organizations. This matter was analyzed by the Ombudsman, respected entity 
who protects constitutionally recognized rights. The Ombudsman, at the time, dismissed the 
allegations above mentioned, concluding that there were no signs indicating violation of due 
process or that arbitrary measures were adopted135.
•		 Criterion	of	analysis	to	sanction	cartels:	per	se	illegality	or	rule	of	reason.	
•		 Use	of	presumption	and	circumstantial	evidence	to	evidence	of	settlements.
•		 Evidence	of	settlement	in	the	absence	of	documentary	indications	and	
  analysis of alternative explanations.
134 An example can be seen on the news and press release published by the investigated companies or companies’ 
unions on the proceeding against poultry market cartel. Among which it can be seen: “El absurdo abuso” 
(Expreso, 22 de enero de 1997); “¿Matamos el pollo peruano a garrotazos?” (Síntesis, 22 de enero de 1997); 
“Avicultores Dicen que Consecuencias Serán Fatales” (Síntesis, 22 de enero de 1997); “Empresarios insisten 
‘Indecopi adopta métodos policiacos’” (La República, 27 de enero de 1997); “‘No es función de Indecopi juzgar 
a gremios empresariales’: Confiep” (Expreso, 06 de diciembre de 1997); “Eduardo Farra cuestiona multa a los 
polleros; ‘Indecopi se excede en sus facultades’” (La Reforma, 07 de diciembre de 1997). Citados en: BOZA, 
Beatriz. (2005). Op. Cit.
135 Statement issued by the Ombudsman on Communication No. 4356-97-DP-OP, July 02, 1997. Quoted by BOZA, 
Beatriz. (2005). Op. Cit. 
136 Once again investigation against poultry market cartel serves as example, as media quickly made clear 
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In addition, Indecopi’s experience on sanctioning cartels is emphasized within the country, 
which in turn is considered to be a very drastic entity against offenders136; but it is also valued 
on explaining and demonstrating both the appropriate manner to conduct investigations on 
this matter and positive results generated for market performance. As it has been mentioned 
by Boza, Indecopi’s work is internationally recognized as a “better practice” regarding 
the investigation and sanction of cartels due to its sophistication degree and its technical 
quality137.
HORIZONTAL cartel beahviors
Indecopi’s Contributions
•		 Creation	of	a	rigorous	criterion	on	sanctioning	cartels,	through	the	absolute	
prohibition referred to in Legislative Decree 1034.
•		 Option	 to	 consider	 as	 accessory	 or	 complementary	 agreements	 some	
agreements that otherwise would be per se illegal.
•		 Validation	of	circumstantial	evidence	as	standard	for	settlements	investigations.
Indecopi’s severity regarding this case decision, although it was also noted that many times they focused on 
highlighting imposed sanctions, rather than mentioning why were they imposed. Among the examples given 
of the above mentioned, it may be seen the following journalistic news: “Indecopi multa a avícolas con S/. 
15’343,200. Las acusa de concertación de precios y competencia desleal” (Expreso, January 21, 1997); “Multan 
con S/. 15.3 mllns a avícolas que concertaron precio del pollo” (El Peruano, January 21, 1997); “Indecopi multa 
a Avicultores con más de S/. 15 Millones” (Síntesis, January 21, 1997); “Ente regulador no da marcha atrás y 
aplica sanción final: Indecopi multa con S/. 5 millones a 16 avícolas por concertar precios” (Expreso, November 
27, 1997), “Indecopi multa con 5’088,000 soles a polleros” (Síntesis, November 27, 1997); “Indecopi sanciona 
a 15 empresas por concertación en precios del pollo” (Gestión, November 27, 1997); “Confirman sanción a 
avícolas por concertación de precios” (El Comercio, November 27, 1997). See: BOZA, Beatriz. (2005). Op. Cit.
137 Ibid. According to the author the investigation carried out by Indecopi on poultry market cartel was studied 
in the following events: “First International Training Program on Competition Policy”, organized by the World 
Bank Economic Development Institute (Washington, December 1998); and “First International Course on 
Defence of Competition and Economic Regulation: Common Challenges”, organized by the el World Bank 
Economic Development Institute and Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (Buenos Aires, March 2001). 
138 Regarding vertical cartel behaviors, it may be seen: FALLA, Alejandro y BULLARD, Alfredo. (2002). Op. 
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3.3. Vertical Cartel Behaviors (exclusivities)138
Indecopi’s practice concerning the supervision of vertical cartel behaviors is not as extensive 
as other types of illegal conducts. Notwithstanding this, the evaluation conducted in those 
resolved proceedings has been quite complete and discussed.
The main ruling issued by Indecopi concerning vertical restraints to competition or vertical 
cartel behaviors according to the law in force, referred as exclusivity cases, are described and 
discussed below.
  
3.3.1 Indecopi’s Pronouncements
Chart N° 26
Vertical Cartel Behaviors
Cases on Indecopi’s Pronouncements
CASES ON
 Indecopi’s 
Pronouncements
Tele Cable S.A. – Tele Cable vs. Fox Latin American Channel Inc. - Fox and 
Turner Broadcasting System Latin American Inc. - Turner (2003)
Group Multipurpose S.R.L. – Gromul and Dispra E.I.R.L. – Dispra, vs. Quimpac 
S.A. – Quimpac and Clorox Perú S.A. – Clorox (2009)
Operaciones	Arcos	Dorados	de	Perú	–	Arcos	Dorados	vs.	Jockey	Plaza	Shopping	
Center	S.A.	–	Jockey	Plaza,	Sigdelo	S.A.	and	several	natural	persons	(2011)
Cit., pp. 215-227. FALLA, Alejandro y DRAGO, Mario. (2012).Op. Cit., pp. 158-182. See also chapters “La 
Exclusividad de las Ventas de Hipoclorito de Sodio para la Producción de Lejía” and “La Exclusividad en el 
Alquiler de Espacios dentro de un Centro Comercial” in FERNÁNDEZ-BACA, Jorge. (2012). Op. Cit., pp. 211-
243 y 244-273, respectively. See also MARTÍNEZ, Martha y QUINTANA, Eduardo. (1998). Op. Cit., pp. 51-59. 
139 Tele Cable also filed a complaint against Telefonica del Peru SAA and Telefonica Multimedia SAC. (Cable 
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 a. Tele Cable S.A. – Tele Cable vs. Fox Latin American Channel   
  Inc. - Fox y Turner Broadcasting System Latin American Inc. -   
  Turner (2003)139
TV Cable, concessionaire of cable television network service in the city of Lima, had a signal 
distribution agreement (broadcasting of programs) with Fox and Turner since 1993 and 
1989, respectively. However, from April 30, 1999 Fox unilaterally terminate the agreement 
and Turner did the same on December 31, 1999, which coincided with the execution of 
exclusive distribution agreements by both companies with Telefonica del Peru SAA contracts 
(Telefonica). 
Tele Cable filed a complaint against Fox and Turner for the alleged development of anti-
competitive practices consisting in establishing signal exclusive distribution agreements. Tele 
Cable argued that subscribed exclusivity agreements aimed at excluding the company from 
the television cable market, since Fox and Turner channels represented “essential inputs” to 
compete in that market.
The defendants denied having engaged in anti-competitive practices. Turner submitted 
rebuttals indicating that the company was not in a dominant position in the international 
market of programmers, in view of the existence of a myriad of programs and content 
substitutes. Likewise, Fox dominant position could not be confirmed due to its channels had 
enough substitutes. 
The Commission considered that the case involved an alleged abuse of dominant position140, 
for that reason an evaluation was conducted on whether the defendants held this position 
in the relevant market. For these purposes, the Commission noted that the relevant product 
was not limited to Fox and Turner signals, but that it should include all those signals and 
programs that could be broadcasted by cable television channels. In addition, the Commission 
identified the categories to which each signal or program from the defendants belonged to 
Mágico), which are telecom operators. Notwithstanding the complaint was filed by telecom regulator (OSIPTEL), 
Indecopi presented the complaint as the Fox and Turner case, according to the arguments stated by the Tribunal 
in Resolution 0355-2000/TDC-INDECOPI.
140 It is important to consider that this procedure was presented during the effective period of Legislative Decree 
701, regulation that did not independently classify vertical cartel behaviors, as now does Legislative Decree 
1034. Accordingly, these complaints had to be presented considering that it was an act of abuse of dominant 
position or a restrictive competition practice (agreements or settlements between companies).
141 Resolution 005-2003-INDECOPI/CLC, dated May 14, 2003.
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and defined which could be substitutes in each category, depending on their characteristics, 
content and audience levels. The comparative evaluation of all existing programs for each 
category gave the following results (see Chart N° 27):
Chart N° 27
Comparative evaluation programs of the Fox and Turne
Category Channel Enterprise Substitute Programs Audience Percentage
Sports Fox Sports FOX
ESPN and America Sports. 
Cable Mágico Deportes had 
more tunning, but it was a 
Cable Magico propierty.
Equivalent to the
competitors
Financial
News CNN Financial TURNER Bloomberg
Equal to the
competitors
International 
News in 
Spanish
CNN in Spanish TURNER
News International Chains 
(CBS-Telenoticias) and 
local news chains (Canal N, 
Antena Informativa)
Lower than the
local competitors
International
News in
English
CNN International TURNER BBC World, NBC Equivalent to thecompetitors
Movies TNT TURNER
HBO, Cinecanal, Cinemax, 
USA Network, MGM Network 
Film and Arts.
Lower than the
local competitors
Children’s
Programs
Cartoon Network 
and 
Fox Kids
FOX 
TURNER
Nickelodeon, Discovery Kids 
and Boomerang
Higher than the
competitors, but
not being
dominant
Series Fox Channel FOX
Warner Channel, AXN 
and Sony Entertainment 
Televisión
Lower than the
competitors
Source: Own development.    
Consequently, the Commission determined that Fox and Turner did not held a dominant 
position in any of the analyzed categories “(...) to the extent that the development of abusive 
behaviors in this market would not be allowed by the existence of substitutes channels and 
international market of programmers dynamic”. However, the Commission considered 
convenient to analyze reported behaviors assuming they did hold a dominant position.
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The Commission evaluated whether exclusivity agreements between the defendants and 
Telefonica could represent abuse of dominant position. Therefore, it was considered that “(...) 
exclusivity agreements can have a double effect; on one side they can increase consumers welfare 
as a result of the efficiencies that could arise from such agreements”. On the other hand, “(...) they 
can also produce a negative effect by restricting or excluding competitors from sources of supply or 
inputs, decreasing the competition level and thereby to a loss of welfare for consumers”.
As a result of the comparative evaluation of positive and negative effects of exclusivity 
agreements, the Commission concluded that negative effects concerning customers loss 
presented by Tele Cable, would be quite reduced to the total of disconnections sustained 
(customers loss) by the aforementioned company during the analyzed period. Thus, 
disconnections were mostly caused by other variables, than exclusivity agreements, such 
as problems with television signals, inadequate distribution of magazine, subscriber travel, 
bad programming, lack of Canal N and international broadcasters, such as ABC, NBC, CBS, 
among others. 
The Commission considered that exclusivity agreements would be only explaining a very 
small part of Tele Cable total number of disconnections and, accordingly, it not could not be 
confirmed that such exclusivities could lead to Tele Cable loss of customers and to be ousted 
from the market. 
Under these considerations, the Commission declared unfounded the complaint filed by Tele 
Cable against Fox and Turner141.
 b. Group Multipurpose S.R.L. (Gromul) and Dispra E.I.R.L. (Dispra) vs.  
  Quimpac S.A. (Quimpac) and Clorox Peru SA. (Clorox) (2009)
In 1995 there were two manufacturers of sodium hypochlorite in Peru: Quimpac and 
Paramonga. In 1997, Quimpac bought Paramonga, becoming the only producer of sodium 
hypochlorite in the domestic market. 
Later, Quimpac subscribed a sodium hypochlorite exclusive distribution agreement with 
Clorox, which is the sole distributor of that product and it could not be directly bought from 
Quimpac by any other company.
142 Resolution 005-2008-INDECOPI/CLC, dated February 22, 2008.
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As a result of what it is stated in the above mentioned agreement, Quimpac refused to meet 
a sodium hypochlorite purchase order of the plaintiffs: Gromul is in the market of bleach 
packaging and commercializing, and Dispra commercialized bleach prepared by Gromul in 
Huánuco and Ucayali.
Gromul and Dispra filed a complaint against Quimpac and Clorox for alleged vertical cartel 
behaviors by arguing that defendants maintained an exclusive contractual relationship of 
sodium hypochlorite sale or distribution, as well as the application of dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent, placed a few competitors at a disadvantage against other. 
Gromul and Dispra argued that the exclusivity agreement described above aimed to 
maintain and increase Quimpac and Clorox dominant position, as Quimpac refused to 
meet the purchase order by specifying that there was an agreement with Clorox. Likewise, 
this agreement allowed Clorox to stock up on sodium hypochlorite at a lower price than its 
competitors, enabling it to reduce its bleach sales prices to the consumer, to the detriment of 
Gromul and Dispra.
Clorox stated that the exclusive distribution agreement was not effective, since its conditions 
were more flexible, as Clorox hypochlorite volumes depended on Quimpac decision and not 
based on Clorox requirements and quantities. Clorox indicated that its dominant position 
resulted from its economic efficiency, achieved by reducing its production costs, to benefit the 
consumer with a better and more comfortable package at a lower price. 
Quimpac stated that it did not hold a dominant position in production and distribution of 
sodium hypochlorite, to the extent that there were not barriers to entry the market. The 
absence of barriers to entry establishes a potential competition within the sodium hypochlorite 
market and Quimpac was not responsible if anyone decides to import it. In addition, Quimpac 
denied the existence of an exclusive distribution agreement with Clorox, by indicating that 
business relationships were maintain with different companies, such as Intradevco, to sell 
hypochlorite during the period of its alleged validity.
According to the Commission analysis, exclusivity agreements between companies that 
are at different levels of the production chain, in case one of the involved companies holds 
a dominant position, could produce an exclusionary effect for competitors of the affected 
market. Therefore, this type of behaviors could be tried under article 6 of Legislative Decree 
N° 701, currently in force, as a restrictive competition practice. 
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Thus, the Commission understood that when these practices involve, at least, one company 
holding dominant market position, there can be negative effects on the efficiency, since the 
capacity of competitors to compete in the market is affected, being necessary to evaluate 
involved benefits and costs. 
Contrary to Quimpac’s statements, the Commission determined that this company held a 
dominant position on the relevant market during the investigation period. Furthermore, 
the exclusive distribution agreement was considered to be made and executed, limiting 
competition and creating more costs than social benefits.
The Commission particularly understood that the referred agreement had created a new 
business level on selling sodium hypochlorite, and that: 
“...competition restriction established by the exclusive distribution of sodium hypochlorite, 
did not find justification on achieving the involved companies indicated beneficial 
objectives, since these could not be achieved through less restrictive mechanisms for 
competition”. 
The Commission illustrated on a graph the situation before and after exclusivity agreement 
and its effect on the business market of hypochlorite of sodium through the following graphical 
comparison (see Graph N° 30):
Graph N° 30
Situation before and after the exclusive agreement to commercialize sodium hypochlorite
Enterprise: Quimpac
Leading Position
Distributin
Packaging
Distributor
Clorox
Packer
Clorox
Gromul
Distributor X Distributor Y
Other
packers
Lave
Before
Enterprise: Quimpac
Leading Position
Distribution
(Exclusivity
Agreement)
Packaging
Distributor Clorox
Packer
Clorox
Gromul Others 
Packers
Intradevco
After
Redistribution
Redistributor 
X
Redistributor
Y
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The complaint was therefore declared well-founded by the Commission regarding the 
implementation of vertical restraints of sodium hypochlorite exclusive distribution agreements. 
Both Quimpac and Clorox were sanctioned by the Commission with an equivalent fine of 
325.93 Peruvian Taxation Unit142. 
On appeal, the Tribunal ruled on the classification of reported conduct as a vertical agreement 
punishable according to article 6 of Legislative Decree 701. In this regard, the Tribunal stated 
that prohibited behavior according to first paragraph of article 6 is equivalent to what in 
doctrine is referred to as cartel behaviors, cartels or settlements, characterized by:
“... a meeting of the minds (covenant, convention, contact, etc.) between two or more 
independent economic operators which undertake a behavior to restrict competition, 
by the exclusion of competitors (e.g. acts of boycott) or concerted fixing of a business 
condition (e.g. prices, quality standards, etc.)”.
According to Tribunal developed analysis:
“... exclusive distribution agreements between independent economic agents working 
in different stages of the production chain and in which one of them holds dominant 
position, could restrict competition in one of the related markets (production - distribution, 
wholesale - retail, etc.) through the exclusion of competitors who eventually could not 
access exclusive input supply”.
Therefore, the Tribunal determined that such arrangements were intended as an alleged case 
of infringement according to letter j) (“cases of equivalent effects”) and the first paragraph of 
article 6 of Legislative Decree 701 (agreement between companies). 
On the other hand, vertical collusions constitute resulting infringements according to the 
Tribunal, requiring its modification:
•	 Execution	of	accused	conduct	(conclusion	of	exclusive	distribution	agreement),	and	
•	 To	 prove	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 negative	 result	 or	 its	 specific	 potentiality	 concerning	
competition and consumer welfare.
•	 According	 to	 the	Tribunal	 the	agreement	did	not	generate	an	effective	damage	 in	 the	
market, although it could generate:
143 Resolution 068-2009/SC1-INDECOPI, dated February 24, 2009.
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•	 Negative	results	for	competition	through	possible	exclusion	of	bleach	packers	from	the	
market, and 
•	 Any	 negative	 effects	 for	 consumers	 who	 could	 have	 been	 affected	 for	 reducing	
consumption alternatives and competitive pressure resulting in lower prices.
Notwithstanding the above mentioned, the Tribunal considered being necessary defining the 
market size in order to evaluate the effect potentiality; concluding that market size in this 
particular case was not significant, due to the fact that the conduct was developed in a not-so-
extensive market, compared to other inputs market within chemicals sector. This fact should 
be considered, to the discretion of the Tribunal, at establishing the sanction. 
As a result, the complaint was considered to be well-founded and the fine was reduced to 
81.48 UIT for both Quimpac and Clorox143, according to the decision issued by the court of 
first instance which was confirmed by the Tribunal. 
In addition, the Tribunal decided to establish the following precedent of mandatory compliance 
as a binding guide for future cases to be processed under Legislative Decree 1034, presenting 
as follows the transcription of its overall content:
“1. Legislative Decree 1034 - Law on the Repression of Anti-competitive Conducts – under 
articles 11 and 12, respectively, horizontal and vertical cartel behaviors are classified; 
i.e., unlike repealed regulatory system where both cartel behaviors were classified under 
article 6, under the exiting regulation, according to lawmaker separate classification is 
necessary by considering their nature and particular typical elements.
(…)
3. Under the existing regulations, vertical cartel behaviors have two particular typical 
elements: (i) that it is undertook by two or more independent economic agents acting 
at different levels of the production chain; and (ii) that one of the involved infringing 
agents holds dominant position in one of the production chain markets.
(…)
7. From this point of view, vertical cartel behaviors are ‘resulting infringements’. In 
other words, in order to establish the infringement and, therefore, violate the principle 
of free competition as a legally protected right, it is necessary not only to undertake the 
accused conduct (e.g., concluding a restricting exclusive distribution agreement,), but 
to prove the existence of a negative result, or its potentiality (certain and imminent) 
144 As it is referred to in the discussed resolution, "tenant mix" is the combination of business premises in a shopping 
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concerning the competition and consumer welfare. Specifically, vertical cartel behaviors 
agreement shall generate an effective tort or risking tort to competition and consumer 
welfare (certain and imminent), in order to sanction this behavior as an infringement of 
competition defense regulations.
(…)
12. This Chamber considers that in order to analyze vertical cartel behaviors legality 
(or illegality), based on the above mentioned, an analysis shall be conducted by the 
competition authority according to the following methodology: 
(i) determine if any of the defendants holds dominant position in the relevant market; 
(ii) establish the existence of restricting agreement charged to the defendants; 
(iii) consider competition restrictive objectives against efficiencies for competition that 
arise from vertical cartel behavior under analysis; and 
(iv) in the event that the restrictive objectives are larger than the efficiencies, determine 
whether vertical cartel behavior had in fact a negative result, or the potential of 
causing a particular detrimental result for competition and consumer welfare (affecting 
general economic interest). Failure to observe these effects, or potential effects, vertical 
restriction will be not declared as offense, although it might have the object of restricting 
competition”.
 c. Operaciones Arcos Dorados de Perú (Arcos Dorados) vs.    
  Jockey Plaza Shopping Center S.A. (Jockey Plaza), Sigdelo S.A.   
  and several natural persons (2011)
In Peru, Arcos Dorados is the licensee company of McDonald’s international fast food chain, 
while Jockey Plaza Shopping Center is managed by Jockey Plaza and Sigdelo is the licensee 
company of Burger King and Pizza Hut international fast food chains.
Arcos Dorados constantly requested Jockey Plaza to lease one or several business premises 
inside the shopping center to establish various formats of McDonald’s restaurants, receiving 
several negative replies from Jockey Plaza who stated that his category was sufficiently 
covered. Finally, on June 12, 2006, Jockey Plaza replied Arcos Dorados leasing request made 
on June 08, 2006, by stating that although there was an interest on McDonald’s participation, 
there were contractual limitations agreed with another operator that prevented it.
Arcos Dorados file a complaint for the existence of vertical restraints to competition between 
Jockey Plaza (shopping center-lessor) and Sigdelo (client-lessee), as Jockey Plaza would 
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have refused to enter into an agreement with Arcos Dorados due to an agreement held with 
Sigdelo.
Therefore, Arcos Dorados alleged that Jockey Plaza is the only leasing company of business 
premises for fast food sale in the shopping center, making evident its dominant position in 
that market. Regarding negative effects of exclusivity agreement between Jockey Plaza and 
Sigdelo, the plaintiff argued that not only did its ability to operate in the relevant market 
was restricted, but affected consumers by reducing options and products at higher prices, as 
McDonald’s prices are relatively lower than Burger King. Finally, it was stated that Burger 
King was not an anchor shop to the shopping center, which did not need to maintain a suitable 
“tenant mix”144, therefore there were no reasonable justifications to exclude McDonald’s from 
the shopping center for an indefinite period.
According to Jockey Plaza and Sigdelo, leasing and selling business premises in Lima and 
Callao is the relevant market, which cannot be restricted only to Jockey Plaza shopping 
center. In addition, the agreement was economically justified, as Sigdelo pledged to lease 
several premises in the shopping center and to pay an additional amount for exclusivity. This 
situation maintained the desired combination of operators and “tenant mix”, and granted 
security to operators who took a risk in a business when profitability was unknown.
Likewise, the defendants stated that a shopping center is not an essential establishment for 
Arcos Dorados to operate in the market and either to considered that Jockey Plaza holds 
share of a market that difficult, limit or restrict Arcos Dorados function, thus (i) there are 
numerous shopping centers in Lima Metropolitan Area and Callao, (ii) Arcos Dorados can 
operate in establishments other than shopping centers, and (iii) there are many potential 
suppliers of business premises.
Finally, as Lima and Callao are considered to be the relevant market, Arcos Dorados 
complaint against Sigdelo cannot be expelled by the exclusivity agreement, on the contrary, 
the agreement stimulated competition, causing Arcos Dorados to set up an establishment 
close to the Jockey Plaza Shopping Center.
center in order to produce, as an assembly, optimum sales, profits, community service and financial viability for 
shopping center owner.
145 Resolution 059-2011/CLC-INDECOPI, dated November 15, 2011. This decision was on appeal before the 
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Firstly, the Commission verified that Jockey Plaza and Sigdelo entered into an agreement on 
February 20, 1997, which remained in force until September 26, 2007, in which no shopping 
center premises or any other area that may hold in the future rights in rem in the Hippodrome 
of Monterrico shall be leased by the former to any McDonald’s licensee. Similarly, it was 
verified that due to this agreement, Jockey Plaza refused to lease business premises to Arcos 
Dorados.
The Commission considered that, regarding the relevant market, the product referred to were 
fast food hamburgers and related products. Shopping centers are considered to be a sales 
platform of goods and services for consumers, thereby the complaint on different products 
(for example, purchase of clothing and fast food) is consolidated within this type of premises 
and buyers usually do not incur costs by going into another place to change one of the 
suppliers. It was also considered that, during the investigated period (1997-2007), there were 
no shopping centers that could be considered as appropriate substitutes for Jockey Plaza 
Shopping Center. Thus, it was determined that leasing of premises in Jockey Plaza Shopping 
Center limited the market to sale hamburgers similar to the ones sold by McDonald’s.
According to the Commission, Jockey Plaza held high market share, there were high entry 
barriers and there were no potential competition, stating as conclusion that Jockey Plaza held 
a dominant position during the investigated period.
A set of goods and services offered at the Jockey Plaza Shopping Center determined the 
affected market, including McDonald’s, Burger King and Bembos hamburgers, considering 
Arcos Dorados requested service, scope of the agreed negative between Jockey Plaza and 
Sigdelo, consumers’ characteristics of the referred product, and Arcos Dorados, Sigdelo 
and Bembos products characteristics. The Commission identified therein that the reported 
behavior had significantly restricted the competition level between Arcos Dorados, Sigdelo 
and Bembos and, consequently, possible consumers’ options were reduced.
In addition, there was no relation between the exclusivity agreement and the need to ensure 
a particular “tenant mix”, nor did it solve the need to return a significant investment made 
by Sigdelo. That is, there were no justifications regarding efficiency or any other nature of 
reported behavior that could validate caused competition restriction.
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Based on the foregoing, the Commission declared the complaint as well-founded for infringing 
letter b) of article 6 of Legislative Decree 701, since the investigation period was from 1997 to 
2007, before Legislative Decree 1034145 came into force.
As a corrective measure, the decision of not making an agreement with Arcos Dorados was 
declared unenforceable and ordered Jockey Plaza to refrain from entering into exclusivity 
agreements. In addition, Sigdelo was sanctioned with a fine of 564.4 Peruvian Taxation Unit, 
Jockey Plaza received a fine of 100 Peruvian Taxation Unit and individuals involved in the 
investigation received fines of 5 Peruvian Taxation Unit each.
The appeal submitted by the defendants is currently pending decision by the Specialized 
Defense of Competition Chamber.
3.3.2 Indecopi’s Impact and Contribution
As it has already being mentioned, Indecopi’s experience on vertical cartel behaviors is not 
such extensive, however, it has given rise to diligent and relevant rulings.
Attention has to be particularly paid to elements below that are usually used by Indecopi to 
analyze this type of behaviors:
•		 The	existence	of	agreement	or	collusion	between	agents	operating	at	different	
levels of the productive or business chain. 
•		 Dominant	position	of	some	participants.
•		 Restrictive	effect	of	competition	(true	or	its	potentiality).
•		 Agreement	positive	effects	for	consumer	welfare.	
Tribunal at the time this work was being drafted.
146 See chapter “La Exclusividad de las Ventas de Hipoclorito de Sodio para la Producción de Lejía” - FERNANDEZ-
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As can be observed, this method of analysis is consistent with international practice, as 
explained in the first chapter. 
Without a doubt, Indecopi’s gained experience regarding vertical restraints of competition 
has also been used to develop Legislative Decree 1034.
As part of the implementation of Legislative Decree 701, it was observed that vertical restraints 
can be detrimental to competition when involving, at least, one company holding a dominant 
position since the agreement made between the former and an economic agent can imply 
an advantageous position compared to its competitors, preventing them to access dominant 
company’s goods or services. This analysis was used, for example, in the case against Fox 
and Turner.
In addition, the absence of a specific provision to classify prohibition of vertical cartel 
behaviors when implementing Legislative Decree 701 was also identified, in which systematic 
interpretation of Legislative Decree 701 provisions was used at that time to decide about this 
class of behaviors. This analysis used on the proceeding against Quimpac and Clorox.
Based on that experience, classification of vertical cartel behaviors and establishment 
of conditions to be modified have been carefully made when establishing regulations of 
Legislative Decree 1034.
Chapter 3 - Jurisprudence and Indecopi Contributions
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VERTICAL CARTEL BEHAVIORS
Indecopi’s Contributions
•		 Independent	classification	as	alleged	prohibition.
•		 Settle	the	existence	of	a	dominant	position	to	be	modified.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Indecopi’s taken positions to rule on the described behaviors 
in this chapter have been argued. On one hand, it can be mention Indecopi’s identification 
and estimation of possible detrimental effects from vertical restraints of competition, 
particularly in the sodium hypochlorite case146. On the other hand, most current debate 
focused on defining the relevant market for exclusivity agreements, since the narrow the 
market, the greater the possibility of vertical restraints to significantly affect competition, 
which occurred in Jockey Plaza shopping center147 case.
BACA, Jorge. (2012). Op. Cit., pp. 242-243.
147 On this regard, it may be seen FALLA, Alejandro y DRAGO, Mario. (2012). Op. Cit., pp. 172-176. See also 
chapter “La Exclusividad en el Alquiler de Espacios dentro de un Centro Comercial” - FERNÁNDEZ-BACA, 
Jorge (2012). Op. Cit., p. 273.
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Competition is a dynamic process through which companies or economic agents compete in 
the market to better meet consumers’ needs and expectations. On this regard, competition is 
considered to be a means to achieve a higher purpose, which is consumer’s welfare through 
market functioning.
Peruvian regulations on free competition defense and protection aimed to avoid companies 
to concentrate market power for reasons other than increasing efficiency and to use illegally 
acquired market power. It also seeks to avoid concentration of power market through companies’ 
mergers and purchases, generating serious risks for competition. These regulations offered 
protection of the competitive process in order to achieve consumer’s welfare.
Indecopi, since the beginning of its duties in 1993, has managed to protect the competitive 
process, not only by facing important challenges regarding interpretation of regulations on 
competition protection for complex cases, such as those relating to acts of abuse of dominant 
position requiring the evaluation of its effects in the market, but also defending the exercise of 
its legal powers to investigate veiled anticompetitive behaviors, such as cartels of competitors.
Indecopi’s decisions regarding acts of abuse of dominant position demonstrate a balance 
between (i) self-determination of dominant companies’ business policies, recognized in a 
social market economy such as Peru, which is reflected in the decisions involving, for example, 
denial to hire or the use of differentiated prices and/or discounts; and (ii) protection of the 
competitive process, by sanctioning dominant companies behaviors which invalidly excluded 
other economic agents from the market.
Indecopi has been careful to manage its sanctioning powers on acts of abuse of dominant 
position; being lengthy when defining the existence of a dominant position in the market, as not 
to unduly extend limitations imposed by the prohibition of acts of abuse of dominant position 
to companies or entities that do not hold substantial market power. Reasons and justifications 
raised by operators holding a dominant position have also been evaluated in a reasonable and 
balanced manner to support that their behavior cannot be considered as an act of abuse. 
By constantly applying regulations that prohibit acts of abuse of dominant position, Indecopi 
identified new types of behaviors of dominant economic agents that can damage the 
competitive process. From this experience, prohibited behaviors included in the proposed 
regulation posed by Indecopi were enriched, giving rise to a new law on defense of 
competition, Legislative Decree 1034.
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Indecopi managed, with the gained experience, to properly elucidate the scopes of prohibition 
of abuse of dominant position, by excluding regulation in force, where after an extensive 
discussion, the so-called acts of exploitative effect that may well adversely affect the consumer 
are not made through a competition restriction.
On the other hand, Indecopi has severely treated cartels of competitors, qualifying them as a 
per se or automatic illegal practice. The reason why are drastically treated is that they collude 
to act as if they were a single economic agent by pretending to compete, considered as 
“market fraud”. The severity of cartels treatment is reflected, without doubt, on the economic 
sanctions imposed by Indecopi, which have been much higher than those corresponding to 
cases of abuse of dominant position.
Indecopi’s gained experience in sanctioning cartels was fully used through the regulatory 
development process, which gave rise to the Legislative Decree 1034, as it states the absolute 
prohibition of cartels of competitors.
Notwithstanding this, Indecopi has also sought to generate balance, by considering that 
cartel behaviors may be exceptionally exempt from per se illegality, as complementary or 
accessory of other most relevant legal agreements, mainly of integration, which objective is to 
achieve greater efficiency in a particular productive or business activity. With this exception, 
some companies’ integration agreements are allowed to compete more aggressively with 
other competitors. This exception has also been referred to in Legislative Decree 1034.
In addition, based on its work of cartels persecution, Indecopi has managed to validate 
two very important aspects for the exercise of its legal powers. First, to use circumstantial 
or presumption evidence to demonstrate the existence of cartels of competitors, as there 
is no direct evidence to demonstrate this illegal behavior. Second, to use its broad powers 
of investigation to obtain evidence, respecting the right of defense of those investigated. 
Indecopi performance in both areas has successfully passed the judicial review.
In this way, Indecopi has earned credibility in the execution of its functions, which is crucial 
to ensure its legitimacy. Indecopi’s work is internationally recognized as a “better practice” 
regarding the investigation and sanction of cartels due to its sophistication degree and its 
technical quality.
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As Indecopi’s experience on vertical cartel behaviors is not as extensive as in the other two 
previously discussed areas, it has also served to improve the existing regulation. On one side, 
it was possible to classify these behaviors in a different section of Legislative Decree 1034, 
independent from competitors’ treaties and agreements. On the other hand, this classification 
was considered as a condition to modify this behavior, in which one of the participants holds a 
dominant position, as only in this case, vertical restraints can be detrimental to competition.
Finally, the following are related to the main future challenges of Indecopi:
•	 Firstly,	Indecopi	has	tools	to	identify	markets	or	situations	in	which	there	exits	at	least	a	
reduced probability in which economic operators affected by acts of abuse of dominant 
position file a complaint, and in which prejudice of consumers’ welfare may be high. 
Both conditions have to be met; we consider that it would justify Indecopi to act ex officio, 
as it tends to do in investigations against cartels of competitors.
•	 Secondly,	 when	 settlement	 cases	 among	 competitors	 are	 based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	
companies’ behaviors in the market as main or only source of settlement evidence, 
we consider being essential for Indecopi to submit settlement hypothesis to a more 
demanding counterfactual analysis, to fully rule out alternative explanations offered by 
the investigated party.
•	 Thirdly,	we	 consider	 that	 in	 the	 future	 Indecopi	 can	make	 the	most	 of	 the	provisions	
contained in Legislative Decree 1034 on undertaking to cease infringing conduct and, 
above all, requests of sanction exemption in return for offering crucial evidence to 
sanction offenders (known as repentance programs). There have been significant results 
to sanction severe anticompetitive behaviors in other countries.
APPENDIX
Appendix
Free Competition218
APPENDIX N° 1
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•	 Carrillo, Diego. (2011). “El Moderno Control de Fusiones Económicas en la Defensa 
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•	 gallarDo, Jose. (2004). Concentraciones Horizontales en la Actividad de Generación 
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148 This bibliographic listing based on the Appendix of DIEZ CANSECO, Luis; FALLA, Alejandro; QUINTANA, 
Eduardo and TAVARA, José. (2012). Op. Cit. includes an exhaustive list of works on this matter written in Peru, 
which we have enriched with several additional references of Peruvian authors, in order to be reviewed by the 
reader and as the topic of control of structures is not developed in this book.
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Antimonopolio del Sector Eléctrico: una Raya más al Tigre del Intervencionismo”. En: 
Thémis. No. 36. Lima. 
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grado académico de Magister en Derecho de la Empresa con mención en Regulación de 
Servicios Públicos por la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
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APPENDIX N°2
CONSIDERED RESOLUTIONS
Abuse of the Position: Negative and Unjustified Treatment
Resolution Date Commissions / Members / Technical Secretary
Resolution N°002/99-INDECOPI/
CLC
19.03.1999 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez	Larraín
Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
Luis Morales Bayro
César	Guzmán-Barrón	Sobrevilla
Alejandro Falla Jara
Resolution N°0216-1999-TDC-
INDECOPI
16.06.1999 Alfredo	Bullard	González
Hugo	Eyzaguirre	del	Sante
Liliana	Ruiz	de	Alonso
Ana María Pacón Lung
Resolution N°011-2000-
INDECOPI/CLC
09.10.2000 Geoffrey Cannock Torero
Carlos	Adrianzén	Cabrera
César	Guzmán-Barrón	Sobrevilla
Thilo Klein
José Luis Sardón Taboada
Resolution N°0869-2002/TDC-
INDECOPI
11.12.2002 Juan Francisco Rojas Leo
Julio Durand Carrión
Santiago Francisco Roca Tavella
Luis	Bruno	Seminario	De	Marzi
Lorenzo	Zolezzi	Ibárcena
Resolution N°022-2001-
INDECOPI/CLC
11.07.2000 César	Guzmán-Barrón	Sobrevilla
Geoffrey Cannock Torero
Carlos	Adrianzén	Cabrera
Thilo Klein
José Luis Sardón de Taboada
Resolution N°0870-2002/TDC-
INDECOPI
11.12.2002 Juan Francisco Rojas Leo
Julio Durand Carrión
Santiago Francisco Roca Tavella
Luis	Bruno	Seminario	De	Marzi
Lorenzo	Zolezzi	Ibárcena
Resolution N°064-2006-
INDECOPI/CLC
04.09.2006 Luis	Felipe	Arizmendi	Echecopar
Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Eloy Espinosa-Saldaña Barrera
José Abraham Llontop Bustamante
Jorge Rojas Rojas
David Ritchie Ballenas
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Resolution N°1122-2007/TDC-
INDECOPI
02.07.2007 Rosa	María	Graciela	Ortiz	Origgi
Juan	Ángel	Candela	Gómez	de	la	Torre
Juan	Luis	Avendaño	Valdez
Luis	José	Diez	Canseco	Núñez
José Luis Fernando Piérola Mellet
Resolution N°045-2009-CLC 25.06.2009 Paul Phumpiu Chang
Lorena Masías Quiroga
Fabián Novak Talavera
Resolution N°009-2010-CLC 04.02.2010 Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Joselyn Olaechea Flores
Raúl	Pérez-Reyes	Espejo
Abuse of the Position: Discrimination
Resolution Date Commissions / Members / Technical Secretary
Resolution N°003-93-CLC 31.08.1993 Armando Cáceres Valderrama
Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez	Larraín
David Fischman Kalincausky
Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
Resolution N°004-98-CLC 30.09.1998 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez	Larraín
Luis Morales Bayro
César	Guzmán	Barrón	Sobrevilla
Ítalo	Muñoz	Bazán
Armando Cáceres Valderrama
Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
Resolution N°0078-1999-TDC 05.03.1999 Alfredo	Bullard	González
Hugo	Eyzaguirre	del	Sante
Luis	Hernández	Berenguel
Liliana	Ruiz	de	Alonso
Resolution N°051-2006-CLC 10.07.2006 Luis	Felipe	Arizmendi	Echecopar
Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Eloy Espinosa-Saldaña Barrera
Jorge Rojas Rojas
David Ritchie Ballenas
José Llontop Bustamante
Resolution N°454-2007-TDC 30.03.2007 Rosa	María	Graciela	Ortiz	Origgi
Juan	Ángel	Candela	Gómez	de	la	Torre
Juan	Luis	Avendaño	Valdez
Luis	José	Diez	Canseco	Núñez
Appendix
Free Competition222
Abuse of the Position: Legal Processes Abuse
Resolution Date Commissions / Members / Technical Secretary
Resolution N°057-96-INDECOPI/
CLC
08.04.1995 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez-Larraín
Cesar	Guzmán	Barrón	Sobrevilla
Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
Armando Cáceres Valderrama
Ítalo	Muñoz	Bazán
Resolution N°037-2005-
INDECOPI/CLC
04.07.2005 Luis	Felipe	Arizmendi	Echecopar
Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Eloy Espinosa-Saldaña Barrera
Jorge Rojas Rojas
David Ritchie Ballenas
José Llontop Bustamante
Resolution N°0407-2007-/DC-
INDECOPI
22.03.2007 Rosa	María	Graciela	Ortiz	Origgi
Juan	Ángel	Candela	Gómez	de	La	Torre
Juan	Luis	Avendaño	Valdez	
Luis	José	Diez	Canseco	Núñez
Resolution N°026-2010-
INDECOPI/CLC
03.05.2010 Paul Phumpiu Chang
Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Joselyn Olaechea Flores
Raúl	Pérez-Reyes	Espejo
Resolution N°1351-2011/SC1-
INDECOPI
27.07.2011 Héctor Tapia Cano
Juan	Ángel	Candela	Gómez	de	la	Torre
Alfredo	Ferrero	Diez	Canseco
Virginia Rosasco Dulanto
Appendix
Free Competition 223
Abuse of the Position: Exploitation Conduct Effects
Resolution Date Commissions / Members / Technical Secretary
Resolution N°003-93-INDECOPI/
CLC
31.08.1993 Armando Cáceres
Alejandro Alfageme
Rodríguez	Larrain
David Fischman
Rufino Cebrecos
Resolution N°004-98-INDECOPI/
CLC
30.09.1998 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez	Larraín
Luis Morales Bayro
César	Guzmán	Barrón	Sobrevilla
Ítalo	Muñoz	Bazán
Armando Cáceres Valderrama
En discordia: Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
Resolution N°1003-96-INDECOPI/
TRI
19.06.1996 Jorge	Fernández-Baca	Llamosas
Rómulo Alegre Valderrama
Fernando Ballón-Landa Córdova
Amanda	Velásquez	de	Rojas
Rodolfo	Castellanos	Salazar
Resolution N°054-2003-
INDECOPI/CLC
10.12.2003 Martín	Reaño	Azpilcueta
Luis	Felipe	Arizmendi	Echecopar
Francisco Avendaño Arana
Ana Cecilia Mac Lean Martins
Resolution N°052-2007-
INDECOPI/CLC
14.09.2007 Luis	Felipe	Arizmendi	Echecopar
Eloy Espinosa-Saldaña Barrera
Joselyn Olaechea Flores
Paul Phumpiu Chang
Resolution N°0027-2008/SC1-
INDECOPI
16.10.2008 Juan	Angel	Candela	Gómez	de	la	Torre
Miguel Antonio Quirós García
Raúl Francisco Andrade Ciudada
Alfredo	Ferrero	Diez-Canseco
Resolution N°005-2010/ST-CLC-
INDECOPI
15.04.2010 Miguel Ángel Luque (ST)
Resolution N°0708-2011/SC1-
INDECOPI
16.03.2011 Héctor Tapia Cano
Juan	Ángel	Candela	Gómez	de	la	Torre
Alfredo	Ferrero	Diez	Canseco
María Soledad Ferreyros Castañeda
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Horizontal Cartel Behaviors: Price Fixing
Resolution Date Commissions / Members / Technical Secretary
Resolution N°047-95-INDECOPI/
CLC
23.11.1995 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez	Larraín
Luis Morales Bayro
César	Guzmán	Barrón	Sobrevilla
Ítalo	Muñoz	Bazán
Resolution N°001-97-INDECOPI/
CLC
15.01.1997 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez	Larraín
Luis Morales Bayro
César	Guzmán	Barrón	Sobrevilla
Ítalo	Muñoz	Bazán
Armando Cáceres Valderrama
Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
Resolution N°276-97/TDC-
INDECOPI
19.11.1997 Alfredo	Bullard	González
Hugo	Eyzaguirre	del	Sante
Jorge Vega Castro
José Antonio Payet Puccio
Resolution N°003-97-INDECOPI/
CLC
11.02.1997 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez-Larraín
Ítalo	Muñoz	Bazán
Luis Morales Bayro
César	Guzmán-Barrón	Sobrevilla
Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
Resolution N°206-97/TDC-
INDECOPI
13.08.1997 Alfredo	Bullard	González
Hugo	Eyzaguirre	del	Sante
Jorge Vega Castro
José Antonio Payet Puccio
Resolution N°025-2002-
INDECOPI/CLC
11.12.2002 César	Guzmán-Barrón	Sobrevilla
Carlos	Adrianzén	Cabrera
Alfredo	Ferrero	Diez	Canseco
Mario Gallo Gallo
José Luis Sardón de Taboada
Edgar Zamalloa Gallegos
Resolution N°0224-2003/TDC-
INDECOPI
16.06.2003 Juan Francisco Rojas Leo
Julio Durand Carrión
Santiago Francisco Roca Tavella
Luis	Bruno	Seminario	De	Marzi
Lorenzo	Antonio	Zolezzi	Ibárcena
Resolution N°069-2010-
INDECOPI/CLC
06.10.2010 Paul Phumpiu Chang
Joselyn Olaechea Flores
Raúl	Pérez-Reyes	Espejo
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Horizontal Cartel Behaviors: Market sharing
Resolution Date Commissions / Members / Technical Secretary
Resolution N°004-97-INDECOPI/
CLC
21.02.1997 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez	Larraín
Luis Morales Bayro
Armando Cáceres Valderrama
Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
César	Guzmán	Barrón	Sobrevilla
Resolution N°255-97/TDC-
INDECOPI
22.10.1997 Alfredo	Bullard	González
Hugo	Eyzaguirre	del	Sante
Jorge Vega Castro
Luis	Hernández	Berenguel
Gabriel	Ortiz	de	Zevallos
Resolution N°020-97-INDECOPI/
CLC
25.08.1997 Alejandro	Alfageme	Rodríguez	Larraín
Luis Morales Bayro
Armando Cáceres Valderrama
Rufino Cebrecos Revilla
César	Guzmán	Barrón	Sobrevilla
Resolution N°0082-1998/TDC-
INDECOPI
25.03.1998 Hugo	Eyzaguirre	del	Sante
Liliana	Ruiz	de	Alonso
Luis	Hernández	Berenguel
Gabriel	Ortiz	de	Zevallos
Resolution N°051-2010-
INDECOPI/CLC
13.08.2010 Paul Phumpiu Chang
Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Raúl	Pérez-Reyes	Espejo
Resolution N°056-2011-
INDECOPI/CLC
11.10.2011 Paul Phumpiu Chang
Joselyn Olaechea Flores
Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Raúl	Pérez-Reyes	Espejo
Horizontal Cartel Behaviors: Specifications
Resolution Date Commissions / Members / Technical Secretary
Resolution N°085-2009-
INDECOPI/CLC
22.12.2009 Paul Phumpiu Chang
Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Joselyn Olaechea Flores
Raúl	Pérez-Reyes	Espejo
Resolution N°3240-2010/SC1-
INDECOPI
16.12.2010 Juan	Luis	Avendaño	Valdez
Héctor Tapia Cano
Raúl Francisco Andrade Ciudad
Juan	Ángel	Candela	Gómez	de	la	Torre
Alfredo	Ferrero	Diez	Canseco
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Vertical Cartel Behaviors (exclusive rights)
Resolution Date Commissions / Members / Technical Secretary
Resolution N°005-2003-
INDECOPI/CLC
14.05.2003 César	Guzmán-Barrón	Sobrevilla
Alfredo	Ferrero	Diez-Canseco
Mario Gallo Gallo
Luis	Felipe	Arizmendi	Echecopar
Edgar Zamalloa Gallegos
Resolution N°0355-2000/TDC-
INDECOPI
23.08.2000 •	Hugo Eyzaguirre del Sante
•	Liliana Ruiz de Alonso
•	Gabriel Ortiz de Zevallos
•	Mario Pasco Cosmópolis
Resolution N°005-2008-
INDECOPI/CLC
22.02.2008 Paul Phumpiu Chang
Luis	Felipe	Arizmendi	Echecopar
Fernando Cáceres Freyre
Joselyn Olaechea Flores
Resolution N°068-2009/SC1-
INDECOPI
24.02.2009 Juan	Ángel	Candela	Gómez	de	la	Torre
Miguel Antonio Quirós García
Raúl Francisco Andrade Ciudad
Alfredo	Ferrero	Diez	Canseco
Resolution N°059-2011-
INDECOPI/CLC
15.11.2011 Paul Phumpiu Chang
Joselyn Olaechea Flores
Elmer	Cuba	Bustinza
Raúl	Pérez-Reyes	Espejo
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